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

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P.R.—The Great Debate

by GARRET FITZGERALD

THE great debate in the Dáil has ended, and at the time of writing the Senate is discussing the Third Amendment to the Constitution Bill, 1958. Quite apart from the earlier and unusual First Reading Debate, the Dáil discussed the Bill on seventeen of the eighteen days on which it sat between 26 November and 28 January (there was a three-week Christmas break), and during these sessions a total of over 600,000 words was spoken by Deputies on the subject of electoral systems. Of 142 sitting deputies (the total excluding the four Sinn Féin Deputies and the Ceann Comhairle), no less than 71, or exactly half contributed to the Debate—one-third of those in favour of the Bill, and just 70% of those who opposed it.

Any review of the arguments for and against the changes proposed in our present electoral system must necessarily draw heavily on the record of this Dáil debate.[1] In the course of this article I hope to refer, however briefly, to every argument used by the principal speakers on both sides in the Dáil, without necessarily confining myself to the case as presented by them, wherever for one reason or another a significant point, whether positive or in rebuttal of a contrary argument, may have been overlooked by these speakers.

On both sides there was one major line of argument, which can be traced through a number of stages. On both sides minor arguments were adduced, dealing with by-products of both the present and proposed system, as they might affect T.D.s. On both sides a number of side-issues were introduced, not all of them very relevant to the main discussion. In addition those in favour of the proposed change pressed the argument that the Dáil should not reject the Bill as this would deprive the people of the right to decide the matter, while those opposing the Bill criticized the timing of its introduction. Finally, the Opposition particularly questioned the reasons for and the desirability of eliminating the alternative vote in the proposed single-seat constituencies.

It is under these general headings that the arguments will here be recapitulated and reviewed.

---

[1] Unfortunately it has not been possible in the time available to quote from the excellent Senate Debate.

THE PROPOSAL

Our present system of election at General Elections involves multi-seat constituencies, with the alternative or transferable vote. At by-elections the constituency is treated as a single-seat constituency, but the transferable vote is retained, and if more than two candidates stand at a by-election, then, as at a General Election, those who obtain the least votes are in turn eliminated, and their votes are re-distributed in accordance with their next preference as expressed on the ballot paper, until only two candidates remain. The candidate who at that stage has the most votes is then declared elected.

The system now proposed involves the creation of 100-150 single-seat constituencies to replace the present 40 multi-seat constituencies which return 147 deputies to the Dáil. In each of these single-seat constituencies the candidate who obtains the largest number of votes in the first instance will be declared elected. Voters will not be asked to state their preferences, as there will be no procedure for passing on preferences ; they will merely be asked to place an X opposite the name of the candidate whom they favour.

This proposed system is the same as that in use in Great Britain, and in most other English-speaking countries, but is not widely used on the continent of Europe where different forms of proportional representation, or party-list systems of voting, in some cases involving two ballots at successive week-ends, are commonly employed.

THE MAIN ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THE BILL

In favour of the Government's proposal it is argued that the P.R. system has not worked out well in Ireland, and that it has been responsible for the emergence of a multiplicity of parties, leading in turn to Coalition Government, which, it is said, has proved ineffective. It is said that the proposed system will tend to force the present opposition parties to unite, thus eventually leading to a two-party system, which would ensure effective government. Finally, it is stated that the proposed system has shown itself in other countries to have been most successful in building up democratic institutions, while P.R. has tended to undermine them.

Mr de Valera argued :

> P.R. has not, in my opinion, in recent times worked out well. As has been pointed out more than once, and as the Leader of the Opposition pointed out when this matter of the Constitution was being discussed, it worked very well for a time, because there were issues so large in the public eye that they dominated all other issues, and, therefore, the people voted on one side or the other because these issues were there. That

continued up to 1938, . . . but even during the War, it needed two elections to get the stability which was required. Some of this stability was acquired rather in spite of the system. . . .

The whole effect of the present system of P.R. has been to cause multiplicity of parties . . . each little group trying to get some support, knowing full well that they have not the slightest chance, independently, of being the Government . . . They can go out and promise . . . anything they choose. They can get some votes for it—the extreme right on one side and extreme left on the other—and then, although they have been preaching quite contradictory policies, when the elections are over and the people can no longer be spoken to, they can come in and unite. Under the system of straight voting they will have to unite beforehand, not after. They will have to unite in front of the people.

(Dáil Debates 171.8.994-997)

To this Mr Costello replied :

The Taoiseach says I agreed it leads to a multiplicity. I did agree—subject to one amendment . . . that if the Irish electorate in this democratic State wished to have a number of Parties they were entitled to have them . . . When the Irish people wanted to get an inter-Party Government they were sufficiently intelligent to know how to achieve that. They did that in 1954 and when they wanted to give an overall majority again, they did so in 1957. They can do what they like within this system. (171.8.1017)

Mr Norton's rebuttal took a somewhat different form.

The allegation is made that P.R. makes for a multiplicity of Parties. There is no foundation whatever for that under the method of P.R. which we operate in this country. What number of Parties have grown up here as compared with 1922 under P.R. . . . In 1923, 36 years ago, we had four Parties in the House. If you rate a Party as a body with, say, at least ten members, then there has been no increase in the number of Parties in 1959 as compared with 1923. (172.2.269)

Because of the multiplicity of parties into which the Opposition is divided, argued the Fianna Fáil speakers, the present system of election offers a Coalition Government as the only practicable alternative to Fianna Fáil. In their view the two Coalition Governments of the last eleven years were ineffective. Mr Aiken referred to

the complete collapse of collective responsibility. Under the Coalitions, the various Departments became independent principalities and the Taoiseach leading the Coalition had no power to get rid of the ' Baron of Baltinglass ' no matter how much he disagreed with what he was implementing in his Department. (172.6.739)

These arguments were of course rejected by Opposition speakers, but there is no room in an article of this kind to rehearse the pros and cons of Coalition Government as such, which have been widely debated during the past decade.

From the argument that Coalition Governments are ineffective, Fianna Fáil speakers turned to the proposed new system of election, claiming that

> the single member constituency does . . . tend to promote the development of a two-Party system. It does not have to have that result, but it tends in that direction—one Party, perhaps a more conservative Party, to the right of the main line of public opinion, the other Party more adventurous in policy, towards the left of the main line, with an uncommitted centre which moves from one side to the other, from one election to another, which can determine the fate of Governments and towards which the political programmes of the Parties and the policies of Government are directed . . . The main advantage of the system of single-member constituencies and straight voting is that it ensures that Governments will march in accordance with the central stream of public opinion. That is why it is in the countries that have that system that democracy has been far more firmly rooted than in countries which have adopted other systems . . . (Mr Lemass 171.8.1044–5)

How do these speakers expect this two-party system to emerge in this country under the proposed electoral system? Mr Lemass appears to visualize each opposition party retaining its identity, and going to the electorate independently of the others.

> In the situation proposed here . . . a party must seek election on its own programme and must face the subsequent election when it leaves office, prepared to defend its performances during its period of office without excuses. One of the effects of this situation is to compel acceptance of responsibility by Parties. (171.8.1054)

But other Government speakers are less sanguine, and seem prepared for a less radical change, limiting themselves to the belief that the new system will compel the opposition groups to

> form a *combined group* (my italics) before an election
> (Mr Aiken 171.8.997)

> One of the things that the abolition of P.R. will do is that the straight vote will compel the small Parties to act straight by the people. If before the election Fine Gael and Labour or Fianna Fáil and Labour, or any other combination combine, they will have to arrange that the two who are going to combine after the election will not fight each other in the constituencies for the benefit of the other Party (Mr Aiken 171.9.1164)

> The system of straight voting will compel that bargaining to be done in front of the people. There must be a candidate chosen who will be acceptable to all the groups and, therefore, the people, when they are voting, will know better what the candidates stand for, for whom they are voting. (Mr de Valera 171.8.998)

To this argument the Opposition leaders replied that this in fact was happening already.

> Whatever may be said about the formation of the first inter-Party Government—and very little, if anything, can be said—there can be no doubt whatever that, in the 1954 election, the people were told that we, as Fine Gael, were going to combine with any Party that would combine with us to form a Government, and even the Taoiseach recognised, immediately the result was declared, that what the electorate at that time had declared for and wanted was an inter-Party Government and that they had (been) given a sufficient majority to enable it to be carried out. (Mr Costello 171.8.1004)

Moreover, declared Mr Costello

> so far as bargains are concerned in connection with the two inter-Party Governments with which I was associated, I assert most positively that there was no such thing . . . any bargains that could come from the fevered imagination of the Taoiseach are nothing compared with the bargains and pressure groups and possible corruption that will come from this new proposal. (171.8.1019)

Mr Norton rejected the Fianna Fáil thesis, on somewhat different grounds.

> The Labour Party policy and outlook are entirely different in many respects from the policy and outlook of the other Parties they are invited and recommended to join by the Minister for External Affairs. Therefore the Labour Party proposes to keep its identity and independence . . . Having served the people in this House for almost 40 years . . . the Labour Party feels it is still entitled to have representation here. But this Bill is designed to keep the Labour Party out of this House. It is designed to keep out other Parties. (172.6.759-760)

The main line of argument by Fianna Fáil was rounded off by Mr de Valera :

> Those countries which have most successfully built up democratic institutions are the countries in which there is a single non-transferable vote. The single non-transferable vote has an integrating tendency ; the proportional representation system has a disintegrating tendency. (171.8.993)

His argument was reinforced by Mr Lemass :

> In countries where P.R. was practised and only in those countries did parliamentary institutions ever fall into disrepute, when the sight of warring political factions and the behaviour of politicians paved the way for the replacement of democratic by totalitarian regimes . . . In countries of the world where the single-member constituencies with the non-transferable vote have been practised, the prestige of parliamentary institutions was never undermined, and the desire to sweep them away in disgust never manifested itself in public. (171.8.1043)

To this argument Opposition speakers replied that circumstances elsewhere were entirely different to circumstances in Ireland. Mr T. F. O'Higgins developed this point :

> We have no large concentrated centres of population. There are very few areas in the country that historically stand for any political side of the House . . . Accordingly, under the British system, a win by a political party in this country is likely to be a clean sweep everywhere . . . that does not happen in England because British history, British geographical features and distribution of population ensure otherwise. Ever since the days of the Wars of the Roses in England there have been clearly defined areas where the Whig and Liberal — now the Labour—outlooks are enshrined. The same remarks can apply to well-defined Tory—now Conservative—areas in Britain. The result is that in British general elections, although a strong tide may be flowing in favour of the Labour or Conservative Parties, the defeated Party has a minimum representation of some 150 members of Parliament. It is because of that peculiarly British circumstance that this system grew up in Britain. (172.2.251-2)

Mr Norton pointed out moreover that

> in half-a-dozen of the smaller European countries—Sweden, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, Norway—there is the single transferable vote and the multiple constituency. In every single one of these, the respective Governments have been able to give the people a better standard of living . . . than that which obtains here (172.3.340)

The position in Switzerland and Sweden was challenged by Mr McEntee, however, who quoted from several sources with a view to showing that both the Swiss and the Swedes were dissatisfied with their present electoral systems.

THE MAIN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE BILL

The main argument against the Bill took the following form. P.R. is fair, and democratic, because it ensures the representation of all political views, including those of minorities, in the Dáil. The new system would

destroy the Opposition, or, alternatively, would involve more bargaining than at present, in the form of electoral pacts which might well deprive the people of their present opportunity to choose a one-party Government from the ranks of the Opposition should they wish to do so. Governments elected under the proposed system would in many cases be minority Governments, and even where they were not, they would appear to be in a minority, thus weakening their moral position. By keeping new groups, such as Sinn Féin, out of the Dáil, unconstitutional opposition to the Government would be encouraged. Finally, whatever defects there might be in the present system could best be remedied by a study of the problem by an impartial commission, rather than by a hastily devised Government Bill such as that before the House.

The view that P.R. is fair was challenged by the Minister for Defence, Mr Kevin Boland, on the grounds that under the P.R. system the alternative vote unfairly favoured the supporters of the smaller groups, who are permitted to pass on their votes to other candidates, while those voting for the largest group have no opportunity to do so, as their candidate remains in the running right up to the end. If his second preferences were counted, argued Mr Boland, then a quite different Opposition candidate might emerge victorious. (171.10.1294)

Mr Lemass, on the other hand, claimed that voters do not understand the P.R. system.

> There are not half the Deputies in this House, much less half the electorate of the country, who can give an intelligent explanation of what happens a No. 3 preference on a ballot paper. Is it not far better to give the people of the country a system of election they can understand? (171.8.1046)

Finally, in Mr McEntee's view, the P.R. system, far from being fair or democratic,

> gives undue weight to the wishes or the whims even of the cranky voter, of the fellow whose very nature it is to be at variance with everyone else . . . The system . . . assumes that it is of no great moment whether the people are represented in Parliament by those men and women whom they think most closely represent their point of view, that is, by their first choice, or by men or women, by Deputies, whose title to sit in Parliament is based on an amalgam of inferior choices. (172.9.1167)

Mr Costello did not share Mr Lemass's scepticism as to the Irish people's grasp of the present system.

> I think we are entitled to say—and the people are entitled to get credit for it—that the electorate are sufficiently educated politically and intelligent enough to be able to work this system in the way they want to work it and wish to have it worked. (171.8.1004)

Mr Costello went on to suggest that if the Bill were passed, we should be

> throwing away one of those valuable traditions which have been of inestimable value to us . . . giving a fair share of representation to minorities. (171.8.1015-1016)

Mr de Valera refused to accept this view.

> It is easy to talk about the advantages of the representation of minorities, but a great deal of that is illusory. It is all right on paper, but when it comes to the practical working out of politics, we all know that that does not work at all . . . It is far better, I would suggest, and it has shown itself here, that groups like that (viz. the Protestant minority) should be represented in the individual Parties rather than to put themselves apart as a separate and distinct element in the community. (171.8.998-9)

Mr Aiken attacked the 'minorities' argument from a different angle

> If the argument is that we should provide an opportunity for every minority wishing to organise itself to come in here, we should not keep to three or four or five member constituencies. Why stop there ! Why not make one seat of the whole 147 ? (172.4.535)

But the chief objection to the new system, in the Opposition's view, was that it would destroy their strength in the Dáil, thus weakening parliamentary institutions. Mr Costello stressed this :

> The net result may be—though I do not say it will be—the end of political democracy as we know it in this country because the results of the operation of this particular electoral system advocated by the Government will almost certainly, in existing conditions, have the effect of doing away with all except a very small section of parliamentary opposition. Parliamentary democracy cannot work without an Opposition . . . that is effective, that can make its will known and make its voice heard throughout the country, and that can stop corruption, injustice and inefficiency. Unless you have an Opposition that is capable of doing that job—and it is not capable of doing its job, unless it can form an alternative Government—then we will have nothing but arrogant Government tending to dictatorship. (171.8.1017-8)

> Everybody who has experience of organising a Party, of trying to keep a Party going, knows how difficult it is to get people to give the necessary money to carry on, and the great strain on the personal . . . self-sacrifice of every member of the Party combining to keep the democratic machine going. Unless there is some possibility or opportunity for such a Party to get into Government . . . the democratic machine cannot work. (171.8.1020-1)

The alternative offered by Government speakers—a series of electoral pacts under which Opposition Parties would stand down in each others' favour in different constituencies, thus ensuring that the anti-Fianna Fáil vote would not be split—did not attract much enthusiasm from the Opposition benches. General Mulcahy referred to

> the kind of thing that will be brought into being by some representatives of a Fine Gael caucus, a Labour caucus, a Sinn Féin caucus and a Clann na Poblachta caucus going into a back-room somewhere in the country and saying : ' We will let you put up your man in such and such a square or section of this country or city, if you will let us put up our man here'. . . . There will be on the one hand the kind of Party Fianna Fáil think they are and, on the other hand, this kind of thing—I would not call it a synthetic Party and I do not know how you could describe it—brought together behind the backs of the people and certainly with none of the display of ' what are you doing ? ' that the Minister for External Affairs feels his political opponents should have. Is that what the Taoiseach is planning for an Irish Parliament and are those the foundations on which an Irish Parliament is built ? (172.3.296-7)

The next objection raised by the Opposition to the proposed electoral system is that it will lead to minority Governments—Governments in office against the wishes of the bulk of the electorate.

> Under the X voting system, the British system which the Government wants us to adopt, it is very much on the cards that a candidate will be elected on a minority of votes in the constituency . . . If on the other hand you retain the single transferable vote and apply it to the single-seat constituency, as least this could be claimed : whatever candidate was elected would be elected only after the largest possible area or field of consent had been drawn on by him to get his mandate for coming into the House. He would be here as the representative of the majority vote in that constituency. (Mr M. J. O'Higgins 172.6.784)

Mr de Valera had anticipated this argument by saying that

> even P.R. may not express the views of the majority. If you go over these things you will find defects in any particular system. The majority in Parliament will not always correspond to the views of a majority of the community. (172.3.337)

But Mr O'Higgins nevertheless hammered home his point :

> The Taoiseach and his Government are asking the people to adopt a system which may very well give us for many years to come, minority Government and a Government which can be demonstrated to be a minority Government. We are asked to do that in face of those views expressed by the Taoiseach (*Irish Press* 20.1.1948), as to the importance of the Government having a majority of the people behind it, not simply a majority in Parliament. (172.6.791)

The Opposition speakers saw a further danger in the proposed system—the danger that it might on the one hand discourage organizations like Sinn Féin from following the well-trodden road to constitutionality, or on the other hand that it might make it easier for them to sweep into power on a wave of mass hysteria.

Mr Costello put the latter alternative.

> It is not beyond the bounds of thought, not to say imagination, that those people who are using guns against the North at the present time may, under the system proposed, get—which they could not do under the existing system—a swing on public opinion, and under the system of the non-transferable vote which gives rise to violent swings and changes, those parties could quite conceivably, in a condition of acute pathological hysteria in the future of this country, sweep the Government out of office and take control of the State. We can remember the mass hysteria that existed in Limerick on the occasion of a funeral there. All sections of the people were contaminated by it. Public opinion in the country was in a most dangerous condition. (171.8.1023-4)

Mr Costello also saw a danger of a Popular Front emerging as a result of the change to the proposed system.

> If certain sections of the community—say the Labour Party, or Sinn Féin, or some other Party of a radical kind that may break from Fianna Fáil when the Taoiseach has disappeared from the political scene—cannot get political representation in this House because under the single transferable vote the great Parties will prevent them—they can combine together and in one constituency say ' You go for that ' and in another constituency say ' You go for that '. By that Popular Front they will break down any system on this direct vote of which the Taoiseach is so very fond, and that, as I say, may be productive of revolutionary results, injurious results which we cannot now see. (172.3.325-6)

In conclusion Mr Costello emphasized that

> I do not regard the principle of P.R. with the single transferable vote as something in the nature of a political dogma . . . There are many defects in the present system . . . but you do not deal with defects, if you can deal with them otherwise effectively, by such radical means as are being taken in this case of substituting for a system that has been tried a system which is completely untried and of which we can only forecast the results, results which may well be disastrous, if and when such a system comes into operation. . . . We are taking a leap in the dark. (171.8.1005-6)

Mr McEntee refused to concede that it was a leap in the dark.

> The Government are not asking the people to leap in the dark in this matter. Many examples of the ghastly experiences of other countries under P.R. have illuminated the public mind and have now brought home to our people—I believe to the majority of our people—how closely the welfare and security of our Republic is bound up with the abolition of P.R. (171.15.2150)

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND T.D.S

In addition to these two major lines of argument, many other considerations, of varying degrees of relevance were introduced into the Debate. A number of these, put forward by both sides, concerned the impact of alternative electoral systems upon T.D.s.

Thus Mr Lemass suggested that under the proposed system the T.D.s would 'be regarded as the representatives of the whole constituency, and will maintain contact with every voter in the constituency, seeking to support their interests', whereas at present they regard themselves rather ' as representatives of the particular group of Party supporters in the constituencies who voted for them.' (171.8.1051).

To this argument Mr Aiken added another, that the proposed system had

> operated in Great Britain and the United States to make certain that the point of view and the susceptibilities of minorities are taken into consideration by the major Parties ; in Britain . . . where there is a strong minority group, both the Labour and Tory people tend to put up people drawn from that minority. (171.9.1153-4)

Both Mr de Valera and Mr MacEntee suggested that under a single-seat system a better type of candidate might come forward—although Mr Sweetman expressed a contrary view. Mr MacEntee felt that the change would eliminate the

> passengers who have to be carried in every election in these multiple constituencies . . . every Deputy will have to earn his election on the service which he renders to the people. (172.5.689)

Mr de Valera added that

> he will be able to attend to his business with less expenditure of time and energy than if he had a larger area to move over. (171.16.2338)

Two other possible features of the new system referred to by Government speakers, were the prospect of eliminating friction between Deputies in the same constituency (Mr Lemass 171.8.1051, Mr de Valera 171.16.2338) which, in Mr de Valera's view ' are very disedifying and tend to bring

democratic representation into disrepute', and the likelihood that 'the retention of membership in this House by a leader of a Party would be no more secure than in the case of any back bencher.' (Mr Lemass—171.8.1042).

The Opposition, on the other hand, detected two major defects in the new system, so far as the actual choice of T.D.s is concerned. In the first place this system would deprive the electorate of the choice of candidates which they at present enjoy : those who support each Party will under this system have no choice but to vote for the candidate nominated by the Party, or else forsake their party allegiance, whereas at present they are usually offered a choice of candidates. Mr Costello described this as 'the apotheosis of Party domination'. (172.3.324).

Worse still, Mr Blowick foresaw the possibility that

> those candidates who are wealthy enough, if they feel like it, can bribe candidates to stand in order to block or injure candidates more popular than themselves, (171.8.1031)

or alternatively that

> a third person in a constituency who would jeopardise the person who is almost certain to get his majority (can), if he is crooked enough (and) knows his value . . . demand his price. (172.9.1178)

IRRELEVANT ARGUMENTS

Next, we come to the irrelevant arguments, some simply abusive, and others merely off the main theme. Thus Fianna Fáil speakers attacked P.R. on the grounds that it was imposed on us by the British, and accused Fine Gael of opposing the Bill purely for Party purposes, or because of their lack of self-confidence. They asked what Fine Gael would propose instead of the scheme in the Bill, bearing in mind Mr Costello's remarks about the defects in the present system, and they attacked Fine Gael for trying to prevent the people being given an opportunity to decide the issue. Finally, they argued that the system could be changed again, if necessary. This last argument was strongly rebutted by Fine Gael speakers.

On the Opposition side it was alleged that the Bill was simply designed to perpetuate the Fianna Fáil Government, that it would lend itself to gerrymandering, that it would hinder the ending of Partition, and that it would give the towns too much influence in the election of T.D.s.

TIMING OF THE CHANGE

Opposition speakers also attacked the proposed electoral change on the grounds that there was no demand for it, and that it was ill-timed.

> There is no demand for this Bill. It is the brainchild of a man who is now leaving the political scene. There was no demand for it in the last General Election ; there is no demand for it now.
>
> (Mr Norton 172.6.760)

> There was no indication whatever during the last General Election, or since, until a few months ago, that it was the intention of the Government to introduce these revolutionary proposals. (Mr Costello 171.8.1003)

Mr de Valera had already explained his position on this question of timing.

> All I can say to the Leader of the Opposition is that, if he thinks that . . . there has been no public opinion, no voice asking for this, . . . he must have had cotton wool in his ears from 1948 to 1951 and from 1954 to 1957, because everywhere I went through the country, everyone I met wanted to know when we were going to get rid of that system which was going to ruin the country. . . . Some of the people who were loudest in demanding the change were members of the Opposition—Fine Gael particularly. (171.8.996)

The timing, which Opposition Deputies had criticized as inopportune, ' was suggested by the fact that next year we have to carry out a revision of constituencies.' Mr Aiken carried the argument a stage further :

> Not only is this the first time (the Irish people) ever got the opportunity to decide on (the electoral system) but . . . very probably, if they do not reject it, it will be the last time they will have an opportunity of doing so. . . . There has never been a system of P.R. changed to the direct system without a revolution or going near to a revolution as they did in France recently. That is why I think it is the last time. I do not believe that in certain circumstances which we all know, if we accept it now for another ten years . . . there would be a Party here in a position to change it after ten years. (171.9.1156-7)

To the objection that time should be allowed for the education of public opinion, Mr de Valera replied that the Debates in the Dail and Senate

> surely (provide) a complete opportunity for educating and informing public opinion and for putting before the people the various arguments to be considered by them when making up their minds. (171.8.992)

THE ALTERNATIVE VOTE

There remains one other major issue which was debated at some length on the Committee Stage of the Bill—the abolition of the alternative vote. It was argued by the Opposition that no case had been made for this second modification of the present electoral system, and that the first stage—the reduction of the constituencies to single-member seats—would achieve all the objectives set down by the Government, without involving any of the undesirable consequences which, it was suggested, would flow from the elimination of the alternative vote.

> I have been going back in my mind over his (Mr. de Valera's) speeches in the House, and, frankly, I cannot remember one single argument he put up in favour of this sub-section (viz. that dealing with the abolition of the alternative vote). The case has not been made for this.
> (Mr Costello 172.5.710)

Mr de Valera had in fact refused to say anything when the sub-section was introduced, referring Deputies to his earlier speeches, in which references to the alternative vote had been virtually confined, however, to the bare statement that

> the system of straight voting compels . . . bargaining to be done in front of the people. There must be a candidate chosen who will be acceptable to all the groups and, therefore, the people will know better what the candidates stand for, for whom they are voting.
> (171.8.998)

In concluding the Debate on the Bill, however, Mr de Valera repeated the argument which had been introduced by the Minister for Defence, Mr Kevin Boland, at an earlier stage, and which has already been referred to earlier in this article. He contended that the alternative vote might work out unfairly as between two Opposition candidates. In a three-cornered fight under the alternative vote system the candidate with the least number of first preference votes is eliminated and his preferences are distributed between the first and second candidates—possibly bringing the second up above the first, and thus giving him the seat. Mr de Valera and Mr Boland argued, however, that the elimination of the candidate with the least number of first preferences might be unfair—because if the second preferences of the *leading* candidate had been considered, they might have pushed the last candidate into second place! (172.9.1287-8)

Clearly the Opposition speakers did not consider this complicated reasoning to be a sufficient argument against the retention of the alternative vote which, in their view, has the great merit of ensuring that a candidate opposed by the majority of the people will not be elected.

Thus, it was argued, in a constituency contested by four candidates, one of them (e.g., a Sinn Féin candidate) might slip in with only 30% of the votes, despite the fact that 70% of the people in the area were violently opposed to his policies. It seems probable, indeed, that over the country as a whole a party obtaining say 39% of the votes would obtain a majority in an election under this system—even though 61% of the people in the country rejected everything it stood for. With the alternative vote on the other hand, while a party obtaining only 35% of the first preferences *could* obtain a majority of the seats in the House, it could do so only if it had the support, in the form of second preferences of a substantial number of people voting initially for other groups, who showed in this way their preference for this party as against the largest party. And no Party could come to power without outside support unless it obtained virtually 50% of the votes.

Mr M. J. O'Higgins pressed this point :

> There is no question about it. Under the single transferable vote, the candidate who is elected ultimately represents and reflects the majority opinion in the constituency.
>
> There is no good reason why the people of the country should be forced into the position that they must vote for the abolition of both of these separate and distinct items at the same time. It may be that many people would like to see the single seat constituency who, at the same time, would prefer to retain the transferable vote. What opportunity, on the Government plan, will those people get of indicating what they want. We hear a lot of prating about the will of the people and of this question being left to the people to decide. Are the Government showing any regard or any respect for the will of the people in the particular type of question that is to be put to them in this referendum. Are not the people going to be forced into the position that if they vote 'Yes' in this referendum, they are voting not alone for the abolition of P.R. but also for the abolition of the single transferable vote.
>
> (172.6.784-6)

This plea was not answered by any Government spokesman during the debate on this sub-section.

THE OPERATION OF DIFFERENT ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

Without entering into any matters of controversy it can, I think, be fairly said that this Debate, despite the range of subjects covered, largely failed to face up to the practical question of what will be the probable outcome of the proposed electoral system, as against the present one, and the compromise alternative—the single-seat constituency in which the alternative vote is retained. Some speakers evidently

assumed that under the proposed system every seat would be contested, and there appeared to be agreement that the result of this would be a greatly reduced opposition. Others, including Mr de Valera himself and Mr Aiken, appeared to assume a widespread network of electoral pacts, which would presumably maintain, to an unspecified degree, the strength of the Opposition.

In view of the fact that the principal stated aim of the proposed electoral change is the substitution of anti-Fianna Fáil Coalitions by single-party anti-Fianna Fáil Governments, this easy acceptance of electoral pacts as a natural outcome of the proposed system appears surprising at first sight. It is less surprising, however, when one realizes that the total number of candidates put forward by the three ' Coalition Parties '—Fine Gael, Labour and Clann na Talmhan—at the last Election was only 120—for 147 seats. Even adding in the sitting Independents who are associated with the Coalition Group, one arrives at a figure which is 15% short of the present number of seats. In only *three* out of 40 constituencies did the number of candidates from this group exceed the number of seats.

On this basis the problem facing the Opposition Parties is not so much the problem of avoiding overlapping, and reaching agreement on local electoral pacts, as the problem of finding enough candidates between them to contest all the seats—unless, as seems possible, the number of seats is somewhat reduced from the present figure of 147.

In these circumstances, how are future elections likely to turn out? While the answer to this question must largely depend upon the swing of opinion at any given time, it is possible to indicate what effects the change in the electoral system might have upon the way in which the pattern of voting reflects itself in the number of seats in the Dáil gained by each Party.

With the present system the relationship between votes and seats is fairly close—although even under proportional representation, as we know it in this country, the two largest parties are almost invariably favoured with a ' bonus ', in the form of a proportion of seats in the Dáil somewhat in excess of their share of the popular vote.

In the case of Fine Gael the margin of advantage is usually small. Thus in the last General Election two years ago it gained 27.2% of the seats in the Dáil with 26.65% of the votes, and even in 1954, when those who gave their first preferences to candidates of the smaller parties were exceptionally assiduous in passing on their second and later preferences to Fine Gael rather than Fianna Fáil, the share of the seats in the Dáil received by Fine Gael, 34.1%, was not very much greater than its share of the votes, viz., 32.0%.

On the other hand the margin of advantage received by Fianna Fáil under the present system of proportional representation is subject to fairly wide fluctuations. In 1954 when, as has just been mentioned, the supporters of the other Parties were united against Fianna Fáil, that Party obtained 44.2% of the seats with 43.3% of the votes—a negligible bonus. But in the last election, when the Coalition vote was much less cohesive, the Fianna Fáil Party obtained 53.1% of the seats in the House with only 48.3% of the vote.

With the two largest Parties obtaining these varying bonuses of seats over and above their proportion of the popular vote, the smaller groups inevitably suffer. Thus in 1954, they obtained 24.7% of the first preferences, but only 21.7% of the seats ; while in 1957, 25.05% of the first preferences gave them only 19.7% of the seats in the Dáil.

In other words, the existing system of proportional representation in this country does not ensure that each group's voting strength will be accurately reflected in its Dáil membership. This could be achieved only if the whole country were treated as a single constituency, thus requiring the electorate to place possibly 300 candidates in the order of their choice. The sub-division of the country into 40 constituencies, which is necessary in order to reduce the individual voter's choice to manageable proportions, interferes with the operation of the proportional principle. Only the larger groups can command a sufficiently high proportion of the votes in any area to ensure the capture of one or more of the three, four or five seats available in these constituencies.

In order to obtain a clear majority with this present system, Fianna Fáil must secure something between 45% and 49% of the total poll—the exact proportion depending upon the extent to which the remaining Parties can induce their supporters to 'vote the Coalition ticket'. Under the new system, proposed by the present Government, this ' break-even point ' will be significantly reduced ; so far as can be calculated at this stage it may fall to something in the region of 38%. This will, of course, make it easier for Fianna Fáil to retain power in the face of the decline in support which it clearly anticipates following the departure of Mr de Valera from active politics.

But this reduction in the vote required to give a Party an overall majority of the seats in the Dáil applies to Fine Gael as much as to Fianna Fáil. Whereas at present Fine Gael would have to win something like 45% of the popular vote in order to secure such an overall majority, under this new system its target, as well as Fianna Fáil's, is lowered to something around 38%. In the last election Fine Gael won 26.65% of the first preference votes, while in 1954 it won 32.0%. So if it could

recover the ground lost between 1954 and 1957, and as much again, it would be brought to the verge of electoral success: not as a member of a Coalition Government, but as a single-party Government.

Unfortunately for Fine Gael, however, that is only half the story. The other facet of this new electoral system is its quite exceptional instability—in the sense that it is highly sensitive to changes in popular support for the different parties, so that a 1% change in a Party's poll will normally lose or gain it something like 5% of its Dáil seats. Consequently while it seems probable that 38% of the votes might win Fine Gael an overall majority, a poll of 32%—the highest achieved by the Party since 1938—might leave it with no more than 20% of the seats in the House.

If at the next General Election, therefore, the Fine Gael Party failed to recover the ground it lost between 1954 and 1957 and more besides, it would, under this proposed system, be so weakened in the Dáil that it might be unable to provide an effective Opposition, or to offer the electorate five years later an alternative government whose members would command public confidence on the basis of their parliamentary performance in opposition. In these circumstances the prospect of an overall majority with 38% of the votes might prove to be something of a mirage so far as Fine Gael was concerned, and the Party might find itself in opposition almost indefinitely.

This is what makes the proposed system such a gamble. Its outstanding feature is undoubtedly the extraordinarily high rate of turnover of seats to votes, which will tend to produce very large majorities, on one side or the other, and consequently very small opposition parties. This instability is an inherent feature of the system as it would operate in this country, where there are few potential 'safe seats'. In Great Britain, where the system originated and where it has operated successfully for centuries, this inherent instability is effectively balanced by the very large number of 'safe seats' held by both parties in different parts of the country, many of them seats which have for centuries maintained their allegiance either to the Puritan/Non-Conformist/Whig/Liberal/Labour tradition, or to the Anglican/Tory/Conservative tradition. The power of these different traditions may be seen in the current strength of Labour in such predominantly rural areas as East Anglia and the South-West of England, and in the surprising strength of the Conservative Party in all but the blackest parts of industrial Lancashire.

With these safe seats behind them the Parties, which at different periods have represented these two essential British traditions, have succeeded in maintaining their parliamentary strength even when in opposition, and despite the high rate of changeover of seats which is such a feature of the single-seat non-transferable vote system.

Moreover, the same thing has happened in several of the English-speaking countries to which this system has been exported—e.g., the United States, Canada, and South Africa, in each of which the political allegiances of the population are deeply-rooted in regional divisions, which ensure that whatever swing may occur in public opinion, the group against which the swing is operating cannot be wiped out.

By contrast, many of the smaller Continental countries, which also derived much of their parliamentary tradition from Britain, have, like ourselves, no clearly marked regional basis for their politics. Some of them have consequently been forced to adopt either proportional representation or some other more complex technique in order to modify the inherent instability of the British system operating under these conditions.

One way in which this instability could be mitigated here, would be the retention of the alternative vote. This would tend to strengthen Fine Gael initially at any rate, by eliminating the danger of a 'split' in the opposition vote, where several Coalition candidates stand in the same constituency, and by securing for Fine Gael the secondary support of the voters who initially favour one or other of the smaller groups, but who in default of their chosen candidate, would prefer a Fine Gael representative to a Fianna Fáil one. Such a system would introduce at the lower end of the scale something like the stability which the safe seats offer to both sides in Britain—although to a lesser extent. It would thus help Fine Gael to secure in the early stages of the new electoral system a level of Dáil representation more in keeping with the volume of popular support which it commands, pending the growth of its popular support to the point where it would be able to offer an effective alternative government.

The extent to which the alternative vote could help initially to maintain the strength of the opposition would depend, of course, upon the number of opposition candidates standing in the various constituencies. If in many areas only one candidate stood against the Fianna Fáil nominee then the transferable vote would play no *direct* part—but its existence would nevertheless provide an incentive to opposition candidates to come forward. In particular it would encourage Fine Gael to contest every seat whereas without the transferable vote Fine Gael would have a strong incentive not to contest constituencies chosen by members of other Coalition parties—and particularly by sitting T.D.s of these parties—so as to ensure that the Coalition vote in these areas would not be split. Such electoral pacts, whether achieved by agreement or by common consent, would clearly tend to encourage the emergence of Coalition Governments, even from the proposed single-seat non-transferable vote system, whereas with the alternative vote

Fine Gael would be much more likely to achieve an overall majority, thus enabling them to form a single-party government.

Finally the retention of the transferable vote would eliminate the dangers referred to by Mr Blowick : the dangers deriving from the menace of vote-splitting under the proposed non-transferable vote.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that this issue of the revision of the electoral system is one of great complexity. Both the present system and that now proposed can be defended on many different grounds, and, more important, perhaps, both can be attacked as seriously defective in one way or another. The electorate is in fact being asked to choose between a P.R. system which Opposition leaders admit to be defective in several ways, and a new system whose operation is uncertain, and whose inherent instability in Irish conditions might in the future create serious difficulties for our parliamentary syste .

The dilemma facing the electorate is all the more acute because leaders of both sides have stated that whatever decision may be taken by the people next June will not readily be reversible, as those groups which may benefit from the electoral system that emerges from the referendum will be slow to give up the advantages thus derived.

Footnote

This review of the arguments on both sides has deliberately been confined to the issue of the electoral system itself. Two other controversial issues have been raised in connection with the referendum—the proposal to set up a Constituency Commission to replace the present method by which the Dáil itself determines the constituencies, and the form of the referendum itself, which, it is argued, is unsatisfactory in that it poses three questions—the single-seat constituency, the non-transferable vote, and the Constituency Commission, but allows only a single answer—Yes to all three or No to all three. A further controversy surrounds the decision to link the Presidential Election with the referendum.

These are all important issues, which have been debated at length in the Dáil and Senate and in the public press, but their inclusion within the scope of this article would, it is felt, have served to confuse rather than to clarify the central issue, the electoral system—to which it has seemed appropriate to devote the maximum amount of space in view of its exceptional complexity and importance.

Artificial Satellites and the Exploration of Space

by D. J. K. O'CONNELL

THE International Geophysical Year (1957-58), which ended on 31 December 1958, was really the third undertaking of the kind. During the International Polar Years of 1882-83 and 1932-33 scientists from many countries combined to attack various problems in the Polar regions. Such valuable results were obtained that experts in various branches of science had long been hoping to organize another cooperative scheme, with the greatly improved techniques now available and on a much vaster scale. The IGY Committee decided that simultaneous observations of many kinds should be made all over the globe, and in particular on the Antarctic continent. This has been far and away the most grandiose international enterprise in the history of science. An enormous amount of scientific data has been accumulated and it will take many years to evaluate it all. Meanwhile great public interest has been aroused by such dramatic events as the crossing of the great Antarctic continent. Even greater has been the astonishment and admiration caused by the successful launching of artificial satellites by both Russia and the United States.

Extraterrestrial voyages had provided themes for imaginative writers from Lucian to Jules Verne, H. G. Wells and C. S. Lewis, but the subject began to be studied seriously thirty or forty years ago, when a few enthusiasts began experimenting with rockets as a means of propulsion. In various countries, Germany, England, U.S.A., interplanetary societies or space travel societies were founded to encourage research into the various problems involved. Most people, if they even knew of their existence, looked on these enthusiasts as harmless visionaries. The proposal to launch artificial satellites during the International Geophysical Year, even though endorsed by leading scientists, met with considerable scepticism. All the greater then has been the impact of the Russian Sputniks and Lunik and the American Vanguard, Atlas and Explorers.

It may be of interest to list the satellites that have been successfully launched up to the date of writing (10 February 1959). In the table are given the date of launching, the name by which the satellite is commonly known and the actual or estimated time during which it remains in orbit. All these satellites move in elliptical orbits around the earth and their minimum distance from the earth's surface (at perigee) is much less than the maximum distance (at apogee). Thus, as the satellite swings down into less tenuous regions of the atmosphere in every

revolution, the resistance of the air causes it to lose energy, and consequently height, so that it spirals ever nearer to the earth. As it moves closer to the earth the period of revolution becomes less. Finally, when the period of revolution has shortened to about 87½ minutes, the satellite has no longer sufficient energy to remain in orbit and it falls towards earth, burning up and disintegrating when it is still high above the earth. The data in the table refer only to the satellites themselves, not to their rocket carriers, which are bigger and heavier than the satellites and have shorter lives. It will be seen from the table that three American satellites (Explorers I and IV and Vanguard I) and one Russian (Sputnik III) are still circling the earth. Explorer II did not reach orbital velocity and is not listed in the table. The Russian Lunik, launched on 2 January 1959, is a satellite of the Sun and not of the earth.

ARTIFICIAL EARTH SATELLITES

Date of Launching	*Name*	*Duration*
1957		
1. 4 Oct.	... Russian Sputnik I	... 3 months (disintegrated early January 1958)
2. 3 Nov.	... Russian Sputnik II (with dog 'Laika')	... 23 weeks (disintegrated 14 April 1958)
1958		
3. 1 Feb.	... U.S. Explorer I	... probably about 5 years
4. 17 March	... U.S. Vanguard I	... several centuries
5. 26 March	... U.S. Explorer III	... about 3 months (disintegrated towards end of June 1958)
6. 15 May	... Russian Sputnik III	... probably more than a year
7. 26 July	... U.S. Explorer IV	... probably about two years
8. 18 Dec.	... U.S. Atlas I (broadcast Eisenhower's Christmas message)	... about one month[1]

People often ask whether the results obtained, or to be anticipated, from these experiments are such as to justify the enormous expenditures involved. While we shall have to wait a long time before all the information has been studied, and a final assessment of its value is possible, we can already get some idea of the scientific results that have been obtained from this exploration of space. In the first place we may state at once that the technological progress made is very remarkable indeed. It has long been known just what energy would be required to launch a rocket of given weight so as to attain the velocity of about 18,000 miles an hour needed to send it into an orbit around the earth, but it was a very difficult task indeed to develop this energy. More than one way has been found to solve this problem. A velocity of about

[1] *Note added in proof.* On 17 February 1959 the U.S. Navy launched their Vanguard II, the sixth successful American satellite. It is expected to remain in orbit at least 100 years.

25,000 miles an hour must be reached in order to escape from the earth's gravitation. The Russians achieved this when they launched their Lunik.

The second very remarkable technical advance has been in the field of electronics. The Americans seem to have been particularly successful in devising telemetering equipment for rockets and artificial satellites, *i.e.*, very light and compact instruments which gather scientific data of various kinds and transmit them to recorders on the earth. They have even succeeded in sending messages to a satellite and having them retransmitted to earth. It has also proved possible to control the motion of a rocket or satellite by radio signals. Most of this equipment is still on the secret list, but it is clear that such recent inventions as transistors, solar batteries (deriving their energy from solar radiation), batteries powered by atomic energy and gyroscopic directional control mechanisms have made these developments possible.

It must be borne in mind that the first artificial satellites were planned as part of the International Geophysical Year programme and it was hoped by their means to learn more about our earth. For instance, an artificial satellite provides a point of reference by means of which the earth's surface can be mapped more precisely. Thus simultaneous observations of a satellite will permit a more accurate linking up of the geodetic surveys of, say, England and the United States than has been possible hitherto. Study of the perturbations of the orbits of the satellites has enabled geodesists to determine the figure of the earth more exactly.

Meteorologists are extremely interested in the observations transmitted from the satellites. For the first time it has been possible to make direct measurements of the density of the upper atmosphere, which is found to be much greater than had been estimated up to now. It is hoped that weather forecasting will be improved by observations of the cloud cover over wide areas, of hurricanes, and of atmospheric circulation generally.

Two belts of very intense radiation (known as Van Allen radiation after its discoverer) have been detected surrounding the earth. This is an entirely unexpected discovery and is a cause of much pre-occupation to the planners of space travel. Much more observation and research are needed in order to learn more about this belt of radiation and to find out what causes it.[1]

[1] *Note added in proof.* In an article just published in *Nature* (vol. 183, p. 430, 14 Feb. 1959) J. A. Van Allen and L. A. Frank give preliminary results derived from the measures of this radiation transmitted by satellites and rockets. The radiation, due to high energy particles trapped in the earth's magnetic field, seems to be symmetrically located about the plane of the earth's magnetic equator. The belts are in the form of doughnuts, leaving the space above the earth's magnetic poles free from radiation. The nearer belt starts at about 600 miles above the earth's surface, and the radiation attains a maximum at a height of about 2,000 miles. The radiation in the outer belt reaches a much higher maximum at a height of about 10,000 miles. The American rocket, Pioneer III, launched on 6 Dec. 1958, reached a height of some 70,000 miles and transmitted measures of the radiation over practically this whole range. It seems that this outer belt of radiation can be traced to about 30,000 miles from the earth's surface.

There is doubtless a great deal more to be learned from the experiments that have already been made, but these journeys into space are only the beginning. The artificial satellites represent man's first unsteady probings outside our earth. We hope to reach very much further into space. What is the aim of such probings? Well, the scientist seeks in the first place to learn more about the universe. For example, how little we really know about our nearest neighbour, the Moon, although astronomers have been scrutinizing it for many centuries. We do not even know what the surface is like, whether it is solid rock or whether most of it is covered with a thick deposit of dust. We want to study the lunar craters and to determine how they were produced, by volcanic action or by bombardment by meteorites or by some cause as yet unknown. There are many things we want to learn about our satellite. A rocket passing round it, not too far from its surface, could send us much information, about the surface itself, about the Moon's magnetic field, its radioactivity, and so on. When appropriate television equipment has been developed, the rocket will be able to televise the far side of the Moon, never yet seen by man, and transmit the pictures back to earth.

In fact, the next step in the exploration of space will be to launch such a lunar rocket. The technical means are already available. What is now wanted is to develop the skill required to carry out this very delicate operation. The American scientists have already made some attempts and it will probably not be long before they achieve success. Here a word should be said about the Russian 'Lunik'. It seems likely, from the very name given to it by the Russians and from the first Russian reports, that it was indeed intended to circle around the Moon, and either to return to earth or to remain moving in an orbit around the Moon. This is an exceedingly difficult operation. If the speed and direction of the rocket are not correct, within very narrow limits, the attempt will fail. The rocket will then either fall back to earth or it will pass beyond the Moon and will move into an orbit around the Sun, in other words it will become an artificial planetoid, or little planet, of our solar system, as has in fact happened to the Lunik. This is in itself a remarkable achievement and a tribute to the skill of the Russian scientists and engineers.

The next step would probably be to send a rocket to one of the nearer planets, Mars or Venus. The energy required to launch such a rocket is not much greater than that needed to send one to the Moon, and it will probably soon be possible to develop this energy. There are, however, still formidable problems to be solved before a rocket could be despatched to Mars or Venus with any hope of success. Navigation in space is by no means an easy matter. Attention is being directed to the development of an automatic pilot, or alternatively a means of controlling the rocket by radio signals from the earth (experi-

ments that have so far been made on these lines cover very much shorter ranges than the distances of Mars or Venus). It will probably take quite some time before these problems are solved. A one-way voyage to Venus would take several months, and that to Mars about a year. Journeys to Jupiter or Saturn would take much longer and would be much more difficult.

So far I have referred only to unmanned rockets. To send a human being into outer space, and bring him back alive, presents extremely difficult problems—technical, physiological, psychological—that have not yet been solved. To begin with, some secure way must be found to bring the rocket, or space-ship, itself back to earth undamaged, a very much more difficult task than the launching of an artificial satellite. When a satellite falls back to earth it becomes intensely hot when rushing through our atmosphere and disintegrates completely long before it nears the earth. Some means must be found to slow it down and to dissipate the heat generated. Then the safety of the crew must be ensured during the rapid initial acceleration and during the deceleration when it is returning to earth. They must be protected from the dangers that may be encountered in outer space—excessive heat or cold, intense and deadly radiation, bombardment by meteorites, and perhaps other dangers of which we have not yet even dreamed. The crew must of course bring with them all that they need for the support of life during their journey, oxygen to breathe, food and drink. It is conceivable that all these problems will be solved in the not too distant future, thus making possible travel outside our earth, to the Moon first and then to Mars or Venus.

The first space voyage would probably be in a vehicle which would circle around the Moon and return to earth, without attempting a landing. Certainly no attempt will be made to land on the Moon until we have learned much more about it. In any case, to send a vehicle to land on the Moon and make the return journey to earth presents problems greater than any that we have yet considered. Very great technical difficulties are involved in making a safe landing on the Moon. There is no air to help in slowing down the space-ship. Probably the braking would be done by reversing the direction of the rocket thrust, which would mean carrying extra fuel from earth. How is the return journey to be made? If the ship has to carry with it the fuel that would be needed to launch it from the Moon's surface with the requisite energy, the total weight as it leaves the earth would have to be greatly increased, even though launching from the Moon would require much less energy than the launching from earth. Of course it may eventually become possible to harness atomic energy for this purpose, but the time has not yet come. Perhaps fuel for the return journey may even be found on the Moon itself. Another possibility would be refuelling out in space. Plans are being considered for estab-

lishing satellites orbiting around the earth, to serve as refuelling stations for space-ships. There is nothing inherently impossible in this proposal.

Many scientists have been concerned about the damage that might be caused by rockets sent to the Moon. The International Council of Scientific Unions has even formed a committee to protect the Moon (The Committee on Contamination by Extra-Terrestrial Exploration). A lunar protection committee may sound like a mild form of lunacy, but it has in fact a very definite and serious scientific aim. If, for example, an atom bomb were exploded on the Moon (as has been suggested), the resultant radioactive contamination would render nugatory any subsequent attempts to determine the original radioactive conditions on the Moon. Or if, by chance, microorganisms were deposited on the Moon from a rocket, their subsequent discovery would mislead later explorers. Hence the American scientists have been careful to sterilize thoroughly their lunar rockets, so as to avoid radioactive or biological contamination of the Moon.

When the time does come that man may venture into outer space with a reasonable hope of returning safely, one may be sure that there will be plenty of volunteers for such dangerous voyages. The spirit of adventure and the thirst for knowledge that drive men to climb Mount Everest, or to explore the Antarctic, or to pass in a submarine under the North Polar ice, would supply sufficient impulse for such travels. Besides we can expect to learn much more from a manned rocket, even if it merely circled a planet without landing on it, than from one containing only instruments. Eventually, no doubt, attempts will be made to land on the Moon and on the nearer planets. Owing to the enormous difficulties to be overcome it would be hazardous to try to predict when such attempts will become feasible.

When men do at length land on the Moon or on Mars or Venus, what can they expect to find? Are there intelligent beings, or even life of any kind, on any of the planets? Well, for one reason or another we can exclude the possibility of life on nearly all the planets of our solar system. The Moon has no air and no water. Mercury is too hot on one side and too cold on the other and has no atmosphere. Jupiter and Saturn are too cold and have atmospheres containing gases poisonous to life. Conditions on Uranus, Neptune, Pluto are worse still. Of Venus we really know very little, for we have never been able to see its surface, on account of the thick clouds which cover it. We do not know what these clouds consist of. It is still quite uncertain how long Venus takes to rotate on its axis. Mars has a very thin atmosphere and some moisture, and it is quite likely that some low form of vegetable life exists there, similar perhaps to our lichens. Mars is the least inhospitable of our planets but even there man would be dependent on air and nourishment brought with him from earth. Our earth is indeed the only planet of the solar system at present suitable for human existence.

Is there then no animal life outside our earth? It would be rash, even presumptuous, to deny the possibility. The fact is that we simply do not know. There may be in the universe millions of stars with attendant planets, some of which may be suitable to support life. However, until now we do not know of even one such planetary system apart from our own. A planet is too small and too faint to be seen at the distance of even the nearest star. Compared to a star, a planet is a very small body and, unlike the stars, it does not shine by its own light, but only by light reflected from the parent star, light so faint that it would be lost in the glare from the star.

In recent years astronomers have found indications that some stars have attendant bodies that are not stars and may even be planets of some kind. It has long been known that the orbit of the double star 61 Cygni is subject to perturbations. From a careful study of these perturbations Dr K. A. Strand in 1943 concluded that they are due to the attraction of a third body in the system, too faint to be seen, and with a mass only one-sixtieth that of the Sun. This dark body, which has a mass much smaller than that of a star, may perhaps be a sort of planet. It is, however, quite different from the planets that we know, for its mass is sixteen times that of our biggest and heaviest planet, Jupiter. There is evidence that a couple of other stars have dark companions of comparable mass. We cannot see these bodies and we shall not be able to find out much about them. Still less shall we be able to discover whether any planets exist that are suitable for the support of life. I repeat that we simply do not know whether another planetary system like ours exists anywhere in the universe.

There are some who dream of voyages even to the stars. No doubt in time it will become technically possible to launch a rocket with sufficient energy to escape from the solar system and to travel on into interstellar space, but the very nearest star is about one million times further off than is Mars at its nearest, and the voyage would take many thousands of years. One would have to travel with a speed approaching that of light in order to reduce the duration of the voyage by a factor of, say, one thousand, so as to bring it within the compass of a human life-time. To attain such a speed it would be necessary to discover some entirely new form of propulsion, as well as a source of power far beyond anything that is yet in sight. This is all in the realm of speculation. In any case one could not land on a star, and it is hard to see how it would be possible to approach close enough to be able to see if the star has attendant planets and yet be able to return to earth again. Of course the whole problem of space travel would be enormously simplified if one had at one's disposal a substance like the 'Cavorite' of H. G. Wells's romance. Cavorite was a substance which cut off the force of gravity, so that a sphere surrounded by it would fly off from the earth, and one had only to open a window, in order to admit

the gravitational force from a star, and the sphere would then move off in that direction. Unfortunately Cavorite is a stuff of pure fiction, with absolutely no basis in fact.

Prescinding from such dreams, and confining ourselves to what now seems possible, we can see, in this dawn of the era of space travel, exciting prospects opening before us. The astronomer above all has reason for great expectations. Astronomy, the oldest of the sciences, has indeed been advancing at an ever increasing rate for several years past, but it still suffers from severe handicaps. Our knowledge of the stars comes from the light and other radiations that we receive from them. These radiations are more or less disturbed in their passage through our atmosphere, so that we see the stars somewhat as a fish at the bottom of the sea sees objects above the surface of the water, that is, greatly disturbed by the turbulence of the water. Besides, much of the radiation is absorbed by the atmosphere and a very large proportion of the radiation that is emitted by the Sun or the stars does not reach us at all. Now for the first time astronomers can realize a long-cherished dream and begin to make observations of the Sun and stars and planets from outside our atmosphere. Observations transmitted from high altitude rockets have already given astronomers new information about the Sun. Plans are now being considered for mounting a telescope in an artificial satellite, together with television equipment, so that the astronomer would be able to study the stars as they are seen from outside our atmosphere. It would of course be more advantageous still if we could use our natural satellite, the Moon, as a site for an observatory, and this may come to pass some day. We cannot even imagine what new things we may learn. We may, however, safely assert that a new door is opening before us that will allow us to penetrate ever more deeply into the mysteries of the universe.

The dawn of this new era was foreseen and welcomed by Pope Pius XII. On 20 September 1956, he addressed the scientists gathered in Rome for the 7th International Astronautical Congress. He spoke of the plans then being made for the launching of artificial satellites during the International Geophysical Year, and of the prospects of interplanetary travel, and then continued :

> The Lord God, who has planted in the heart of man an insatiable longing for knowledge, did not intend to set any limits to man's efforts at conquest when He said ' Subdue the earth' (Genesis 1/28). He has entrusted to him the whole of creation and offers it to the spirit of man, in order that he may penetrate it and may thus come to understand ever more thoroughly the infinite greatness of his Creator. If until now man has felt himself, so to say, imprisoned on this earth and had to content himself with the fragmentary pieces of information that reached him from the outer universe, it seems that now he is offered the chance to breach this barrier and to attain to new truths and to new knowledge of the things that God has spread in such profusion throughout the world.

From Monaghan to the Grand Canal

by PATRICK KAVANAGH

I HAVE been thinking of making my grove on the banks of the Grand Canal near Baggot Street Bridge where in recent days I rediscovered my roots. My hegira was to the Grand Canal bank where again I saw the beauty of water and green grass and the magic of light. It was the same emotion as I had known when I stood on a sharp slope in Monaghan, where I imaginatively stand now, looking across to Slieve Gullion and South Armagh. An attractive landscape of small farms and a culture that hadn't changed in a thousand years. A hundred yards away from me I could observe primitive husbandry where Paddy Nugent was threshing oats with a flail in a barn.

Yes, indeed.

But something disturbs my imagination.

I am thinking of a term which was much in use in the early days of my life in Dublin, just under twenty years ago. He has roots in the soil, they used to say. I was one of those who had an unchallenged right to claim roots in the soil, but I was an exception and the rooted in the soil theory gave birth to a vast amount of bogusry—in Ireland, writers like Michael McLaverty, and in England, H. E. Bates and indeed Thomas Hardy. Could any man be more remote from the simple elemental folk of Wessex than Hardy?

Roots in the soil meant that you knew about people living close to nature, struggling for survival on the small farm, and you had a practical knowledge of animal breeding.

But of course roots in the soil have nothing to do with these things. What are our roots? What is our material?

Real roots lie in our capacity for love and its abandon. The material itself has no special value; it is what our imagination and our love does to it.

Lying at the heart of love we wander through its infinities.

The world that matters is the world that we have created, just as we create our friends. In making friends or a myth the material is sometimes of account. Some people will not stay made as friends; you mould them to your heart's desire, and when you are absent they change their shape.

Writers whose gimmick is roots in the soil produce a very violent article. The Seven Deadly Sins of Pride, Covetousness, Lust, Envy, Anger, Gluttony and Sloth loom large in those novels. But real elementalism is a more tawdry thing, resentful, mean and ungenerous. The majority of men live at a very petty level.

The society and place out of which I came was not unattractive. No man ever loved that landscape and even some of the people more than I. It was a barbaric society not appreciably different from an old-fashioned Dublin slum. Our manners were the same. But there was the landscape and the sense of continuity with a race that had come down the centuries.

I loved that country very much in spite of its many defects, and I had no messianic impulse to leave it. Everything that I did as regards acting or doing something was done against my natural feelings. Perhaps it is that basically we realize that all action is vulgar, that only the contemplative matters.

Watching the potato buds coming up, living the old pattern, what was there of spiritual values that could not be fitted into that context? And yet, having sown a couple of acres of barley in May, I walked off. I felt that I shouldn't have done it, that I was acting by some untruthful principle that had been created. It is indeed that untruthful principle that besets all of us in most of our activities. We can be taught only what we know. When you try to teach someone something they have not experienced they do not hear.

I think that in coming from the society and background that I have come from was disadvantageous to me in some respects. The worst respect was that one accepted as the final word in painting and letters the stuff that was being produced in Dublin. Another disadvantage was that the basic ingredients of the society in which I grew up were football and the smoky, sweaty dancehall. Football is not too bad but as the dancehall is one's only contact with social life, it was tough on a man of sensibility. It was simply impossible to love a galvanized dance-hall and the atmosphere both physical and moral which prevailed there. Literature could not be made out of that material as Carleton made literature out of the many thrilling dances which are to be found in his *Traits* and *Stories*. Earlier I did find some imaginative and comic material in dances given to celebrate a wedding. The ear caught many of those delectable idiocies that people produce when in a state of excitement.

I remember a neighbour giving such a dance explaining that they weren't going to have any intoxicating drink. 'Their fill to eat and drink of currant bread and tay, and what more do they want?' A

phrase like that was sure to gain currency in the ironic country where there were many intelligent and amusing people.

When I came to Dublin in 1938 the dregs of the old Literary Revival were still stirrable. The Palace Bar was crowded with two or three dozen poets and their admirers. I do not wish now to be satirical about these men. I am speaking about them now as part of my literary pilgrimage mainly because I have been provoked into it by some articles in a recent issue of *Studies*. Here the Movement which I thought quite discredited was being talked about. When I came to Dublin, Yeats was dead. Yeats was a poet and he invented many writers. He invented Synge and Lady Gregory and he was largely responsible for F. R. Higgins. As George Moore wrote : ' The Irish Literary Movement began with Yeats and returned to him.'

During my early years in Dublin the virtue of being a peasant was much extolled. This peasant derived naturally from the roots in the soil theory. Knowing nothing better I accepted it and flaunted my peasantry in their somewhat spivvier genealogies.

Poor Higgins tried hard to play the peasant with bad poems about blackthorn sticks. The ballad was the peasant's poetic form. I suffered sore at ballad-mongering sessions before I realized that this form of torture was no different from the self-expression of any bore from the golf bore to the architect and cricket bore. Ballad singing is all right for the singer, but will he ever stop and give the others an innings ?

I was the established peasant poet. Far from the poet being a peasant—if there is such an article outside the Russian novel—he is the last word in sophistication. All his life's activities are towards the final fusion of all crudeness into a pure flame. The keynote of the poetic mind is an extreme subtlety.

All this stuff about roots in the soil, peasants and balladry was no doubt the degenerate family of the preRaphaelites, coupled, by the time I came to know them, with the left-wingery of the International Brigade of the Spanish Civil War. The magazine *Ireland Today* brought this element in and I cannot deny that I subscribed my quota of ' working class ' jargon to the magazine. Somebody recently embarrassed me by reminding me of a poem I had printed in *Ireland Today* about a servant boy. O my goodness ! Well, we live and sometimes learn.

With a small society lacking intensity like this, one needs a coarse formula, if we are to have any body of writing. And that is what we have had for the past fifty years.

I cannot help saying that as far as I can see and as far as I have experienced, there has never been a tradition of poetry in Ireland. One can feel this lack of belief all the time.

And now raising my eyes to the horizon I am again looking across the small fields of South Monaghan and South Armagh, and wondering did any of the Irish writers who claimed to bring realism instead of the old sentimentalities ever express the society that lies within my gaze, with the exception of my own small effort in *Tarry Flynn*?

I am not suggesting that being true to life in a realist way is the highest function of a writer. As I have pointed out already the highest function is the pure flame from the material.

The writers who wrote about Ireland in the new 'truthful' way proved to be no truer than the popular sentimentalizers such as Kickham and Canon Sheehan; they all seemed off-truth. This is not surprising, for most men who attempt to write about a particular society are deluded as to their qualifications for the job. For example, Mr Peader O'Donnell has written novels about Donegal. It seems at once *his* country, but is it? Similarly there is a group who write about Galway and another about Cork and another about Kerry. Yet another school believe that in Dublin with its unique *clichés* and way of life is a ready-built band wagon on which to ride to literary success. Any critic whether from Dublin or Soho can see that this stuff is just noisy emptiness, completely unfunny.

* * * * *

It took me many years to work myself free from that formula for literature which laid all the stress on whether it was Irish or not. For twenty years I wrote according to the dispensation of this Irish school. The appraisers of the school all agreed that I had my roots in the soil, was one of the people and that I was an authentic voice. I wrote, for example, a terrible piece about—

> My soul was an old horse
> Offered for sale in twenty fairs;
> I offered him to the Church, the buyers
> Were little men who feared his unusual airs.

One can at once see the embarrassing impertinence of and weakness of it, the dissolute character whining. But it was the perfect Irish formula and English publishers loved it. Nothing would satisfy them but to put it first in the book. There has always been a big market in England for the synthetic Irish thing. Even Shaw who was a bogus Irishman had to do a bit of clowning.

Another villainous maw opened for things Irish-and-proud-of-it is the American literary market. The stuff that gets published as Irish in America is quite awful. One of the great, roaring successes of American

publishing a couple of years ago was a novel by a Brian Moore about some Irish girl who had a vast number of illegitimate children. In reviewing this book (and books of this kind) none leaned further back in referring to its compassion, its humour and its many other qualities than the Catholic papers. They seem terrified that they will be outdone in the liberal ethic race. A dreary dust of left-wingery, a formula which excludes all creative thought, lies over the vegetation. They feel, I suppose, that literary and thought politics, like all other politics, is the philosophy of the posssible. What's the use in being different if you can't get your words printed? Still.

In Ireland one is up against the fact that very few care for or understand the creative spirit. You can come across by being specifically Irish in manner and spirit, but when you attempt to offer them the real thing it's no go.

When I started to write what I believe is the real thing three years ago, there was not much response, except possibly from Stephen Spender who described it as 'violently beautiful'.

Previously I had been concerned with Ireland and with my ego, both of which come together often enough. Imagine the dreadfulness of

> It would never be summer always autumn
> After a harvest always lost
> When Drake was winning seas for England
> We sailed in puddles of the past
> Pursuing the ghost of Brendan's mast.

M. J. McManus, writing about this, described it as wonderful poetry but bad history. If a thing is untrue it cannot be good poetry. When the editors of *The Oxford Book of Irish Verse* wanted something of mine they worked on me for this poem, and in the end, owing to my need for money, I let them in. But how appallingly this poem accepts the myth of Ireland as a spiritual entity.

Then one day as I was lying on the bank of the Grand Canal near Baggot Street Bridge having just been very ill in the hot summer of nineteen-fifty-five, I commenced my poetic hegira. Without self-pity to look at things.

> To look on is enough
> In the business of love.

To let experience enter the soul. Not to be self-righteous. To have a point of view which is a man poised with a torch. Whoever wants to

light a taper may ; the torch-bearer does not mind. The light was a surprise over roofs and around gables, and the canal water was green stilly.

> Commemorate me where there is water,
> Canal water preferably, so stilly
> Greeny at the heart of summer. Brother
> Commemorate me thus beautifully
> Where by a lock niagarously roars
> The falls for those who sit in the tremendous silence
> Of mid-July. No one will speak in prose
> Who finds his way to these Parnassian islands.
> A swan goes by, head low with many apologies,
> The bending light peeps through the eyes of bridges
> And here ! a barge comes bringing from Athy
> And other far-flung towns mythologies.
> O memorial me with no hero-courageous
> Tomb but just a canal-bank seat for the passer-by

This sonnet was inspired by two seats on the bank of the Canal here 'Erected to the memory of Mrs Dermot O'Brien.'

> The main thing is to be free
> From self-necessity.

On the road of my hegira I began to reflect with astonishment how poor as technicians the Irish school of poets and novelists have been. Real technique is a spiritual quality, a condition of mind, or an ability to invoke a particular condition of mind. Lack of technique gives us shallowness : Colum's

> O men from the fields
> Softly come through
> Mary will fold him
> In a mantle of blue.

A charming sentiment undoubtedly, but all on the surface. Technique is a method of being sincere. Technique is a method of getting at life. The slippery surface of the *cliché*-phrase and -emotion causes a light skidding blow.

I discovered that the important thing above all was to avoid taking oneself sickly seriously. One of the good ways of getting out of this respectability is the judicious use of slang and of outrageous rhyming. Auden in a radio lecture a year or so ago mentioned this and made a special reference to Byron's *Don Juan*. The new and outrageous rhymes are not to be confused with the slickeries of Ogden Nash. I draw attention to my rhyming of bridges with courageous.

Another bad thing about the Irish school was its dreadful sadness and lack of comedy. People who are unsure of themselves cannot afford to break out into uproarious laughter or use a piece of slang. You may find a small number of readers who cotton on to the technique but large numbers of people will look with contempt at you and say what a pity it is that he lacks schooling. This can be depressing.

To write lively verse or prose, to be involved with Comedy requires enormous physical and mental power. Energy, as Blake remarked, is eternal delight. The more energy is in a poem or prose work the more comic it is. Melville's *Moby Dick* is a tremendous comedy, borne along to its end on the wings of its author's outgiving faith in his characters. Melville loved everything on that ship. And what a great poet in prose he was ! We laugh inwardly in our souls with Melville.

Laughter is the most poetic thing in life, that is the right kind of loving laughter. When, after a lifetime of struggle, we produce the quintessence of ourselves, it will be something gay and young.

But to be undull is dangerous. Dullness as a cultural asset is most valuable. One remembers that old school friend meeting Johnson after many years and his saying rather sadly that he might have been a great success but ' cheerfulness kept breaking in.'

I have my own trouble with humour. A work that is inspired by the comic spirit has much to contend with, for a work that is inspired by the comic spirit has a sense of values, of courage and rectitude—and these qualities are hated immemorially.

Why they should be hated is not difficult to understand. A man in offering the small unique thing that is the most the greatest possess, eliminates completely the gassy fiction by which the majority live.

The notion of being one of the people is part of the general myth of roots in the soil. Analysing the thing now I see or feel that I always had some sort of kink in me. It is this kink which makes a poet, I believe. As Colette observed, it is not what a poet writes that makes him one, but this other thing. ' Rectitude ' Cocteau calls it.

To have absolute rectitude in any field is to be an eccentric. You are not in step. Perhaps it is a form of pride and selfishness born of the realization that telling lies is a bore. In high company or low pub this rectitude is a constant quality with a poet. Being fated to live with this terrible tyrant of truth has often driven the possessed to violence, rage and, as in the case of Dylan Thomas, drink.

I am not sure if this kink of rectitude is on the whole beneficial to the man possessed by it ; it makes a poet of him, but is it really necessary ? It is this kink which makes people say, ' why are you so damned difficult ? We are anxious to help you.' And so on.

A trouble with the poet is that he is not a professional writer in the usual sense. Most of his hours are spent living. He can gulp out all he has to say in a short time. After a lifetime of experience as Rilke pointed out we find just a few lines. It is because of the minute quantity of that poetic essence that is in the best men that I do not regret having developed late and very slowly. If you read about English poetry you will find that the poets spent most of their time in taverns—Ben Johnson at the Mermaid, Dryden in Will's Coffee House. It takes a lot of living to produce a little experience. We remember Tennyson's remark, quoted by Carlyle, 'I am the greatest poet since Shakespeare ; unfortunately I have nothing to say.'

The poet is a poet outside his writing as I have often argued. He creates an oral tradition. He does something to people. I am not sure that that something is always good, for it is a disruptive, anarchic mentality which he awakens—and if we pursue him far enough we will be inclined to agree with Plato that the poet is a menace.

There is however not much danger of his menacing Dublin or, I imagine, Ireland generally.

Voltaire said that doing a thing was the only reward worth while and Cézanne put that idea into practice when, having painted a picture, he left it behind him in a cottage or perhaps flung it into the bushes.

For a period of about a week a year ago, I wrote some poems to the new light and since then I have been sustained by them. If most of them have not yet been published, I do not mind. I am sending them out sparingly, as I want to 'kitchen' them.

But maybe now I am talking too near my ego.

It was a long journey for me from my Monaghan with my mind filled with the importance-of-writing-and-thinking-and-feeling-like-an-Irishman to the banks of the Grand Canal in nineteen fifty five, the year of my hegira.

The Mystery of Pablo Picasso

HARLEQUIN AND THE MINOTAUR

by CYRIL BARRETT

PICASSO was once followed to his studio by two German students who pressed him for his aesthetic theory. He made no reply but drew from his pocket a revolver and fired into the air ; the students fled. After all a man has a right to defend his own mystery, and the Picasso mystery is one of the most famous we have.

Theologians know that while by definition a mystery is insoluble, it is always helpful to determine where precisely the mystery lies. The Picasso mystery is somewhat relative. To the general public he is an almost complete mystery, if we exclude the paintings of his early years and the occasional excursions he has made into the conventional forms of art from time to time. The mystery at this level might be put thus : why does a man with undeniable talent and an obvious appreciation of beauty, particularly human and feminine beauty, abuse his talents by producing ugly monsters ? At a slightly more critical level the mystery might be stated : why does a serious artist frivolously try his hand at every technique which comes into vogue and dissipate his energies over so wide a field of artistic media ? At any level we may ask why at any given time a change in style or technique took place, and what sort of man can pass from extremes of brutality to an almost cloying sentimentality, while remaining in ordinary life affectionate and peace-loving. In 1932, on the occasion of an exhibition at Zurich, Jung described him as schizophrenic, to Picasso's great indignation. But Jung had met only his pictures.

One of the obvious difficulties in studying an artist like Picasso is that the apparatus is necessarily cumbersome. No serious study of any artist, least of all of Picasso, can be done without having at hand a complete set of reproductions of his works. But Picasso produces pictures at the rate of one a day (oils are dated by the day of the month, sketches sometimes by the hour of the day), and he has been painting since 1889-90. Even Christian Zervos's catalogue does not reproduce them all.[1] It is only when one studies his work as it appeared year by year and even month by month during the formative years up to the First World War, and after that the different techniques as he took them up again and again, each time changing and developing them, sometimes

[1] *Picasso.* By Christian Zervos. Editions Cahiers d'Art, Paris. Vol I (1932)—Vol VIII (1957).

at intervals of years ; only in this way can light be thrown on the mystery of his seemingly arbitrary and capricious adoption of styles. There is an attention to artistic problems, an aesthetic preoccupation and curiosity, a serious purpose in all these changes which becomes apparent when one can trace a new technique through all the stages of its development or a motive through its various stylistic manifestations.[1] Thus, in my opinion, the ' Outline Guide to Pablo Picasso', published by *The Sunday Times* (28 September 1958), and ably prepared with the help of Professor Douglas Cooper, can only mystify the layman, while the film, *The Picasso Mystery*, directed by Clouzot, which showed Picasso in the process of creation, is a true guide and source of enlightenment (though some lovers of crime fiction must have been badly taken in). However, a study of his works alone is not sufficient, especially since the heroic years of experimentation which ended in the twenties when he began to branch out in many directions at the same time ; we must turn to his life.

Here we are up against even greater difficulties. Picasso is the sort of man who calls forth inflated imagery : ' bestriding the century like a colossus', etc. While we might deplore the language, the fact is, alas, only too true ; Picasso has known almost everyone of consequence in the artistic world of this century ; he has lived at the centre not only of every major artistic revolution but of the two great political upheavals ; he was not in Russia for the Revolution but he came under its influence in his own country in the thirties and in France since the War ; and his private life has not been dull. The influence which have played upon him both in his native Spain and in France have been numerous, diverse and complicated. It is not surprising that no one has undertaken the immense task of collecting and marshalling the relevant material. Monographs covering certain limited periods of his life or certain aspects of his work have appeared. *Cahier d'Art,* edited by his friend Zervos, has followed him year by year since the twenties. And there have been memoirs by his friends, notably Jaime Sebartés, Gertrude Stein, Jean Cocteau, Fernande Olivier, Wilhelm Uhde, Max Jacob, Maurice Raynal. They have not been merely anecdotal. Most of them give valuable insights into Picasso's method of work and its significance. Among these memoirs we must class a book by an English friend, Ronald Penrose, which appeared last autumn.[2] Penrose has known Picasso since 1936 (though he was in Paris from 1922 and knew Braque and the Surrealists) ; he has been his host in England, has organized his exhibitions there and is at present organizing an exhibition

[1] ' Whenever I have had something to say I have said it in the manner in which I felt it ought to be said. Different motives invariably require different methods of expression.' (Barr : *Picasso : Fifty Years of His Art* p. 170).

[2] *Picasso : His Life and Work.* By Ronald Penrose. 392 pp. London : Gollanz. 1958. 25s.

to be held in the Tate Gallery next year. Though the frontispiece is signed ' pour Ronald Penrose son ami Picasso', the only reference to him in the text does not suggest close intimacy, ' coming by car from Cannes with an Englishman', but this was written at the beginning of their acquaintance and modesty may explain the absence of anything more cordial.

The title of the book is ' Life and Work ' but it must nevertheless be classified as a memoir, even though it covers every phase and aspect of Picasso's work and runs to nearly 400 pages of small type. The fact is, it does not conform to the type ' life and works'. The life is there and the works, but there is no fusion of the two. It is a narrative filled out with personal reminiscences and illuminating comments on individual works, but the works are not seen in relation to the life. The author has read all the relevant information and used it (mostly the other memoirs) to fill out his story, but he has not chosen it with an eye to clarifying the works, as a glance at, for example, Gertrude Stein would show. Even his choice of photographs is not helpful. One picture of Cadaqués (a town on the Costa Brava), or Horta de San Juan, Tarragona, would have been worth all the snapshots of Picasso and his friends ; it would make it immediately clear why cubism should have developed in Spain. But the friends matter more than the works. The works are for the friends who understand and appreciate them ; they are the bond of union between them. More perhaps in this than in any other of the memoirs one feels that Picasso is a possession of the author and that the reader is an intruder or at least an outsider. In this it seems to reflect something characteristic of Picasso. When Penrose says, for example, that Picasso joined the Communist Party ' from a profound desire within himself to enter into a pact of friendship with those around him ' he is at his best and most illuminating.

A friend, unless he is also a scholar, cannot take the detached view necessary to write the sort of critical biography that is needed. The personality of the artist comes between him and the work. Again and again Penrose lets us down when we most need his help. He mentions all sorts of details which might lead to a better understanding of Picasso's aims and of the influences at work on him, but he never follows these up.

Picasso was born at Malaga, the son of a painter, but most of his early formative years were spent in Barcelona. At that time Barcelona was in close touch with the intellectual life of Paris, of which it was a reflection. The same dissatisfaction with academic painting, the same revolutionary ideas, the same bohemian existence was to be found there as in the French capital. It had its Els Quatro Gats (The Four Cats) to correspond with the French cabaret, Le Chat Noire. We know from Picasso's sketches entitled *The Embrace* that free-love was among the questions freely discussed (Penrose does not mention this). Ruskin and

the English PreRaphaelites had a strong influence not only on that weird architectural genius Gaudi, and the others of the Art Nouveau, but also, through his father, on Picasso. Here Penrose makes an interesting observation He gives as the reason for the projected destination of Picasso's first journey outside Spain, which was not Paris but England, the opinion he had formed of English women from reading the life of Lady Hester Stanhope. 'Finding a woman of a type so different from any he had ever met, a woman who had conquered her own liberty as well as the hearts of men, he decided he must investigate the country which fostered women of this admirable breed.'[1]

One of the remarkable things about Picasso's art is that, in spite of his years in Paris, it remains Spanish. Not only that ; it remains circumscribed in its formative ideas within the compass of those early days when he spent as much, or more, time in Spain than in France. It was at this time that Picasso's long association with poets began and it is also the time when his symbolism makes its first appearance. Anything therefore concerning the intellectual life of Barcelona which has a bearing on Picasso's artistic development is valuable. From Penrose it all gets cursory treatment.

The book has one particularly illuminating suggestion to which we shall come in a moment. But there are some lacunae which simply cannot be passed over, and I shall deal with them as briefly as possible.

In 1901 Picasso suddenly began to paint the outcasts of society in a dominant tone of mysterious, cold green-blue (which gave the name Blue Period to this phase of his work). His aim, says Prof. Broeck, was 'to give heroic stature to a class that previous art had portrayed only realistically.'[2] From what source within him or without (beyond his experience of poverty) this conception came we are not told. Was it a coincidence that Rouault was painting with a like compassion, though with greater feeling? About 1906 with the *Portrait of Gertrude Stein* (towards the end of the so-called Pink or Rose Period)[3] Picasso's figures, which hitherto had been flat in the manner of Lautrec, became solid and heavy and negroid in appearance like primitive carvings or masks, culminating in the sensational *Les Demoiselles d'Avignon* (1907). This picture was so revolutionary (it was too much even for his friends : 'one day,' said Derain, 'we shall find Pablo has hanged himself behind his great canvas.') and the possible influences so numerous and well known that they could not be passed by in silence, but the author dismisses them in general terms in a page : 'theories and speculations of science, such as the fourth dimension and the exploration of the

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 62.

[2] *Pablo Picasso.* By Broeck and Sebartés. London, 1955 p. 123.

[3] The Pink Period is so called because of its comparative gaiety after the preceeding gloom and because pink was used in some pictures (mostly of circus folk) though not as a dominant and symbolic tone as in the Blue Period.

subconscious, were topical talk among intellectuals,' etc.[1] The evolution of analytical and synthetic cubism does not concern Picasso alone and might pardonably be left to the art historian. But Picasso's sudden return to the most conventional and naturalistic form of drawing in the portraits of Vollard and Max Jacob (1915) calls for some sort of explanation. To say merely that Picasso 'shared with all great artists a desire to keep in touch with reality' will not do. What does reality mean when talking about Picasso? It is with hesitation that I quote the suggested source of the 'monstrous nudes' which appear about 1920.

> That the series should have begun at the time of his wife's pregnancy seems not without importance. The fertile promise of her distended form and his recognition of his own intimate part in the creative process must have awakened his wonder. Another association linked with his childhood can also be brought into account. Picasso once told me how, when he was very young, he used to crawl under the dinner table to look in awe at the monstrously swollen legs that appeared from under the skirts of one of his aunts. This childish fascination by elephantine proportions impresses him still. (p. 220)

It is interesting to know that a still life called *The Guitar* (1926), a collage made of, among other things, a dishcloth and nails, and intended as a 'malicious joke' at the expense of the public, was originally to have had razor blades embedded in the frame so that anyone who touched it would cut himself. But this does not explain why in 1927 he began to adopt certain elements of the surrealist technique and produced those aptly called 'monstrous distortions', displacements of features and members, which we have come to associate with the name Picasso. And if in these major crises of the development of his art we get little help, it is hardly to be expected that we should be better served in the innumerable changes which have taken place since the twenties.

Great though the need for a critical biography may be, the time is not yet ripe for it. Much more work has to be done on the various periods. In the meantime we have a useful reference book to go on with, and for that we can be grateful to Mr Penrose.

At what level should a life of Picasso be written in order to be really illuminating? The author has given us a wealth of information about Picasso's domestic and social life, his friends, his children, his mistresses, the houses in which he lived, the arrangement of his studio, his travels, etc. This has not been mere chatty gossip. It throws light on the personality of the man. But is it at this level that his life has an important influence on his work? Surely not. Surely it is on a higher plane, on the level of thought and imagination and emotion. The important

[1] The author quite rightly draws attention to the tendancy towards greater solidity even in the Blue Period but this does not explain the revolutionary changes of 1906–7.

things are his beliefs, opinions, prejudices, character. These are known from his sayings, writings, and behaviour. The author has provided us with a number of valuable sayings but his interest in this aspect of his life is not sustained.

But perhaps the fundamental weakness, a weakness in critical history generally, is the absence of an overall assessment of Picasso's work in the light of the art of past ages and in relation to the other forms of thought and expression of his own age, or at least the absence of any intention to make such an assessment possible. Merely to try to fit him into the context of nineteenth century French painting will lead nowhere. In the first place he is not French. Even when most under the influence of French painters, during his first visit to Paris (and just before it), there was a solidity and hardness of outline in his drawing which was quite unFrench. Secondly, he does not 'fit in' anywhere. He has never adopted a 'style'; he has borrowed certain aspects of a technique which suited his purpose. He was never an Impressionist, or a Fauvist, or a Surrealist, though superficially he might resemble them. Thirdly, he has nothing to do with the nineteenth century.[1]

Once one has grasped these three points it will be clear that the most fruitful sources of information will come from outside France, from Spain and other Mediterranean countries, and from earlier ages.

'Complications,' says Gertrude Stein, 'are always easy but an other vision than that of all the worid is very rare.' It certainly is, but that is what Picasso has achieved for himself. Whether he can impose it on others, or whether it is in response to an inner necessity not only of his own but of his age, time alone can tell. Stated in its simplest terms, what Picasso has done is this. He has reversed the manner of regarding the visible universe and its relation to art which has been in existence since the time of the Greeks, and has returned to a more primitive vision (primitive, that is, in time but not necessarily immature).[2] The Greeks taught us to look upon the universe objectively and scientifically and to see objects and events in relation to one another. The representation of an ordered and visually coherent universe, where the spacial relations of objects are seen from a single, unambiguous view-point (and not, for example, partly in profile and partly full-face) became the norm of art. But the preclassical Greeks and Egyptians and Cretans

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[1] Gertrude Stein is very insistent on these points and is worth hearing. 'Painting in the nineteenth century was only done in France and by Frenchmen, apart from that painting did not exist, in the twentieth century it was done in France but by Spaniards.' 'He was contemporary with things and saw these things, he did not see as . . . all the world thought they saw, that is to say as they themselves saw them in the nineteenth century.' *Picasso.* By Gertrude Stein. London, 1948. Pp. 1, 44.

[2] The reader is referred for further elucidation of the ideas briefly stated here to *Before Philosophy* by H. Frankfort and others (Chicago University Press and Penguins 1946) and *Kingship and the Gods* also by H. Frankfort. For the artistic aspect of the question, to *Arrest and Motion* by G. Frankfort.

and Mesopotamians and all those who have not fallen under Hellenistic influence had a different way of regarding the universe. They looked upon it subjectively and eclectically. While they were aware of the world around them and could often record certain elements of it (*e.g.* animals in profile) with great fidelity and perceptivity as in the prehistoric cave paintings, they were not sufficiently interested in its merely visible aspect to represent nature with coherent spacial relations. Since their purpose generally was to represent the supramundane world of gods, demi-gods, mythological beings, spirits and departed souls, the autonomous art world of ambiguous spacial relations which they had evolved served them very well[1]. On the whole they would probably have agreed with Picasso when he said, 'Nature and art are two different things. Through art we express our conception of what nature is not'.

Picasso did not get up one morning and suddenly decide that he'd had enough of the Hellenic view of things and that it was time for a change.[2] Various influences were at work to bring about this change in him. His interest in negro masks and Egyptian and Mesopotamian art certainly played their part. What the other causes were we would very much like to know, and to find them, is, I suggest, the task of the critical biographer. The process was long and slow. It began at the end of the Pink Period. With the *Demoiselles d'Avignon* he had probably reached the point of no return (of the five 'demoiselles' one had the appearance of an Egyptian figure, two were negroid, and two looked like Catalonian primitives; 'somewhat Assyrian' Uhde described it). But he had to pass through the period of breaking down objects to their simplest geometric shapes, known as analytical cubism, and through the period of building up objects out of any old material that came to hand, known as synthetic cubism, until, with the help of surrealism, he was free to paint as he liked, to put an eye where an ear should be and two nostrils on the same side of the face. He has not set out to do this, no more than Thales and Anaximander had set out to discover Aristotelian logic. ('Every time I begin a picture, I feel as though I am throwing myself into a void. I never know if I shall fall on my feet again. It is only later that I begin to evaluate more exactly the result of my work.') He was driven on partly by the sheer love of picture making and partly by something within him that was sensitive to certain opinions which, as Fr Vincent Turner has pointed out, can ultimately be traced to

[1] So infatuated were the Greeks with the beauty of the universe that they had to idealize men and women to suggest gods and godesses, and with the decline of religion in Hellenistic times Greek art degenerated to naturalism. Byzantine and Medieval Art is a compromise between the Greco-Roman classical vision and the primitive vision of the East, of the Celts, of the Barbarians.

[2] Much less did he set out to copy or intentionally imitate primitive art, or bring about a sort of Primitive Revival like the Gothic and Classical Revivals. His technique cannot be attributed to any one ancient model, and he has, of course, carried distortion much further than the primitives ever did.

nineteenth century philosophical idealism.[1] It can be shown that at every stage of development Picasso was pursuing a purely aesthetic purpose. He was attempting to solve the problem of representing a three dimensional object on a flat surface without treating the surface as a mirror or pretending it did not exist. At times the picture surface claims so much attention that the object is barely recognizable, but it is always there, and a little patient searching will bring it out.[2] Picasso never loses touch with Nature however cavalierly he may treat it : he is not, and never has been, an abstract painter. It is this tension and balance between the surface pattern and the representation of three dimensional objects that makes pictures like *The Harlequin* (1915) so exciting and aesthetically satisfying.

But Picasso is living in an age and culture where the Greek view still prevails. That is the dilemma, if not the tragedy of Picasso. If he is to communicate with his fellows he must meet them on common ground. This, I would suggest, rather than a desire to beat the conventional artist at his own game is responsible for his ' lapses ' into the traditional forms of art. The preclassical artist could give plastic expression to the myths in which he and his contemporaries believed, and with which they speculated about the visible universe, but in so far as Picasso's contemporaries believe in anything they do not believe that the sun is the god, Re, who emerges each morning from the womb of the sky-cow, Nut, or things of that kind. He is condemned to work out a new mythology which will have universal validity and can be accepted as an expression of common experience. It is too early to tell whether he has done this, but he has certainly produced a number of symbols which aptly express certain aspects of human experience. The visible universe no longer holds the hidden terrors it held for primitive peoples, but within the lifetime of Picasso a new and unexplored and rather frightening region, the subconscious or unconscious, has been opened up. Here is a field for the mythmaker to work in, where symbols are the mode of expression and the laws governing the natural visible universe do not operate with great rigour.

It is at this point that I can with great pleasure call on certain very pertinent observations of Mr Penrose. He has drawn attention to the fact that in a number of his pictures Picasso has incorporated his own portrait or at least his profile. In *Meditation* (1904), from the Blue Period, he is the young man contemplating with gloomy seriousness the sleeping form of a lightly clad girl ; in the circus scenes of the Pink Period he identifies himself with Harlequin, as in the famous *Family of Saltimbanques*

[1] ' The Desolation of Aesthetics ' in *The Arts, Artists and Thinkers*. Edited by John M. Todd. London : Longmans. 1958. 35s.

[2] Ronald Penrose tells how he was able to recognise Uhde in a crowded café from a portrait of him in the analytical cubist manner which had been painted twenty-five years before. Op. cit. p. 154.

(1905) (which inspired Rilke's ' But tell me, who are they, these acrobats, even a little more fleeting than we ourselves . . . ') ; after the cubist experiments, when his art becomes ' convulsive', the profile reappears in the *Three Dancers* (1925). It is now the outer mask or *persona* of a man who dances with a disintegrated and frenzied female nude. Picasso, it seems, wanted to associate himself with the orgy, not that he wished to take part in it, but because he knew that there was ' a man within ' who, if he got control, might drive him to who knows what excesses. In 1929 this inner force is portrayed with unequivocal horror, this time as a woman with streaming hair, grinning teeth and mouth opened in a maniac yell (*Woman's Head and Self-portrait*). But the most significant self-identification with the potential forces of evil belongs to 1937. Picasso's sympathies were with the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War. He hated Franco and all he stood for. In order to satirize him (and at the same time raise funds for the Reds) he drew two sheets of small etchings called *The Dream and Lie of Franco*. They are bitter and blasphemous. Franco is portrayed as a sort of bulbous, hairy root, dressed in armour and riding a horse whose entrails spill on the ground, or kneeling behind barbed wire before the Blessed Sacrament. When Picasso was signing a copy of this for him, Penrose noticed that ' the capital letter with which he commenced his own signature had fundamentally the same form as the twisted and grotesque head that he had invented for the man he most hated.' (p. 268) You can forgive a man a lot, whatever his views, if he is prepared to admit that he is liable to commit the evil he detests in others. But that is not the point. What is interesting is that he should identify himself with the secret and terrible possibilities for evil that are in us all.

The symbols with which he has given the most satisfactory expression to this aspect of experience are drawn, as we might expect, from the bullring. The chief protagonists are not man and bull, but bull and horse. It is impossible in this short space to follow these two animals through all the stages of their evolution. Like the deer, lion and little man on Mesopotamian seal impressions, their *rôles* are not fixed and can sometimes be even reversed. But in general the bull stands for male aggressiveness and for the hidden forces of violence in man and nature ; the horse or mare (on which in the ring the picador rides) is usually the meek victim of the bull's violence, gored and dying, gentle, feminine and submissive. In a pencil sketch of 1917 (*Horse and Bull*) in which, alone in the arena, a bull gores a mare, ' the agony of the horse, its neck stiffened in a final ejaculation, can be taken to be symbolic of the supreme act of love and death.' With time the bull becomes the Minotaur and the unconscious figure of a female matador tossed by the bull became associated with the horse—' hybrid beasts who have the consciousness of the demi-gods of Egypt.' (Apollinaire)

The Minotaur is not always sinister. He can be friendly and pathetic. In a moving picture, *Blind Minotaur* (1935), the creature, lit by a strange light, stumbles through the night, his head raised to the stars, supporting himself by a staff and resting his hand on the shoulder of a little girl with a dove, while fishermen and a woman look on in wonder. But it is in another picture of the same year that Picasso makes his most profound and powerful mythological statement. This is the *Minotauromachy*. The Minotaur with an angry roar drives before him the terrified wounded horse and the unconscious female matador lying across its back. With one hand it directs the point of the matador's sword towards the horse's neck and with the other tries to extinguish a light with which a little girl illuminates the scene. While the little girl stands fearlessly before the beast, the light in one hand and a bunch of flowers in the other, a bearded man makes his escape by a ladder. The strength of this imagery is that it is valid at various levels of reality. The violent trample on the weak and destroy the sensitive and beautiful ; they shun the light. Childish innocence is fearless but ' conscience ' makes cowards of the aged. We are all a mixture of these elements : passion, reason, sensibility, innocence and that pale cast of thought that leads to inactivity.

Minotauromachy moves in a realm of pure mythology ; its origins in the bullring are remote. But another mythological work painted two years later, the great canvas *Guernica,* draws its inspiration from the bombing of the ancient Basque capital during the Spanish Civil War. The bombing has just taken place : a woman falls screaming from a burning house, another runs half naked and bent low in fear, a third clutching her dead infant howls to the sky. But the action is outside ordinary time and space. An arm appears from a window to light the scene with a lamp ; above it is the oval of the sun with an electric light bulb in its heart. On the ground lies a dismembered warrior, his broken sword in his hand. Above him the horse, transfixed by a lance, is sinking to its knees, its neck arching backwards and its mouth open in a cry of agony and defiance. Finally there is the bull; turning its head towards the horizon, it scans it angrily for the enemy. No technique within the Greek canon, not even that of Bosch or Goya, could give such powerful expression to the horror of modern warfare and the terror in which we have lived (and live).[1]

Picasso has never quite succeeded in this genre again. He has painted pictures which are more horrific like *The Charnel House* (1944-48), inspired by the Nazi atrocities, and *Massacre in Korea* (1951), but they are

[1] Space does not permit a discussion of the various interpretations of this picutre. Picasso has stated that it is not political (' Picasso Explains ' in *New Masses* 13 March 1945 quoted by Penrose p. 272). The horse has the same significance as before ; it also represents the people and is defiant in death. The bull is still brutality and darkness, but it is not the enemy ; in fact it has something of righteous anger aroused and a promise of vengance.

not deeply symbolic. Not having seen *War* (1952) in its setting in the Temple to Peace at Vallauris in the south of France, it is hard to judge what its impact would be, but from reproductions its symbolism seems a little contrived and not sincerely felt (there is an element of propaganda in the suggestion of germ warfare). The same insincerity and lack of deep feeling is to be found in the more joyful mythological scenes of goats and centaurs such as *Pastoral* (1946), where the symbolic figures do not evolve out of Picasso's imagination but are borrowed from ancient mythologies. The mythologies continue with more success in the series of drawings and etchings of which the most important are the *Vollard Suite* (1933) and *Picasso and the Human Comedy* (1954). In these, where men and demi-gods, circus folk and artists meet, Picasso explores the mystery of his art, of sex, and of on-coming age. They are the meditations on life of a frank and perspicacious pagan. In these, as in all his mythologies, there are strong literary influences which have not yet been analysed.

But the majority of Picasso's paintings and drawings are not symbolical. They are mostly studies of the human face or form, or rather reconstructions of features of the human anatomy. The products bear some resemblance (often a striking resemblance, considering the transformation they have undergone) to the original ; a few, by showing various facets of a head simultaneously give an interesting if not profound knowledge of the subject (e.g. *Jaime Sebartés*, 1939) ; and they are alive, alarmingly alive, for Picasso's technique is so masterly that he cannot paint a dull picture or even draw an uninteresting line. And everyone of them is quite unlike any other (' To copy others is necessary but to copy oneself is pathetic '). That is Picasso's great weakness ; he is driven on by the demon of originality. Aesthetically he is always exciting, often satisfying and sometimes (in the still-lifes and landscapes) pleasing. But this almost always presupposes that, in the case of the human figure, one prescinds from the subject-matter. As subjects they are monsters living in a world of their own, without meaning. They are neither demons nor demi-gods ; they have no hieratic justification which they might have had in an earlier age. They can only be accepted, as many of them are intended, as jokes.[1]

There is one sphere in which this Harlequin quality of turning one thing into another has been fruitful : the sphere of sculpture and ceramics. While as a painter Picasso takes things from their normal surroundings and places them in an unreal world, in his sculptures and ceramics he transforms them into something else. (' Two boys arrived yesterday

[1] A ' portrait ' of Nusch Eluard is entitled *Pour Nusch, poor Nusch* (it was translated in an English catalogue *For Nusch, for Nusch !)*. Penrose rightly draws attention to the words of Baudelaire : ' laughter caused by the grotesque has about it something profound, primitive and axiomatic, which is closer to the innocent life and to absolute joy than is the laughter caused by the comic in man's behaviour.' *op. cit.* p. 342 (from *The Mirror of Art.* p. 144).

with a pebble which they said was the head of a dog until I pointed out that it was really a typewriter.') The saddle and handle-bars of a bicycle become a bull's head, a toy motor-car becomes the head of an ape, a vase becomes an owl or a dove (' You see to make a dove you must first wring its [the vase's] neck '). These animals not only live, their qualities and characteristics are intensified and enhanced by the transformation, a sort of plastic metaphor. Picasso, as the aquatint illustrations to Buffon's *Histoire Naturelle* (1936-42) testify, has a deep sympathy with animals and an understanding of their behaviour. Besides, animals are likely to fare better under Picasso's treatment. While it tends to reduce human beings to the grotesque, it raises animals to a new and higher life and invests them with a curious personal quality that makes us feel that they are rational beings. *The Goat* (1950) and the lamb, *Man with Lamb* (1944) and perhaps also *Ape with Young* (1951) have already a place in our sculptural heritage.

It may very well be that, apart from the major paintings and engravings, Picasso's lasting title to fame will rest on his sculptures and ceramics. They are media that lend themselves more readily to non-naturalistic treatment; one can never prescind from the material as one can in painting and a certain amount of distortion is necessary, especially in ceramics. Moreover, Picasso has not the same fatal facility in these media and must therefore exercise more care. As a result his sculpture and ceramics have a finish that his paintings usually lack—once he has worked out a composition he loses interest and passes on to the next problem, as the film *The Picasso Mystery* has clearly shown. His place in the history of the art of this century is, of course, assured. Not since Michelangelo has any one artist dominated his time as Picasso dominates the twentieth century, whether for good or ill we cannot yet say. (Paul Klee was afraid to look at his work for fear of falling under its domination.) In this year's Biennale at Venice there was not much evidence of direct influence of Picasso (though the most original work was to be found in the Spanish pavilion). On the other hand, Braque, whose work was on exhibition there, still seems to have something to say to the present generation of painters. He has always aimed at achieving technical perfection in his work and at the same time treated his objects with loving care. A jug, as Patrick Heron once pointed out, is invested by Braque with a sort of new life of its own ; by Picasso it is changed into a bird. Braque brings us back to the original point of departure ' our real, natural, calm, unhallucinating, permanent surroundings ', a thing Picasso never does. For this reason artists can learn from Braque while they can only marvel at the Harlequin, Picasso, the man who can work wonders.

Eliot in Fair Colonus

THE ELDER STATESMAN

by DENIS DONOGHUE

The Elder Statesman is T. S. Eliot's sixth play, if we include *Sweeney Agonistes*. Like the earlier plays it is concerned with the possibility of holiness in the modern world, with duty, responsibility, and moral choice. Most of the critics who have commented on the play have been uneasily aware that Mr Eliot is a substantial figure in the theatre, but I believe they have misunderstood the significance of the play. The main reason for this failure, I suspect, is that *The Elder Statesman* is related to a tradition of comedy which virtually lapsed with Shakespeare and which reappeared in the English theatre only in the decadent version exhibited by J. M. Barrie. It is *not* related to the ' comedy of manners ', the only form of comedy which modern theatre-audiences understand. In a full study one would wish to ' place ' *The Elder Statesman* not only in relation to Eliot's earlier plays but in its bearing on *The Idea of a Christian Society* and *Notes toward the Definition of Culture*. The present essay attempts only to suggest the quality of the play *as drama* : it is based on the first performances of the play at the Edinburgh Festival last August.

* * *

Eliot's plays strive toward the condition of prayer. In a period in which public or communal prayer has declined, he is tricking his theatre-audiences into an analogue of worship. Thus the opening scene of *The Cocktail Party* is a representation of—from a religious point of view—oaths and blasphemies (politely translated) which by the dramatist's dialectic will be made over into prayers : the prayers are enacted in Celia's death and in Alex's report of that death. Being of our own irreligious or neutral time, we perpetrate such oaths and blasphemies, and Eliot takes us as we are before attempting to make us over in his own prayerful image. He has to begin somewhere : ' If people believe *eight*, I can recommend *nine* ; I can do so by the manipulation of their *eightish* assumptions ; I need not justify my *nine* by arguing for *one*.'[1] These are not Eliot's words,

[1] Kenneth Burke : *The Philosophy of Literary Form*. New York. Vintage Books, 1957. p. 309

but no matter, they serve. Eliot's later plays begin with eight oaths, politely disguised, and end with nine prayers.

This transformation is achieved by gentle indirection, not by apocalyptic admonitions : these plays are not jeremiads. Eliot may feel as strongly as Increase Mather, but we have forced him to con a different style. He achieves his prayers nonetheless. The first Act of *The Elder Statesman* has a few beguiling moments of thin young love, but it is essentially a malign fiesta ; bitter, sophisticated, with a grey wit. It is a concentration of Wyndham Lewis's horror in the more familiar medium of guilt, deception, and emptiness. It is the waste sad time in which the ghosts of *The Hollow Men* are more palpable than Lambert who brings in the tea. The ' oaths ' in *The Elder Statesman* are spoken by the spectres from Lord Claverton's past, the sinister forces which he has carried within himself for many years. Eliot calls them Federico Gomez and Mrs Carghill. They command a language which he long ago perfected for such purposes :

> You'll be afraid of whispers,
> The reflection in the mirror of the face behind you,
> The ambiguous smile, the distant salutation,
> The laughter in the corridor, the snicker in the doorway,
> The sudden silence when you enter the smoking room . . .

Lord Claverton himself spends most of the first two Acts mouthing ' oaths ' ; putting up a righteous facade against the bland Gomez, playing a world-weary part to fend off Mrs Carghill, gesticulating as a maligned father in the face of a son who has repudiated his inheritance.

Thus the beginning. And the end is a litany of love intoned for us—as hierophants—by Charles and Monica. These two are our stylists, ' saying the right thing', finishing off the play with an essay in practical love now no longer thin but rich and mellow. Thus the play, changing oaths to prayers, is an uncovering, pulling back the curtains, breaking up the pieces to put them together again in new configurations. It is a substitution of new and deeper pieties, deeper because Lord Claverton, in exorcising the prudent devil which has ' guided ' him for many years, frees himself from the spectres and emerges ' into something like reality'.

There is a motto for all this ; it is a-going-back-to-the-beginning, a new beginning in a different spirit. The false gods are rejected and we go back to the point at which—impiously—we went astray. One of the most moving speeches in *The Elder Statesman* comes at the end of the second Act when Lord Claverton, watching his severed son Michael go arm-in-arm with Mrs Carghill and Federico Gomez, sees that there

is no escape from one's self ; and, seeing this, he sees also that he must go back to the beginning, and his son in his own way must do likewise :

> What I want to escape from
> Is myself, is the past. But what a coward I am,
> To talk of escaping ! And what a hypocrite !
> A few minutes ago I was pleading with Michael
> Not to try to escape from his own past failures :
> I said I knew from experience. Do I understand the meaning
> Of the lesson I would teach ? Come, I'll start to learn again.
> Michael and I shall go to school together.
> We'll sit side by side, at little desks
> And suffer the same humiliations
> At the hands of the same master. But have I still time ?
> There is time for Michael. Is it too late for me, Monica ?

This gesture is carried down into the detail of several speeches : it is a process of constant revision and correction—as children at school—in the pursuit of truth and reality. Thus when Monica refers to her father ' thinking of nothing', he revises the remark to ' contemplating nothingness '.

* * *

Everyone has seen that *The Elder Statesman* bears some relation to *Oedipus at Colonus* : the relation is both structural and qualitative. *Oedipus at Colonus* provides the ' shape ' of the new play, some of its most important relationships, and a model for its tone. At the centre of both plays there is the father-daughter relationship, testifying to possibilities that will be realized—prayerfully—at the end of the play. These possibilities, insofar as they express themselves in terms of sexual love, involve the substitution of Charles Hemington for the second sister Ismene : Monica is a gracious, if pallid, reflection of Antigone. Michael-Polynices is the common ground through which the protagonist and the antagonist principles come to grips ; the ' translation ' into modern terms is in his case entirely convincing. There is no Teirisias in Eliot's play, because Lord Claverton in his role as self-critic, the silent observer who when forced speaks out, gathers up this role unto himself as Oedipus. Since the context in which the action of *The Elder Statesman* is imitated is not very important, there is no need of a Theseus ; and since the gods are to be invoked—if at all—only obliquely and apologetically, there is no need of a Creon. These omissions speak for themselves.

The tone of *The Elder Statesman* cannot be described as if it were something static. As the play moves from oaths to prayers it ' spits from the mouth the withered apple-seed ' and yearns toward the autumnal mellowness of the great beech-tree at Badgley Court. There is a place

for grey, bitter wit, but it would be a breach of decorum here in the late afternoon near the beech-tree which is in the-place-without-a-name at fair Colonus. Perhaps it is also ' under the larches of Paradise.' In any event, Eliot has been graciously loyal to the Sophocles of *Oedipus at Colonus ;* he has not bruised the late fruit, nor has he hurt the moving spirit of consolation—Boethian also—in which Oedipus proceeds on his last journey. *The Elder Statesman* is one of the few modern plays which move with distinction in the realm of Perception.

In this respect the play is an extension of *The Family Reunion,* just as *The Confidential Clerk* is a revised version of *The Cocktail Party.* In this new version of *The Family Reunion* the issues of the early play are reconsidered in a fresh attempt to accost that guilt-ridden experience which has been in the shadows of Eliot's world since before *The Hollow Men.* There may seem to be little connexion between Harry Monchensey and Richard Claverton, but if we seek an early figuring of the elder statesman do we not find it in Harry's father, the man who hands on a smoky inheritance to his son ? It is as if Eliot were to bring Harry's father out of the shadows into the world of human relationships, giving him another chance to redeem himself. In his earlier world ' there was no ecstasy ' ; the elder Monchensey lived with his wife in a lonely country house learning the meaning of loneliness. It is a fitting context for the awful privacy of Lord Claverton, imprisoned in guilt and deception : ' only fear of the emptiness before me ' :

> But waiting, simply waiting,
> With no desire to act, yet a loathing of inaction.
> A fear of the vacuum, and no desire to fill it.
> It's just like sitting in an empty waiting room
> In a railway station on a branch line,
> After the last train, after all the other passengers
> Have left, and the booking office is closed
> And the porters have gone. What am I waiting for
> In a cold and empty room before an empty grate ?
> For no one. For nothing.

Lord Claverton and the elder Monchensey may not be one and the same person but they are closer than mere participants in the same black world ; they share the same figure in the carpet. The difference is that where the elder Monchensey was doomed to the spectral existence of a ' presence ' behind Harry's guilt-ridden life, in the new play he has been granted a second chance to liberate himself from the human wheel. When we speak of the ' humanity ' of the new play this is what we mean, that it offers a second chance which we had been given no reason to expect.

And of course *The Elder Statesman* is a more humane play than *The Family Reunion,* more humane, indeed, than any of its predecessors. There

are no longer any aunts and uncles whom we can use as scapegoats, burdening them with our guilt before we cast them off the rocks. There is no longer a John Monchensey to whom we can bequeath a rancid world, thereby exhibiting our own fine taste. Lord Claverton and his Monica do not opt out of the human world in their pursuit of latter-day felicity ; there is in the new play no urge to deny the integrity of the human world, or to sell it short. It is a measure of the play's humanity that it preserves the finite world intact—through Charles and Monica—more generously than *The Cocktail Party* or even *The Confidential Clerk,* and that it endorses no inevitable dichotomy between our everyday world and the world of our most strenuous aspirations. Edward and Lavinia from *The Cocktail Party* have now been given a second chance ; as Charles and Monica they find at Badgley Court a richer love than they were granted in their London flat. Perhaps the enigmatic Julia was to blame : she was a severe moralist :

> Everyone makes a choice, of one kind or another,
> And then must take the consequences. Celia chose
> A way of which the consequence was crucifixion ;
> Peter Quilpe chose a way that takes him to Boltwell ;
> And now the consequence of the Chamberlaynes' choice
> Is a cocktail party. They must be ready for it.
> Their guests may be arriving at any moment.

But Sir Henry Harcourt-Reilly was a little more yielding :

> You will have to live with these memories and make them
> Into something new. Only by acceptance
> Of the past will you alter its meaning.

and Edward interpreted this as saying ' that every moment is a fresh beginning.' But Edward was not granted the illumination of knowing the meaning of love. He could not have glowed in the insight as Charles does when he says to Monica :

> And no future life is even conceivable
> In which we should not be conscious of each other
> And conscious of our loving . . . . .

The love of Charles and Monica is, among other things, a mellow critique of the love of Edward and Lavinia, just as it ' defines ' the love which Colby and Lucasta sketched in *The Confidential Clerk.*

At the centre of all this is Lord Claverton's vision of his world. This is the determining focus of the play. We can understand it best, perhaps, if we chart its development, bearing in mind its earlier manifestations.

The Ur-hero in Eliot's previous plays was the religious man defining himself in a secular society. It was part of Eliot's strategy—and part of the thin humanity of those plays—to load the dice too heavily in the hero's favour. Not content to exalt his hero as a man of outstanding integrity, Eliot made the mistake of regarding as the Enemy not only the avowedly irreligious factors in the everyday world but that world itself, in its entirety, in all its manifestations. Everything went into the same bin. In the plays up to *The Cocktail Party* the *scene* itself was endowed with malignant motives. Hence the tendency of those plays to denigrate the finite and to associate the hero's aspirations with some esoteric Essence which demanded, as a prerequisite, that the finite world of Matter and Body be sloughed off. But Lord Claverton's role is new in at least one important respect. It is not a case of a hero, a man of conscience and consciousness, confronting a hostile *scene*—and then destroying it or transcending it—but such a man confronting *himself*. The 'argument' of *The Elder Statesman* is strikingly personal and internal. The place of the scapegoat *scene* is now taken by those factors of cowardice. 'prudence', and emptiness which Lord Claverton sees in himself: he does not put the blame on Society, or on Matter, or Body, or Nature, or on any other capitalized malignity. There is no whine in this play. Claverton does not say, as Harry said in *The Family Reunion:*

> It is not my conscience,
> Not my mind, that is diseased, but the world I have to live in.

That is always an easy way out, at least provisionally, but it is not available to Lord Claverton; to get to his great beech-tree he must cut through his own deception.

This involves an act of moral choice, an unfashionable procedure in modern drama, including Eliot's own. Bearing in mind the ambiguous representation of such an act in *The Family Reunion* we should now acknowledge that *The Elder Statesman,* penetrating similar experience, commits itself firmly to the possibility of an individual moral act. There comes a certain stage in *The Elder Statesman* at which Lord Claverton, like Harry Monchensey, decides not to run away from his spectres; but Claverton's decision, unlike Harry's, issues unambiguously from his own resources as an individual moral being. The new play asserts, as clearly as anyone could wish and much more clearly than he might have expected, that Man has the power of moral choice, that he holds this power by

virtue of his existence and dignity as a human being, that the exercise of this power is a matter of incalculable moment. When Monica urges her father to escape from those obnoxious familiars Federico Gomez and Mrs Carghill, he corrects her—as we have seen—warning her that there is no escaping one's self. This act of moral choice leads not to the conventional 'happy ending'—or to that only superficially—but to the radical extension of the circumference of insight within which Lord Claverton interprets his world. And in this new, wider circle there is a mellower place even for such 'failures' as that of his severed relationship with his son. Michael's flight to San Marco represents the enormous risk attendant upon an act of moral choice, but the risk is accepted graciously and incorporated into the new circle of intrepretation. Lord Claverton, reciting a gentle lesson about reality and make-believe, says :

> And Michael—
> I love him, even for rejecting me,
> For the *me* he rejected I reject also.
> I've been freed from the self that pretends to be someone ;
> And in becoming no one, I begin to live.

The key-word is Love ; not indeed a new word even in the spare landscape of Eliot's plays, but until now a word used only with a certain embarrassment. *The Elder Statesman* offers the word with full, grave commitment as the Meaning of Meanings. Eliot could have found the word already with a rich meaning in *Oedipus at Colonus,* seizing it now as the definitive term, not so much correcting what had gone before as acknowledging a more humane direction. Listing the key-terms of the early plays we have Conscience, Consciousness, Understanding ; and now Love. And since this is the wisest of Eliot's plays the nature of Love is defined not by a context of limp 'good deeds' but by a genuinely won illumination, a flowering of insight into the relation between reality and responsibility. Eliot's new testament is endorsed by Love as the Term of Terms within which all lesser terms find speech.

The words spoken in *The Elder Statesman* are neither diffident nor ostentatious ; benign, chaste, more relaxed than those of *The Confidential Clerk,* and more equable in their partnerships. And it is significant that along with the more humane version of experience represented in *The Elder Statesman* there is a greater trust in the possibility of verbal communication. (This is offered at least as a pious hope, and the gentleman's agreement still holds ; there are certain topics, certain names, which the dramatist has undertaken not to mention, on pain of 'excommunication.')

There is a feeling in the new play that if our words could only be supported by Love they need not break under any burden thereafter :

> It's hard to make other people realise
> The magnitude of things that appear to them petty ;
> It's harder to confess the sin that no one believes in
> Than the crime that everyone can appreciate.
> For the crime is in relation to the law
> And the sin is in relation to the sinner.
> What has made the difference in the last five minutes
> Is not the heinousness of my misdeeds
> But the fact of my confession. And to you, Monica,
> To you, of all people.

In *The Family Reunion* there is nothing of this ; Harry's psychosis was intensified by the failure, the collapse, of verbal communication. Agatha encouraged him to speak in his own language without stopping to debate whether it might be too far beyond the understanding of his audience ; and he made the attempt, without much assistance from syntax :

> The sudden solitude in a crowded desert
> In a thick smoke, many creatures moving
> Without direction, for no direction
> Leads anywhere but round and round in that vapour—
> Without purpose, and without principle of conduct
> In flickering intervals of light and darkness ;
> The partial anaesthesia of suffering without feeling
> And partial observation of one's own automatism
> While the slow stain sinks deeper through the skin
> Tainting the flesh and discolouring the bone—

But he fell back from this awful privacy of insight :

> This is what matters, but it is unspeakable,
> Untranslatable : I talk in general terms
> Because the particular has no language . . . .

Lord Claverton is more fortunate : directed by Love he finds the words for the confessional act which he performs in the presence of Monica and Charles. Hence we chart the following terms, not as synonyms but as mutually endorsing forces : Love, Speech, Communication, Understanding, Illumination, Consciousness. Monica encompasses this ample world of possibility when she refers to ' Love within which all other love finds speech ' : at this stage she has divined, with Charles, that the felicity of one's private world exists not as a secret place blocked off from the outer, public world but as the consciousness of ' love unchanging ' in the integrity of the public world. The garden of Monica and Charles—

to speak of it in terms of *The Confidential Clerk*—is a part of one single world, its own reality testifying to the reality of other things. It is a glowing image to offset many rivalries, dichotomies, and severances. Lord Claverton's terms are an autumnal translation of Monica's insight : he speaks of 'the peace that ensues upon contribution', and 'the illumination of seeing what love is' ; again, 'I have been brushed by the wing of Heaven'. This is luminous speech and there are luminous acts, too, as when Lord Claverton says to his severed son, 'I shall never repudiate you, though you have repudiated me.'

* * *

In *The Elder Statesman* Eliot has stuck to his guns : he has been scrupulously loyal to those insights which he has been exploring in the theatre since *The Family Reunion*. To some the new play has seemed an 'ironic melodrama', perhaps a sequel to *The Strange Boarders of Palace Crescent,* but this is to mistake the genre. Keeping before his mind the development of Shakespeare's later plays, Eliot has written, in *The Elder Statesman,* an 'ideal comedy'—the term is Northrop Frye's[1]—gently drawing forth, from an ambiguous situation, an image of communal order ; order based upon the acknowledgment of responsibility, in a spirit of piety and love. The mood is optative rather than indicative, and what the play envisages is not merely individual felicity but an idea of social harmony of which the Claverton family—in its new circumference of insight—represents a beautiful instance.

Eliot's problem—or so we conceive it—was to compose a modern equivalent of *The Tempest* or of *Oedipus at Colonus*—each would serve—while keeping adequately close to the 'realistic' expectations of his audience. Perhaps the solution emerged somewhat as follows : starting with Lord Claverton's psychosis, Eliot broke it down into its two conflicting parts—the 'negative' or sinister part, which he divided between Gomez and Mrs Carghill, and the 'positive', upward-striving part, which he reflected in Monica and her Charles. Michael the erring son provided the battleground. Lambert the butler was added to make the Claverton home more substantial. Mrs Piggott was added for several reasons ; to insinuate the play's contact with a world outside its windows, a world which, knowing nothing of Lord Claverton's problems, was nevertheless implicated in them ; to offer comic relief in those moments in which the situation might have gone soft ; above all, by providing—for the Clavertons—a local, innocuous dissatisfaction, to modulate between the much more sinister distresses represented by Gomez and Mrs Carghill. These are sound rhetorical reasons.

[1] Northrop Frye : 'A Conspectus of Dramatic Genres' *Kenyon Review,* xiii, 4, Autumn, 1951, pp. 543-562

And indeed Eliot is a skilful rhetorician ; this is conceded even by those who ' don't like ' the later plays or their ' answer ' to the problem of communication in the modern theatre. *The Elder Statesman* may be cited as a case in point : when a Mrs Piggott is required, Eliot is quick to sense the need and to bring her on. But in one respect—and that a serious one—he has erred as a theatre-rhetorician : he has been niggardly in giving *The Elder Statesman* the climax for which it cries out. We have already emphasized the significance of Lord Claverton's moral act : the entire play depends on it ; but it comes too easily. We are asked to acknowledge the soul-stirrings, the agonizing torments which Lord Claverton suffers, but we are shown little theatrical evidence of their existence : a craggy, pained face ; a few wise, sad words ; nothing more. Contrition here seems an easy thing, hardly an ' act ' at all, but it can hardly be so. Likewise, confession : it is as if the fears, the misgivings, and the shame were suffered off-stage ; Lord Claverton enters, resigned, to tell his story to a gentle daughter. No wonder, then, that we remember as the climax of the play the moment in which Michael cries out to his father, ' What is my inheritance ? ' True, the moment is highly charged, at once poignant and chilling, but it should be no more than a prefiguring of Lord Claverton's own pained appraisal. Perhaps Eliot was reluctant to risk injuring the tone of his play by charging it here with the laments of a disconsolate chimera ; *The Family Reunion* was a more ample *genre* for this kind of thing. But even in ' ideal comedy ' a man does not tear himself apart without our hearing the noise.

This is the most serious defect in *The Elder Statesman* and it injures the play as theatre-poetry. The central relationships, particularly the relationship between Lord Claverton and his daughter, would be much more convincing if Lord Claverton were shown in agonized recognition of his own emptiness. Monica's answering love would then seem a rich fulfilment rather than an unearned increment. Mrs Carghill and Federico Gomez would seem more palpable servants of Satan. And the process of spiritual regeneration would seem a truly heroic endeavour.

Perhaps the fault lies in Monica's role. Gentle, and ' qualitatively ' apt, yes, but she makes very little contribution to the play. In one scene in particular she fails us entirely. Eliot was perhaps foolhardy in having Lord Claverton confess his sins *twice*—once to us, then to Monica—but he might have negotiated the hazard if he had ensured that the second confession would be *a new thing,* a new phase in the central relationship, or the uncovering of resources in it beyond our expectation. If Monica had received the confession with something more intense or more individual than the elaborate recitation of *It's-alright-daddy,-I-love-you-more-than-ever,* the scene might have been saved. As it stands it merely repeats what we already know, and it has nothing new to enact in the relationship of father and daughter.

Reflections on Dr Zhivago

by J. F. REYNOLDS

THE appearance of *Dr Zhivago* in an English translation was the major literary sensation of 1958. Never, I suppose, has a genuine work of literature had such an immediate success.

It is hardly contestable, nevertheless, that its success had very little to do with literature. After the drama of the Nobel Prize award, it was idle for intellectuals to protest that the book was not political, that it was the lonely, personal testament of an ageing poet. The public made it a best-seller because it *was* political. Here, it was felt, is a devastating criticism of Soviet Communism by one who has lived in Russia throughout the past fifty years. The professional anti-Communist, his faubus-face wreathed in smiles, took it as a major propaganda victory. Poor Pasternak, acclaimed for un-Russian activities, has had to bear this praise with the calm patience he bears the disapproval of his colleagues and rulers.

In fact, the praise of *Dr Zhivago* for its political content indicates a much more superficial evaluation of the book than does the blame cast on its author by the Soviet Union of Writers, who knew exactly what they were condemning. The freedom sought by Zhivago is a fundamental one, and has little to do with the more spectacular displays of oppression.

If those who praised *Dr Zhivago* because of its anti-Communism are guilty of a misunderstanding, can we be sure that the book was understood by the enlightened who have read it as a work of literature and have acclaimed it as a masterpiece? In short, are we in the West capable of judging the book at all?

A fact that appears to have been overlooked in the excitement is that nobody, apart from a very small number of people, has read *Dr. Zhivago*. We have the book only at hearsay, so to speak. We have read, not Pasternak, but an attempt by two sensitive and intelligent people to convey what they felt the poet was saying. The translators themselves are very modest on this score: 'All we can hope for is that we may have given English readers some approximate idea of the merits of this great work.'

The difficulties of translation are notorious, and are keenly felt by all who attempt it. Whether they are so sharply appreciated by readers is doubtful. Assuming, then, that the translators are not being coyly modest, let us take them at their word, and accept that we have been given only an approximate idea of Pasternak's work.

It is a commonplace that if a reader is to derive any benefit from a book, he must give himself entirely to it ; he must read, not idly or haphazardly, but creatively, bringing to the book all his store of knowledge and imagination. In reading a book written in a familiar language, dealing with people and ideas of which we have some knowledge, this can be a difficult enough task. In reading a translation from a foreign language about people and manners and ideas that are strange to us, the task is infinitely more formidable. What, then, must we bring to Pasternak's book that we may read it creatively ?

It will be said that our knowledge of the literature of nineteenth century Russia places us in a favourable position to meet this task. But this knowledge, based as it is on translations, may be a misconception. In the case of Dostoevsky alone, the critics are so contradictory that one sometimes wonders whether they are discussing the same writer. Each commentator seems to remake the novelist in his own image, and then proceeds to theorize. Reading their books, one is more likely to gain an insight into a Middleton Murry, a J. C. Powys, or a D. H. Lawrence than into Dostoevsky. I am not including here the work of such scholars as Ernest J. Simmons who have done much in making Russian ideas more intelligible to us. Nor have I in mind individual works of genius such as André Gide's *Dostoevsky*. I do, however, feel sympathy for the Russian critic who caustically observed :

> It has become a tradition for the omniscient geniuses of the West to exercise their intuitive powers on the subject of Russia, where they can move freely, unhampered as they are by any excess of irrelevant and needless information.

On a lower plane, the non-professional critics, the general body of readers and playgoers seem to suffer from a grave misconception of Russian literature and ideas. How often has one heard the word ' morbid ' used when the great Russian writers are mentioned ? Vague ideas of ' superfluous men', of ' oblomovism', of vast spaces and endless talk, of sadness and despair seem to float in the air when Russian literature is discussed. Westerners are antipathetic to such ideas and feelings, and so we commonly find Russian literature dismissed as dreary and depressing. An exception is generally made of Tolstoy, but, then, Tolstoy in his greatest work has been so assimilated into the history of the Western novel that one can hardly call him a Russian at all. I think that the average English reader, when reading *War and Peace* performs an unconscious feat of transmogrification, transforming Pierre, Natasha and Prince Andrey into members of the English upper classes who might possibly be on speaking terms with, and certainly would think and feel and act as, the heroes and heroines of Jane Austen's novels. The later Tolstoy cannot be so transformed, and consequently is read little and

appreciated less by the English reading public. The other great writers who cannot easily be made assume English dress are similarly neglected. Russian literature is thus largely unknown to us.

To appreciate Pasternak's book, we cannot therefore presume on a knowledge of Russian literature. Nor, not being omniscient geniuses, can we depend on an intuition, ' unhampered by irrelevant and needless information '. We must retrace our steps, and re-read and re-think Gogol and Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and Turgenev, Chekhov and Gorki, to name only the giants. The poets, Pushkin, Lermontov, Tyutchev and the rest are almost beyond our ken. Being poets, they are untranslatable.

The biographies of the nineteenth century Russian writers will be of some help in enabling us to understand the phenomenon of Pasternak and to appreciate his peculiar position. In a sense, all Russian writers were political. Conditions in Russia during the past one hundred and fifty years have been such that none of her great writers could ignore them. Those now concerned about Pasternak's safety will notice a curious parallel between his position and that of Pushkin under the iron rule of the Tsar Nicholas the First. A friend of Ryleiev and several of the other Decembrists who had revolted in an attempt to prevent the accession of Nicholas, Pushkin was distrusted by the Tsar, and was under the constant surveillance of the Third Section, or secret police. In 1830 we find Count Beckendorf, Chief of the Third Section writing this extraordinary letter to the poet, then in his thirty-first year and at the height of his fame :

> In answer to your letter of January 7th, I beg to inform you that His Majesty the Emperor does not deign to grant your request with regard to a journey abroad, since such a step on your part would be a strain on your finances and would moreover take you away from your work . . .

Pasternak, one feels, would appreciate Pushkin's mood on receiving this intimation of the Tsar's solicitude.

In a recent article in *Encounter,* George Steiner makes the point that ' Marxist-Leninism and the political regimes enacted in its name take literature seriously, indeed desperately so.' As he says, ' to shoot a man because one disagrees with his interpretation of Darwin or Hegel is a sinister tribute to the supremacy of ideas in human affairs—but a tribute nevertheless.' I cannot, however, agree with him when he goes on to say : ' This constant preoccupation with the life of the mind would alone serve to distinguish Marxist autocracy from other species of totalitarianism.'

If he were to say ' Russian ' rather than ' Marxist ', he would be nearer the truth. In Russia, the writer has always been taken seriously. Any

heresy, be it Tsarist or Marxist, is severly dealt with. It was because of their writings and their thoughts, not because of any physical revolt, that the great Russians, Pushkin, Lermontov, Dostoevsky, Byelinsky, Plescheyeff, Hertzen and many others were exiled. If Pasternak is now to suffer because of the publication of *Dr Zhivago*, his persecutors would be merely following the tradition of the autocrats of Tsarist Russia who attempted to stifle the greatest intellects of the nineteenth century.

* * * * *

We can now approach a little nearer to *Dr Zhivago*. So far we have only looked at it from afar, timidly, conscious of our serious lack of equipment with which to assess it.

It is not an easy book to criticize, and one leaves down most of the critical articles on it with a feeling that somehow the critic has failed in his task. Dr Zhivago is always just out of the grasp of his professional fingers. Comparisons with *War and Peace*, though perhaps inevitable, are not rewarding. Nor are academic questions about the book's qualifications as a perfect work of art or a great novel relevant. It does not really matter whether *Dr Zhivago* is a masterpiece or not. Such an approach, so favoured in the West, is out of place here. It is too limiting. The greatest Russian novelist has suffered in the hands of critics who persist in measuring him with standards which meant nothing to him. A great many critics have been utterly incapable of seeing the excellence of *The Brothers Karamazov* and *The Idiot* because these books do not fit into their preconceived notions of what the perfect novel should be. They are concerned with Art, while to Dostoevsky Life alone mattered.

It is appropriate that the best discussion of *Dr Zhivago* to appear was that of Max Hayward, one of the translators, in *Encounter*. This article is so luminous that I think it the greatest of pities that the publishers did not think of adding it to the English translation as an introduction. Hayward is particularly acute in his discussion of the *obyvatel*, or 'superfluous man' of Turgenev and Chekhov in Russian literature. Reiterating the importance of Gogol's *Overcoat*, he shows that *Dr Zhivago* is the latest in the stream of writings in defence of the small man. Comparing Zhivago with Prince Myshkin, another *obyvatel*, he says :

> There is the same inability to transform knowledge and intention into action ; the same final triumph in failure, the triumph of the uncompromising attitude to reality, which will not be bribed by the promise of worldly success . . . Unlike Dostoevsky's hero, however, Zhivago is not a Jesus-like figure. He is more like an apostle, one of those disciples who could not keep awake during the vigil of Gethsemane.

Here the heart of the matter is touched. Zhivago is modern man, not in the Western sense, but in a strictly Russian one, which means a Christian sense. Pasternak is as deeply Christian as Dostoevsky, but he is not tortured by the latter's frantic Dionysism. His Zhivago is a human being, a Christian sinner, a person ; and throughout the book is the insistence that the only important thing in the world is the human person.

> When the Gospels say that in the Kingdom of God there are neither Jews nor Gentiles, do they mean that all are equal in the sight of God ? I don't believe it means only that—that was known already—it was known to the Greek philosophers and the Roman moralists and the Hebrew Prophets. What the Gospels tell us is that in this new way of life and of communion, which is born of the heart and which is called the Kingdom of God, there are no nations, but only persons.
>
> Now you said that facts don't mean anything by themselves—not until a meaning is put into them. Well—the meaning you have to put into the facts to make them relevant to human beings is just that : it's Christianity, it's the mystery of personality . . .

These ideas are uttered by Gordon, a friend of Zhivago. Speaking of the Jews, Gordon says :

> Their national idea has forced them, century after century, to be a people and nothing but a people—and the extraordinary thing is that they have been chained to this deadening task all through the centuries when all the rest of the world was being delivered from it by a new force which had come out of their own midst ! Isn't that extraordinary ? How can you account for it ? Just think !—This glorious holiday from mediocrity, from the dreary, boring constriction of everyday life, was first achieved on their soil, proclaimed in their language, belonged to their race ! And they actually saw it and heard it and let it go ! How could they do it ?—How could they allow a spirit of such overwhelming power and beauty to go out of them, to leave them, so that when it was enthroned in triumph they were left behind like the empty skin it had cast aside ? . . .

Here is the exasperating enigma of human nature. In the presence of greatness, of holiness, man is quite likely to be unaware of it, to continue living in his shell, unmindful of the miracle about him. He can even grow tired, yawn, and fall asleep. In one of Zhivago's poems, *Gethsemane,* Christ returns from the garden, and finds his disciples asleep :

> He awoke them : God has granted you to live in my time
> And you loll about like this . . .

Constantly in the book this theme is reverted to, the incapacity or unwillingness of man to grasp what is noble and good—though the yearning after these very qualities is ever present. Yury Zhivago is not a saint. He is a sinner, a Russian sinner. Faced with his problems, he does not use logic in the Western manner, and adopt an attitude,

religious or irreligious, according to his bent. He is a human person, and for such a one ' to live one's life is not as easy as to cross a field'.

It is only when we read the tragic story of his love for his wife Tonya and for Lara Antipova that we realize how much modern Western literature has lost in depth and complexity :

> It was now more than two months since that day when he went to town as usual but, instead of returning home the same afternoon, spent the night at Lara's and later told his family that he had been kept on business and had stayed the night at Samdevyatov's inn. He had long been calling Lara by her Christian name and saying ' Thou ' to her, though she still called him ' Zhivago'. Yury was deceiving Tonya and what he concealed from her was becoming increasingly grave and illicit. This was something unheard of between them . . .
>
> Had he been unfaithful to her because he preferred another woman ? No, he had made no comparison, no choice. He did not believe in ' free love ' or in the ' right ' to be carried away by his senses. To think or speak in such terms seemed to him degrading. He had never sowed ' wild oats,' nor did he regard himself as a superman with special rights and privileges. Now he was crushed by the weight of his guilty conscience.
>
> ' What next ? ' he sometimes asked himself, and hoped wretchedly for some impossible unexpected circumstance to solve his problems for him.

One is reminded of Mitya Karamazov's agonized cry :

> Yes, man is broad, too broad, indeed I'd have him narrower. The devil only knows what to make of it. What to the mind is shameful is beauty and nothing else to the heart .

Later in the book, Zhivago encounters Lara's husband, Pavel Antipov, now known as Strelnikov.

> They had been talking for hours. They talked as only Russians in Russia can talk, particularly as they talked then, desperate and frenzied as they were in those anxious, frightened days.

It is almost impossible for the Western mind to appreciate this scene where husband and lover talk. What is presented in the literature of the West as a scene of low comedy, of hatred, or, worst of all, of ' civilized ' good behaviour is here a meeting of two human beings. To give any idea of its flavour, the scene must be quoted in detail. Zhivago asks Strelnikov if he has any idea of Lara's love for him (Strelnikov).

> ' Sorry. What was that you said ? '
>
> ' I asked you, had you any idea how much she loved you ?—more than anyone in the world ! '
>
> ' What makes you say that ? '
>
> ' Because she told me so herself.'
>
> ' She said this ? To you ? '
>
> 'Yes.'

'Forgive me, I realise it's an impossible thing to ask, but if it isn't hopelessly indiscreet, if you can, will you tell me exactly what it was she said to you?'

'Gladly. She said that you were the example of what a human being should be, a man whose equal she had never met, that you were unique in your sincerity and that if she could go back to the home she had shared with you, she would crawl to it on her knees from the end of the earth.'

'Forgive me, if it isn't intruding on something too intimate, can you remember the circumstances in which she said this?'

'She had been doing this room, and she went outside to shake the carpet.'

'Sorry, which carpet? There are two.'

'That one, the larger one.'

'It would have been too heavy for her—did you help her?'

'Yes.'

'You held it at either end and she leaned far back, and threw up her arms high as on a swing, turning away her face from the blowing dust, and screwed up her eyes and laughed? Isn't that how it was? Don't I know her ways! And then you walked towards each other folding up the heavy carpet first in two and then in four, and she joked and pulled faces, didn't she? Didn't she?'

They stood up and went across to different windows and looked out in different directions. After a time Strelnikov came up to Yury, caught hold of his hands, pressed them to his breast and went on as hurriedly as before:

'Forgive me. I realise that I am touching on things which are dear and holy to you. But I should like to ask you more questions, if you'll let me. Please don't go away. Don't leave me alone. I'll be going myself soon . . .'

I can think of no scene in English literature to equal this for its heart-breaking simplicity. One thinks of Zhivago's own remark jotted down in his notebook—'The fabulous is never anything but the commonplace touched by the hand of genius.' Throughout the book we find examples such as this of 'the commonplace touched by the hand of genius.' As I have insisted, it is not an easy book for us to assimilate, but the more you read and reread it, the more the conviction grows that here is one of the very greatest books. It is a profound manifestation of the human spirit. That it should have come out of Russia at this time might strike us as extraordinary, but, if not Russia, what country could have produced a Pasternak?

More than a quarter of a century ago Spengler prophesied that the West was dying and that the only hope for the world lay in Russia, not indeed the Russia of the Communists or the broken Russia of the Tsars, but a hidden Russia, Christian and spiritual in a way that the

West, corrupted by the enlightened philosophers of the eighteenth century, no longer was. He was decried as a shrill ranter. But, having read *Dr Zhivago,* his words do not seem so ridiculous :

> The real Russian is a disciple of Dostoevsky. Although he may not have read Dostoevsky or anyone else, nay, perhaps *because* he cannot read, he is himself Dostoevsky in substance ; and if the Bolshevists, who see in Christ a mere social reformer like themselves, were not intellectually so narrowed, it would be Dostoevsky that they would see as their prime enemy. What gave this revolution its momentum was not the intelligentsia's hatred. It was the people itself, which, *without hatred,* urged only by the need of throwing off a disease, destroyed the old Westernism in one effort of upheaval, and will send the new after it in another. For what this townless people yearns for is its own life form, its own religion, its own history. Tolstoy's Christianity was a misunderstanding. He spoke of Christ and he meant Marx. But to Dostoevsky's Christianity the next thousand years will belong.

The autocrats of Communist Russia must have smiled many a time at these foolish words. But now the miracle has happened. A wayward human being has shown them that the human spirit cannot be confined, that man does not live by bread alone.

Spiritual Formation of the Adolescent

by E. F. O'DOHERTY

THE more one knows of human nature the more meaningful becomes the phrase *gratia naturam non tollit sed perficit.* As a result it would appear that the more one tries to understand human nature the more one can hope to facilitate the operation of grace in forming human beings in the spiritual life. In the early days of psychology, the science suffered by reason of the fact that many of the greatest of the new psychologists were antagonistic to religion. There is a large and growing literature on the relations between psychology and religion and it seems fair to say that the issues at stake and their solutions are now fairly clear. If one assumes scientific humanism (or its older form, straight materialism) one will naturally accept Freud's *Future of an Illusion,* the main contention of which is that religion (in any form) is a neurotic manifestation of our need to defend ourselves against childish fears. If on the other hand one accepts the fact of revelation and the existence of a non-material reality, one can still profitably study the psychological processes involved in both the natural and supernatural spheres, and find many parallels between them. Dr Zilboorg did us all a great service by pin pointing the fallacy, which he called the fallacy of psychomechanistic parallelism, of identifying the two orders, natural and supernatural, on the ground that the same processes are discernible in both. It was this fallacy which underlay all attempts by psychologists to ' explain away ' religion simply by showing that religious behaviour (including religious thinking) involved the same psychological mechanisms as other forms of behaviour and thought.

Freud thought that he could show that the processes of repression, projection, rationalization and so on were common to religion and the psychoneuroses. Therefore religion itself was a psychoneurosis. Very few would now cling to this form of argument. In fact the position is quite the other way round. The same psychological mechanisms underlie the diverse functions of the mind, whether rational or irrational, normal or abnormal. We have always recognized this at the level of ' ordinary ' psychology. Thus the child learning to play ludo and learning arithmetic is using the same functions of perception, remembering, understanding, and may have the same emotional experiences of excitement, joy, courage, or of apathy, fear, discouragement, etc. Similarly in teaching religion one uses the same psychological processes and techniques as are used in teaching arithmetic : memorizing, imaginative illustrations, intellectual

comprehension, and so on. It should not be in the least surprising therefore to discover that, if we can find other deeper processes which are common to the human mind in diverse functions, these also will be helpful in teaching religion and in spiritual formation.

In adolescence, the social nature of man begins to make its demands felt for the first time. Up to this point, the family has been enough : it has provided a necessary and sufficient environment in which the individual could develop. But in adolescence this is no longer sufficient. The developing child now needs associations outside the family if he is to develop into a normally balanced and mature individual. This is not easy for him because of his shyness, awkwardness, self-consciousness. If he fails in effecting the transition from family to wider group, he may grow up to be a withdrawn, shut-in type, an 'Athanasius contra mundum', or a paranoid type with an ineradicable sense of grievance. If a wider society is not provided, the adolescent tends to provide it for himself, and hence the 'gang' phenomenon which worries sociologists so much. The adolescent needs to belong to a group because he needs something with which he can identify himself : a set of co-ordinates which will serve to determine his status as a person vis-à-vis other persons, and which will provide a pattern according to which he can determine his behaviour, a set of facilitating mechanisms which will minimize his bewilderment or uncertainty in new situations. He has a well-nigh insoluble task on hand : he must now achieve the desirable (and inevitable) status of being a person, independent and incommunicable, and at the same time resist, by all the psychological devices at his disposal, the painful, conscious awareness of selfhood, independence and responsibility.

Gradually he learns how to behave, but it is still through the channels which characterized his childhood learning : introjection, identification, imitation, and not through the processes of adult learning : the acceptance of an abstract principle, and the application of it as a standard of judgment to the present concrete situation. This of course remains the ideal to aim at, but it is important to remember that even the adult only rarely behaves in this way, the adolescent almost never.

During infancy and childhood, the child has had to learn, often at considerable cost, to master his instincts and impulses. He has had to learn to master his innate aggressive impulses (e.g. not to hurt another child), to achieve a high level of control over otherwise reflex acts (to master techniques of evacuation, to acquire a rhythm of sleep), and to curb the more marked manifestations of his comparatively simple emotional life. With the onset of puberty however he is confronted with a much more complex task. His newly developed instinctual powers and vastly expanded capacity for emotional life both present new problems. They generate anxiety, which is nothing but fear reduced in intensity and pro-

longed through time. The anxiety arises because he is not yet aware of the nature and strength of these instinctual powers, nor of his ability to master them. At the same time desire and curiosity are aroused. His attitude to instinctual life becomes ambivalent : it is at once attractive and repulsive, both the attraction and repulsion being tinged with fear. The antagonism to the instincts now generated can lead to a redoubling of his efforts to master them, and this can take the form of something very closely resembling asceticism. It is not quite the mechanism of repression, for technical reasons, but it has much in common with repression. It involves for instance an ignoring of the instincts in the first part of adolescence, and this of course can be a valuable process, but it is not necessarily healthy. It can mean the deliberate avoidance of enlightenment (commoner probably with girls than with boys and of necessity involving a high level of selective inattention to the barrage of stimuli to which the adolescent is currently exposed). Essentially it is this deliberate aspect of the process which differentiates it from repression. The pseudo-asceticism which results may take the form of not caring for ordinary physical needs. The adolescent will endure extremes of cold rather than wear an overcoat, he may try to do without food or without sleep for considerable periods of time. All this can be valuable, but it requires very careful handling in order that its value may emerge. Probably for most youths in our environment it is successfully turned into something valuable, since it contributes greatly to the youth's ability to master his great difficulty, the sexual instinct. But the need for great care is evidenced by the danger that, if left to itself, this tendency may lead only to an unhealthy puritanism.

The average healthy normally-developing youth has a constitutional aversion to sexual things. True, there are always some unhealthy youths with a morbid interest in such things, but these stand out as exceptions, and in their case one will nearly always find some idiosyncratic psychogenetic factor in their psycho-sexual development to account for this. The aversion referred to here is quite compatible with a natural healthy curiosity : both are in fact aspects of the same ambivalence referred to in the previous paragraph. The psychological source of the constitutional aversion is found in the fact that the outward-regarding (or extraverted) character of the youth's psyche is more marked than his introspective tendencies, so that the instinctive movements from the deep unconscious are experienced more as frightening phenomena than as pleasurable or attractive. And this aspect of the instinctive life is reinforced by two other factors : he has already had much training in curbing aggressive influences, and, through toilet training, he has learnt a great deal about the need for privacy. This constitutional aversion has much in common with the ' innate ' character of the virtue of modesty, on which Father Evoy, S.J., wrote a doctoral thesis for the University of Chicago.

This constitutional aversion is balanced, on the other hand, by the awakening of passionate desire. This is St Paul's 'law of my mind struggling against the law of my members', only that St Paul is speaking about a conscious adult conflict, while we are here concerned with an unconscious adolescent one. It is this ambivalent attitude which enables us to understand the apparently inexplicable and contradictory aspects of the youth's behaviour.

One should not confuse the natural asceticism and innate modesty to which I have referred with the virtues of mortification and purity. These, because virtues are habits, have to be developed by repeated acts of the will and strengthened by grace through participation in the life of grace through the sacraments, prayer, and the practices of the spiritual life generally. But clearly these natural phenomena can be of tremendous help in building a spiritual life. If however they are themselves mistaken for spiritual phenomena, the crash when it comes will be all the greater.

The natural healthy curiosity referred to above in connection with instinctual life is part of a wider curiosity the adolescent experiences in regard to the world in general. This wider curiosity is the source of another important aspect of the adolescent mind : its apparent intellectualism. Normally the instinctive affective life is inversely related in intensity to the intellectual life. This means that the more the instinctive-affective life is indulged, the less (at the same time—for of course they can be consecutive) will the intellectual life flourish. But in adolescence there is an apparent reversal of this law. The reversal is only apparent however; what appears as a fine flowering of intellectualization is really only what athletes call a 'work-out'. It is interesting to watch the difference between the performance of an athlete exercising himself before a high-jump, and his actual jump ; or a shadow-boxing performance and the real thing. The fine intellectual performance of the adolescent discussing ideals, or politics, international affairs or religion, marriage, literature, or art, makes little or no difference to his actual behaviour. Such discussions can be formal, as in a school or university debate, or informal, as in what the young American male calls a 'bull session', or more informal still when a group of youths propound among themselves wild anarchic statements and draw up blueprints for the nation or the world. Clearly these exercises are largely verbal, as indeed is much of their schoolwork and study. It would be a mistake to read into them a depth or significance which, if the adolescent knew we were doing it, would only embarrass him. Anna Freud puts the matter very clearly :

> We recognise . . . that we have here something quite different from intellectuality in the ordinary sense of the term. We must not suppose that an adolescent ponders on the various situations in love or on the choice of a profession in order to think out the right line of behaviour,

> as an adult might do . . . . Adolescent intellectuality seems merely to minister to daydreams . . . He evidently derives gratification from the mere process of thinking, speculating, or discussing. His behaviour is determined by other factors and is not necessarily influenced by the results of these intellectual gymnastics.[1]

The situation closely resembles the pre-speech phase of babbling on the part of the infant. Like babbling, which prepares the infant for speech proper later on, these intellectual exercises of the adolescent prepare the way for real thinking later on.

It is important to note that the subjects in which the adolescent in these intellectual exercises is primarily interested are precisely those linked most closely with his anxieties. Family, friendship, love, God, religion, and power (in all its phases : leadership, politics, athletics, engines, scientific control of nature, etc.), all play a part. His difficulty is the ever-present one of ' relating the instinctual side of human nature to the rest of life',[2] of deciding to indulge or to control a sexual impulse, of choosing between liberty and restraint, between revolt and submission, obedience and disobedience. His asceticism has not solved the problem, and repression will not solve it. A temporary escape from it is achieved by ' intellectualizing ' it. This enables him to turn to his conflict in thought, instead of running away from it or yielding in actual behaviour to the pressure of instinct. Hence ' the abstract intellectual discussions and speculations in which young people delight are not genuine attempts at solving the tasks set by reality.' But they can be most valuable nevertheless. They serve to turn instinctual processes into conceptual thinking, and so render them accessible to consciousness. This is the very first requisite in making them amenable to control, and eventually bringing them under the control of the will. The apparent asceticism, the constitutional aversion, the ' innate modesty', and all the other defence mechanisms to which one might refer derive from the non-rational, or better pre-rational, instinctual, unconscious part of us. They are not fully ' human acts'. But when intellect through conceptual thinking begins to grapple with them, and will can choose appropriate lines of action, the moral quality of the resultant behaviour changes. It would clearly be a mistake to build too much on their instinctual, pre-rational, natural character.

Such then in brief is the phenomenon we are dealing with : an individual human being, who must not be thought of as a miniature adult but only as a potential one, with problems and processes specific to his own age-group. We must now consider his spiritual formation.

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[1] *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence,* pp. 175-176

[2] A. Freud, *loc. cit.* pp. 176

It is noteworthy, at the outset, that there have been very few indeed canonized from this age-group. Saint Dominic Savio comes to mind, and Maria Goretti, Saint Stanislaus Kostka, and perhaps one or two more—but a very great number has been canonized from the next age-group : the young adults. The reason for this is not difficult to find. Apart from martyrdom, sanctity is achieved through heroic virtue, and the exercise of the virtues is through human acts, whereas, as we have seen, much of the behaviour of the adolescent, even when it is good and savours of merit, is still largely instinctive rather than voluntary. In training adolescents, moreover, it is important to remember that young people generally will tend to behave in the ways in which we expect them to behave, rather than in the ways in which we tell them to behave. They do this through two mechanisms : on the one hand through empathy—they feel our lack of confidence in them ; and on the other, through identification : they observe the contradictions in our own lives between performance and precept, and identify with us at our level of achievement rather than our level of aspiration. It is obvious therefore that if we are to succeed in training adolescents we must reorientate our own thinking first.

Furthermore, it is obvious that knowledge is not virtue. We can give, and young people can receive almost passively a great deal of knowledge. But the acquisition of virtue must come from within, and actively—from autodetermined action at the level of human acts. This means consciously chosen, willed acts, with knowledge of the substance and end and all the relevant ethical determinants. Do we ever in fact provide opportunities for this kind of act ? True, opportunities will arise for the adolescent. But do we try to provide them, in the way in which we provide training for a football team, or illustrations for history or geography ? I do not mean, do we tell them moral tales or goody-goody-stories ? It would not be difficult to think up ethical or moral problems, analogous to the *casus* of moral theology, but of course much simpler and more direct, more immediately relevant to the adolescent's world. This could be done in the form of questions at the end of a class on the commandments, for instance : ' What would you do if you found a purse in the street ? ' ' If you found at the end of the day that you had not worked hard enough to earn your salary ?' 'If you knew that your team was fielding a man over age?' 'If you broke a window?', etc., etc., naturally geared in difficulty to the different age-groups.

This kind of training could be supplemented by more concrete methods. These of course will not involve situations where a breach would involve sin, but where nevertheless a conscious choice at the level of human actions has to be made. In homework, or study preparation for example an occasional piece of work could be given for which the solution is available in some textbook at the disposal of the students.

The students might be told : ' You may take this from your books if you wish, but if you do, mark your exercise with an ' x ' . . . .' This confronts the youth with a choice which is very real and which is very tempting in one direction. It is only on rare occasions that the adolescent is presented with situations where the raw act of the will is fully conscious. Discipline is necessary for the adolescent, as is routine. But the experienced teacher can think up a thousand ways in which open choices are presented, without endangering good order and discipline.

In teaching religion to adolescents, and in preaching to them, it is important to avoid the importation of emotional elements. By this I do not imply that emotion is bad or undesirable. I mean only that the emotions we may import will be the wrong ones. We will only succeed in embarrassing the young people, thus producing negativism or worse. Heartiness and humour (unless it is extremely cleverly done) will be just as embarrassing as sentiment or mawkishness. Many of the mysteries of religion are emotional enough in their own right : Bethlehem, Calvary, mortal sin, Hell, etc. But the adolescent strives to conceal his emotions because he is afraid of them. He will avoid the more tender emotions with particular care because he cannot be sure of his own responses, as witness his avoidance of affection for mother or sister in public. With regard to sin and Hell, he is already suffering conflicts in their regard. It would be a pity to aggravate these conflicts for that will not resolve them. The desirable approach is a cool, dead-panning attitude in which the teacher's position is plainly and unequivocally one of ' What I am saying to you is a set of true propositions,' and not one of ' What I am saying to you is an exhortation, or moral uplift.' There are two points to be stressed here. One is the difficulty of identifying a genuine act of faith in an adolescent. The other is the immediacy of his awareness of temporal punishment, both through emotional guilt and through his experience of disciplinary measures. The first point means something like this : the adolescent does of course make acts of faith since he has the infused theological virtues through Baptism and Confirmation. But we, looking on from the outside, can be easily misled. To the adolescent, at any rate in early adolescence, there is no more mystery about the spiritual world than there is about outer space, no more mystery about Transubstantiation than there is about the conversion of mass into energy in the atom bomb. This of course is a good thing, and I do not wish to suggest that we should put difficulties into his mind. What I mean is something quite different and much more general. The intellect reaches its peak point of development in adolescence and the adolescent has a clearer eye than we have for spiritual things. Like the disciples on the road to Emmaus, his eyes can be opened (Luke xxiv, 31). Adolescents have the grace of God and the indwelling of the Holy Ghost to help them; they have the gifts of wisdom, understanding, and know-

ledge. We can therefore give them a great deal more than we usually do. The more we give, the more they can take. We are sometimes tempted to confuse what the adolescent ought to be able to repeat or reproduce with what he ought to know. This is an elementary pedagogic mistake. The adolescent can take something very close to the content of a lecture on dogmatic theology. He should not therefore be limited to a few abbreviated shorthand notes. If he is given the full richness of the Church's teaching on some mystery, for example Transubstantiation, he will penetrate very far indeed into it. It will then be possible to insist on the memorizing and reproducing process in a meaningful way. But sometimes at least, all he is given is what he is expected to reproduce. It is at this level that the danger may arise about the act of faith. Christian Doctrine should be taught to adolescents at an adult level. We have already accepted this in regard to algebra, geometry, the calculus, literature, etc., and we take it for granted. For a generation or more, we have been teaching material to youths at school which up to recently was difficult for adults. We have not yet decided, in teaching religion, to be as wise as the children of this world.

There is an incidental consideration to be made here. Some teachers tend to import into their teaching of religion two elements of anxiety which have no place there. First, because of the importance of the subject they are themselves anxious about it, and may communicate this anxiety to their pupils. The second anxiety is the generation in some schools of an examination neurosis greater even than that which arises with regard to secular subjects. Examinations are of course necessary. But the teaching of religious knowledge should be a model subject in the school, and not a frantic fear-laden cram three weeks before the examination. How many schools put their very best teachers in charge of this subject?

In the spiritual formation of the adolescent, the main dangers and difficulties should now be fairly obvious.

First, there is the danger of confusing a purely naturalistic approach with a supernatural one. The adolescent has anxieties and difficulties of his own. He may discover, or we may communicate to him, that he can find relief for his anxieties in religious practices. He may tend to use religion for this purpose, to the possible detriment of religion itself in the long run, for it will not necessarily relieve anxiety, and it is not its formal function to do so. He may discover that it does not do so in his case (as apparently James Joyce did) and then turn away from it altogether, at least for a time. The maturation process can easily be delayed through this naturalistic use of religion.

Secondly, there is the danger of mere conformity. This is familiar to most teachers, and most school authorities take precautions against it. This danger arises because of the adolescent's need, referred to above, for

group-structure, group organization, and identification. He will be enormously helped in this by group-organizations such as sodalities. But membership of these organizations should not be confused with meritorious human acts. There may be only a minimum of human volition and free choice involved. Such organizations are a means to an end : the end being the inducing of free human choices on the adolescent's part. If they do not do this, they will have failed. The enormous number of young people in England who cease (temporarily) to practise their religion after leaving school would seem to indicate that the organizational method has not succeeded in making their religion for them a matter of personal choice. (Many of them make a clear choice again later on, usually on the occasion of marriage, so that it would be a mistake to think that the method has failed entirely.)

Thirdly, the apparent intellectualism of the adolescent is obviously important in the context of spiritual formation. It means that one will naturally expect to find the adolescent expressing an interest in spiritual things, a readiness to read spiritual books, to discuss spiritual topics, etc. But it would be a mistake to take this too readily as a sign of spirituality. It may mean no more than a similar interest in space fiction or romantic literature. And even if it is more than this and represents a genuine interest in spiritual things, it may have little or no influence on behaviour. It may represent a transient interest rather than an abiding need. I would not like to suggest that the adolescent should be discouraged from spiritual reading, but it might be a good thing to discourage him from reading spiritual books written for adolescents. These are usually well-intentioned, but sometimes rather frothy, especially in their presentation of adolescent saints. It should be remembered that the intellect, as was said above, reaches its peak point of development in adolescence. Playing down to the adolescent can only result in harm. He will turn away in disgust from what he will regard as ' sissy ' writing. People who write books on religion and spirituality for adolescents should read the kind of thing provided for adolescents in astronomy, archaeology, space travel, science fiction. Only the best lives of the saints and spiritual books should be given to the interested adolescent. The emphasis for the moment should in general be on inculcating the natural virtues: manliness, honesty, reliability, fair-dealing, etc. In this way a solid basis will be laid down for spiritual development. If this is not done, much effort will be wasted on ephemeral and accidental matters.

Prayer is one of the most difficult topics to discuss accurately in reference to the adolescent. The obvious danger is that we may teach the adolescent to use prayer as a rationalization rather than as a spiritual exercise. The difficulty is one of drawing the line, and I do not wish to exaggerate. We do not let the adolescent think that he is going to pass his examinations merely by doing novenas. And most of his prayer is

probably sanctifying and efficacious. But his anxieties are not automatically relieved or cured by prayer, nor is he necessarily helped into adulthood by the kind of prayer he most often uses : prayer of petition. The adult seeking peace of mind or peace of soul generally knows what he is seeking. His search is a rational one, and for many it will also be supernaturalized. He seeks forgiveness for conscious wrong-doing, or perhaps greater certainty about God's mercy. His anxiety may very well be the *timor Domini* which is the beginning of wisdom. If his anxiety has a natural source in his own emotional life, this will not surprise him. He can cope with it, and in praying for peace of mind he will not apply the test of freedom from a natural emotional upset as a criterion of the efficacy or otherwise of prayer. But it is otherwise with the adolescent.

In general, the normal adult will not think that the value of his prayer is proportioned to the physical intensity he can put into the act of ' saying a prayer', nor is he still subject to the magic of words (a childhood phenomenon) to the same extent as the adolescent. ' Open Sesame ' as an efficient cause capable of opening a locked door presents no difficulty to a child. This type of word-magic survives in the meaningless expletives (or even meaningful obscenities and curses, and conventional phrases such as ' cheers', ' sláinte ') of the adult, which serve as efficient means of relieving one's feelings. The average adult does not perhaps realize that the latter are word-magic similar to ' Open Sesame '. The adolescent comes somewhere between the overtly magical use of language by the child, and the automatic ritualistic quasi-magical use of the adult. He does not really believe in ' Open Sesames ' but he does not reject the possible efficacy of a wish to bring about a desirable state of affairs. He does not really believe that calling somebody a nasty name will turn the person into the corresponding thing. But he has his own taboo words (usually common to a group, gang, or school), and he usually accepts some form of sympathetic magic. He must be led to discriminate between prayer and word-magic.

It should be clear therefore that one must be extremely careful about adolescent prayer. If an adult is in danger of using prayer as a wish-fulfilment, the danger is even greater for the adolescent, since he is in any case prone to indulge grandiose fantasies in day-dreaming. Romanticizing the priesthood or the missions or the Life of Our Lord can serve to feed the imagination rather than to deepen the spiritual life. Prayer can be a successful outlet for the adolescent's emotional drives, and for the pseudo-intellectualization described earlier in this essay. Sublimation is one of the few defence mechanisms which can serve healthy purposes, but the wise director will not encourage it. Finally, one must ensure that prayer does not partake of a compulsive-obsessional character. Should it do so, to that extent it ceases to be profitable or a genuine act of worship. This can easily arise if too much stress is laid on

repetitive vocal prayer, and is especially true of youths in the late teens who are already in process of formation as ecclesiastical students. The dangers I have been underlining are on the whole the dangers of a minority, at any rate in acute forms. I do not wish to suggest that all, or even a great number, fall into them. The vulnerable group is in any case always a minority group, and it is from the minority group that problems arise.

Because of the keenness of his intellect the adolescent will almost inevitably encounter doubts and difficulties about religious matters. It is only too easy to teach him to repress these doubts and to rationalize his difficulties. This is a mistake. It should be explained to him that a doubt in his mind is really a question : a seeking of further enlightenment, not a rejection of faith. It is an occasion for the deliberate exercise of an act of faith. A difficulty likewise should serve as an occasion for the deeper penetration of the mystery, and adolescents should be led to understand that the great theologians advanced our knowledge of God and the spiritual world by a combination of prayer and the facing of difficulties. This does not mean that every alleged difficulty and doubt should be treated equally seriously. Adolescents delight in playing the game of trying to stump the teacher. A little experience will enable the teacher or spiritual director to discriminate between the genuine question and the game. Moreover, as was pointed out in an earlier article (' The Adolescent', *Studies,* March, 1953), most of the adolescent's difficulties about religion are not theological difficulties, but moral or mental health problems.

In this article I have not been concerned to expound the well-proven principles of the spiritual life : the necessity of regular participation in spiritual exercises, of mortification, of mental prayer, of the examination of conscience, and the exercise of the virtues. My concern has been to try to show something of the nature of the adolescent to whom we must expound these principles. There is every reason to hope that the deepening insights into the adolescent mind now available may be of great help in teaching religion and in the spiritual formation of young people. *Timentibus Deum, omnia cooperantur in bonum.*

Ireland's Attitude to External Affairs

by MICHAEL MACDONAGH

IN the thirty odd years since the State was founded we have done little positive thinking about our relations with other countries. We have had big domestic problems to contend with and, on the whole, we have been content to let the world go by, heeding it only when necessity forced us to do so.

It is true that since 1945 there has been a big increase in our activities abroad. We have taken an active part in the Council of Europe. We have joined some of the specialized agencies of the United Nations ; as soon as we were given a seat in the General Assembly, we entered with vigour into all its debates. In the economic field, we have done a great deal to extend our foreign trade. We have sought and won markets in the most unlikely places ; for example, we have sent meat to Turkey and milk foods to Iraq and Ceylon ; we have sent cigarettes to Burma, machinery to India, woollen goods to Japan and linen to the Philippines. Our businessmen have travelled extensively and have made valuable contacts in other countries. We have always, I think, had a lively interest in world affairs and, since the war, this interest has become more marked. This is due, in part, to the impact of the war itself. It may also be due to the emphasis which has been placed in recent years on the need to extend our foreign trade. Another reason is that more people than ever before are going abroad on holidays and business.

Yet, in spite of all this, we have hardly begun yet to think constructively about our external relations. This may be understandable because until we became independent we had little direct concern with world affairs, and between 1922 and 1939 we were so preoccupied with our internal problems that we had little time or inclination to become involved in any others. Then came the war when we settled on a policy of neutrality, and we deliberately isolated ourselves from the rest of the world for the next six years. The result is that our outlook now is essentially isolationist. Great as our interest in world affairs may be, we are reluctant to abandon our isolationism. There is nothing wrong, of course, with isolationism in itself, provided it is constructive. The fact is that we have not really faced up to all the issues involved and our isolationism is based on emotion rather than reason. As an example of what I mean, let us take the case of NATO.

We have decided not to join NATO : the official reason given for this is that to do so would compromise our position in regard to Partition. Every member of NATO must guarantee to respect the existing territorial boundaries of the other members. Thus, if we were to join NATO, we should have to signif your respect for the existing territorial boundaries of the United Kingdom. These at present include six Irish counties. But, we say, we cannot guarantee our respect for the existing boundaries of the United Kingdom and therefore, we cannot join NATO. This view is held by all the political parties and has gone almost unchallenged.

The fact is, however, that we do in fact respect the existing boundaries of the United Kingdom. Our official policy is to try to bring about the unity of Ireland by political persuasion of the minority in the North. We reject the policy of physical force. This does not mean that we recognize the Border in principle. But we accept its existence until such time as we can do away with it by peaceful and political means. It seems illogical, therefore, that we should refuse to apply to NATO the policy we have adopted in relation to the United Kingdom. If we were to join NATO, it would not mean that we had to sacrifice our claim to the Six Counties in principle. The way would still be open to us to recover them by political persuasion.

It must be borne in mind that no organization such as NATO could exist without such rules. NATO could not exist if its members were to wage war against each other. We are not waging war against Britain. It is worth noting that although Greece was engaged in a bitter territorial dispute with Britain over Cyprus, she did not allow this to interfere with her membership of NATO. Would we join NATO were Ireland united ? I see no great enthusiasm for our joining NATO in any circumstances, either on the part of the political parties or on the part of the public. Maybe there are good reasons why we should not join NATO ; but if there are, let us state them and understand them. Do not let us hide behind the excuse of Partition.

Even if we consider that Partition is an obstacle to our joining NATO, are we justified in regarding it as an insuperable obstacle ? We know that if war breaks out between the Soviet Union and the Free World, we cannot escape being involved. We cannot hope to escape as we did in the last war ; but even if we could, would we be justified in sitting on the fence while the rest of the world fought the Soviet Union and China ? If our answer to that question is that we cannot remain neutral in a war with the Soviet Union, then we must ask ourselves are we justified in remaining neutral now.

Our position with regard to NATO is but one of the many serious problems confronting us. Our attitude to these problems must be based on a full understanding of the issues involved and on courageously

honest judgment. This is possible only if the full facts of our situation are made known to the public and only if the public is encouraged to think constructively. Some special effort is needed to stimulate the public into such thinking. Much more could be done by the political parties and the newspapers. One way in which the political parties could help would be in having more frequent Dáil debates on foreign affairs. Unfortunately Dáil debates, even on foreign affairs, tend to lose themselves in personal and party bickerings, and debates on such a level do not stimulate the public into constructive thinking.

An example of this was the reaction to Mr Aiken's vote in favour of a discussion of China's entry into the United Nations. A great many people disagreed with Mr Aiken's view and it was right and proper that those who disagreed with him should challenge him. It was hardly fair, however, to question his motives. Those who wanted to challenge him could have made out a very good case without descending to the level of an attack on Mr Aiken's personal character. Unfortunately, this aspect of the controversy which followed Mr Aiken's vote got the lion's share of the publicity and as a result the real issues at stake failed to make much impact on the public in general.

So far as the newspapers are concerned, they are devoting a good deal more space to foreign news than they used to. Nevertheless one senses a lack of policy behind this. There is little continuity in the presentation of foreign news so that often one will see a story begun and then seemingly forgotten. Not long ago, for example, it was reported in two of our newspapers that Ceylon intended to become a republic and to leave the British Commonwealth. This was officially denied by the Ceylon government a few days later but the denial was never published in Dublin. Perhaps there was a policy there—but, if so, what was it? One cannot altogether blame the newspapers, however, for this apparent lack of policy in the presentation of foreign news because the newspapers, like the public, are suffering from the effects of our long isolation from world affairs. A newspaper cannot be very far in advance of public opinion if it is to survive as a business.

The fact is that if one wants to be well-informed on world affairs one must read British and foreign newspapers—even, indeed, to keep informed about the activities of our own delegation in the United Nations. It is only by reading newspapers such as *The Times* and the *Manchester Guardian* that one can see how the Irish delegation has voted in some of the debates. We are, of course, at a considerable disadvantage compared with the big British newspapers, in that we cannot afford to send our own correspondents abroad. We are dependent almost entirely on reports supplied by the various foreign news agencies. It must be remembered that a news agency can only carry a limited wordage every day over its wireless and teleprinter circuits. We are,

too, a small market and the cost of collecting and distributing news is heavy. Naturally the agencies give priority to news which is of most general interest throughout the world or which is of special interest to big market areas. The cost of keeping a foreign correspondent in a place like New York is something in the region of £5,000 a year. If men were to be stationed in Paris, Rome, Strasbourg, London and Berlin, let alone all the other places which need coverage, the cost would be enormous.

An effort was made to overcome this problem when the Irish News Agency was formed. Its purpose was to supply foreign news to the Irish newspapers and to supply Irish news to the foreign Press. The agency was subsidized by the State to the extent of some £50,000 a year, but it was hoped that eventually it would operate on a balanced budget. The subsidy was a drawback because it left the agency open to allegations that it was subject to political interference. The pity is that a direct government subsidy was not really necessary, and a little more thought would have indicated to the organizers that the money could have been paid to the agency in an indirect way which would have saved it from the allegations made against it. Furthermore, the agency clashed with some of the Irish newspapers and with newspapermen because it engaged in the collection and distribution of local news for local newspapers. Originally, it was never intended that the agency should do this and it was accused of endangering the livelihood of Irish journalists. Whatever the rights or wrongs of this, the unfortunate fact is that the agency failed.

The Department of External Affairs could be of great help. At present the Department issues a weekly bulletin which has a wide circulation at home and abroad, but which is of little real value. Much of the information it contains is out of date by the time it reaches its readers. I spent some years working for one of the big news agencies in London. In my experience, the Irish bulletin, which arrived every week, was rarely found to be of any use as a source of news, and this is as true in Dublin as it is in London. It would be a very valuable contribution to the creation of an enlightened public opinion if the Department were to issue up-to-the-minute bulletins on its activities abroad. Government departments do not like publicizing themselves, as a rule, but it is illuminating to see how the foreign affairs ministries of other countries operate in this connection. I spent some twelve years abroad as a foreign correspondent. One of my daily chores was to keep in touch with the foreign affairs ministry of the country I happened to be stationed in. As a rule this was not very difficult because most ministries held regular press conferences at which the reporters and foreign correspondents were given detailed briefings by senior officials. Invariably, I found, a positive effort was made to convey information

to the Press and through the Press to the public, both at home and abroad. It was always a propaganda effort, of course, but nevertheless it was also invariably true that questions were freely answered.

It has now become urgently necessary to stimulate public thinking about our external relations because it is inevitable that we shall find ourselves increasingly drawn into the turmoil of world affairs. We are, for example, faced with the prospect of a Free Trade Area in Europe. Our attitude to this question now will determine our well-being for years to come. It is essential, therefore, that we should understand fully the facts of our economic position. The economic difficulties of post-war years have probably impressed on most people an appreciation of the fact that we have to export to live, and no one will deny that Britain is our best customer. The real significance of this, however, is but dimly realized and it has only been hinted at in official statements on the Free Trade question. The loss of the British market for our agricultural exports would be a calamity. However much we may expand our imports to other countries there is no hope that we can ever replace the British market. This economic dependence on Britain limits our freedom of action, politically as well as economically. Full political freedom is impossible without full economic freedom and it requires very fine judgment indeed to effect a sound balance between political independence and economic dependence. This is a problem which has become acute since the war with the rise of the two super-powers—the United States and the Soviet Union. The economic and political power of Europe has waned and with it Europe's freedom of economic and political action. As an act of self-preservation, six of the Free countries of Europe have surrendered some of their sovereign powers to form a Common Market. Britain is faced with a similar problem but she is more reluctant than the Common Market countries to sacrifice any part of her sovereignty. She could have joined the Common Market but declined to do so. She could not find a way to do so without risking the loss of her Commonwealth.

The problem now faces us, for it seems likely that Britain will join some form of Free Trade Area, either independent of, or in association with, the Common Market countries. This would entail some sacrifice of sovereignty without appreciably weakening Commonwealth ties. (The difference between the Common Market and the proposed Free Trade Area is this : The Common Market countries propose to eliminate all tariff barriers between themselves and to institute a common tariff barrier against all other countries ; the Free Trade countries would eliminate all tariff barriers between themselves but would be free to impose their own individual tariffs against non-members.) It is obvious that if Britain were to join a Free Trade Area, it would have a big effect on our British market, for we would then have to

compete in this market with the produce of other countries entering the market free of tariffs.

The question is, could we stay outside the Free Trade Area? Could our exports compete with the produce of the Free Trade countries? It is hardly likely. It looks as though we must be prepared to sacrifice some part of our national sovereignty. There would be nothing shameful in this. We would be taking part in the great movement towards the ultimate goal of a United States of Europe. It would also open up great opportunities to us. It would allow us to compete on equal terms with all members of the Free Trade Area in all their markets. If the Free Trade Area were associated with the Common Market Area, it would draw us into the main stream of European culture from which we have been so long divorced. This is an exciting possibility. We shall need knowledge and mature judgment to guide us along the path opening out before us. We shall also need hard work; it is not easy to get a man to work hard unless he appreciates the reason for it.

The Categorical Imperative

by MICHAEL CONNOLLY

> Abbé Terrasson remarks, with great justice, that if we estimate the size of a work, not from the number of its pages, but from the time which we require to make ourselves master of it, it may be said of many a book that it would be much shorter, if it were not so short.
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> Kant : *Critique of Pure Reason,* in the Preface to the First Edition.

A CELEBRATED Irish moralist begins his chapter on 'The Categorical Imperative' with these words : ' I feel that it is due to the reader to give him notice at the very beginning of this chapter that I do not profess to understand Kant's system of philosophy. I have tried and tried to get to the heart of it and failed '.[1] This candid avowal will comfort lesser men who may, in patient mystification, have laboured through the pages of Kant's ethical works in their best-known English version, the volume by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, sometime Senior Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin.[2]

Of those works the first in time and in importance was published in 1785 and entitled : *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten.* It is quite necessary to give the book its German title, since differences of opinion concerning its interpretation will be reflected in the very translation of the title. Thus Professor A.R.C. Duncan, in one of the books noticed in the present article,[3] renders Kant's title : *Foundations for the Metaphysics of Morals.* In this use of the proposition *for* to translate *zur* Professor Duncan is at variance with all Kant's translators hitherto. Thus Abbott translates : *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals* and Paton : *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals.* We might say without exaggeration that the whole purpose of Professor Duncan's work is to vindicate his use of *for* instead of *of.* But this pithy description must not be taken to mean that his book is a highly specialized study, mainly concerned with minutiae. On the contrary, it is a most readable, stimulating and illuminating introduction to Kant's difficult little treatise.

To call Kant's *Groundwork* (as I should prefer to call the *Grundlegung*) difficult is almost an understatement. It would be hard to name another philosophical treatise of comparable length which has produced so much disagreement amongst its readers. ' Disagreement with the opinions expressed by a philosophical author is only to be expected, but the dis-

[1] Walter McDonald, D.D. : *The Principles of Moral Science.* Dublin, 1903
[2] *Kant's Theory of Ethics,* 6th edition, 3rd impression. London, 1927
[3] *Practical Reason and Morality.* London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1957. pp. xviii, 182. 18s.

agreement generated by the *Foundations* deserves to be set in a class by itself. Its critics disagree about the general nature or tendency of its teaching, about the presence or absence of specific doctrines within its pages, about the style and language used in its composition, and even about the philosophical rubric under which it should fall '. (Duncan, p. 2)

This last point of controversy is the most remarkable. To what branch of philosophy should the *Grundlegung* be regarded as belonging? There are three nouns in the title—*Groundwork, Metaphysic, Morals*—and each of them is selected by a different school of interpreters as the operative word. For some the word is *Morals;* Kant, they believe, meant to give us a treatise on ethics, setting forth the most general principles governing human conduct. For others, the important word is *Metaphysic;* Kant gives us here his philosophy (metaphysic) of freewill. A variant of this opinion is that which holds that the book is primarily a treatise on ethics, but with an extended appendix on freewill. Yet a fourth view fastens on *Groundwork* as the key-word and maintains that the book is not primarily ethics, nor metaphysics, but something preparatory (or ' propaedeutic', as Kant would say) to both, namely, an inquiry into the power, range and validity of practical reason—in one word, a *critique* (Kritik) in Kant's sense of the word, corresponding to the similar inquiry (propaedeutic to the *metaphysics of nature*) concerning the theoretic use of reason which Kant undertook in his most famous work : *The Critique of Pure Reason.*

This last is the view adopted in Professor Duncan's book. And it has this to recommend it from the outset, that it corresponds with Kant's own description of his intentions in the Preface to the *Groundwork* : ' Intending, as I do, to publish some day a metaphysic of morals, I issue this *Groundwork* in advance. For such a metaphysic there is strictly no other foundation than a critique of *pure practical reason,* just as for metaphysics there is no other foundation than a critique of pure speculative reason which I have already published.' (Paton's translation). But, now, even amongst adherents of the last-mentioned interpretation, Duncan's book itself marks a divergence of views.

Despite this wholesale disagreement about its meaning, Kant's *Groundwork* has had a profound influence on the course of moral philosophy. H. J. Paton, a very eminent Kantian scholar, calls it ' one of the small books which are truly great ' . . . ' It has exercised on human thought an influence almost ludicrously disproportionate with its size. In moral philosophy it ranks with the *Republic* of Plato and the *Ethics* of Aristotle ; and perhaps . . . . it shows in some respects a deeper insight even than those.' (*The Moral Law,* p. 7)

Partly on this account and partly because it is considered a brief, handy exposition of his ethical theory, Kant's *Groundwork* is often the only book of the Critical philosophy which is prescribed reading in English-

speaking faculties of philosophy. It is therefore rather surprising that scholars have been so tardy in providing English-language commentaries. Since the War, however, much has been done to remedy this defect, though it is not quite accurate to say that H. J. Paton's *The Categorical Imperative* was 'the first full book-length study in English of Kant's *Foundations*.'(Duncan, p.ix) Already in 1924, J. W. Scott's *Kant on the Moral Life* gave, in lucid English, paraphrases, commentary, and appraisal of the *Groundwork*. Unfortunately this book seems to be out of print.

The major work in English on Kant's *Groundwork* is unquestionably *The Categorial Imperative* by H. J. Paton. It is clear, copious and written in a sympathetic, not to say enthusiastic, spirit. Yet it is fair and objective, glossing over none of its subject's deficiencies. Paton followed it up with *The Moral Law,* a new translation of the *Groundwork,* with extended analysis of the text and brief, but helpful notes. In 1948 the Aristotelian scholar, Sir William David Ross, published a shorter but useful commentary on Kant's work, entitled *Kant's Ethical Theory*. The 'Pelican' on Kant by S. Körner (1955) has won the encomia of the discerning. It has two good chapters on Kant's ethics. And now comes Professor Duncan's book, noted above, remarkably readable and propounding a novel and interesting thesis. Whether that thesis is admitted or not, this book fully deserves its place beside the English-language Kantiana of Scott, Paton and Ross. Much therefore has been done since 1945 to make Kant's *Groundwork* comprehensible to English-speaking students.

* * *

It may not be superfluous to give a brief account of the teaching of the *Groundwork,* so far as the present writer understands it. The attention given in recent years to this work, as evidenced by the books we have just mentioned, is motivated not solely by academic interest in a philosopher who contrived to say something new on an ancient theme, but also by the belief that Kant's insistence on the importance of reason in conduct has an important application in modern times.

The doctrine of the *Groundwork,* even when stripped down to essentials, is not easy to present coherently in a few pages. I can only hope to do so by concentrating on one aspect of it, albeit the major one, to wit, its quality of *critique*. For it is primarily a piece of typically Kantian *criticism* (Kritik) though containing, as I believe, embedded in the *critique,* a rudimentary ethical treatise. This sketch of a systematic, *a priori* ethics (a Metaphysic of Morals) is regarded by Professor Duncan as a mere afterthought, not part of Kant's original plan for his work, but an irrelevant interpolation, though made by the author himself. That is the point at

issue in Duncan's book. While admitting that 'the ethical interlude' is a subordinate part of the *Grundlegung*, I am not convinced that Duncan has proved his point. I shall say a word about it presently.

In the *Groundwork* Kant undertakes two main tasks: to explain what morality means, and to show that it is possible. It was 1784. Three years previously he had published the *Critique of Pure Reason*; and, in 1783, the *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic*. In those works he had explored and determined, to his own satisfaction, the contribution made by our mental faculties to the amalgam called knowledge; as he would express it, he had endeavoured to discern the *a priori* part of our theoretical knowledge. Those two works contained Kant's 'metaphysics of nature', and his next project is to write what he calls a 'metaphysics of morals'. He was convinced that man's moral thinking also, his judgments regarding conduct, contain an important element of the *a priori*, that is, an element contributed by the spontaneous activity of reason, analogous to the theoretical *a priori* examined in the two previous works. And the purpose of the Metaphysics of Morals will be to isolate this element.

Kant anticipated no difficulty in making his projected Metaphysics of Morals popularly intelligible. He was a great believer in the capacity of the ordinary man to recognize moral truth when he met it. But a preliminary task had to be done, a highly philosophical and difficult one, by no means suited to the capacity of the ordinary man. That task was to show unequivocally what morally good action was, and also, to dissolve the doubts and objections of those who could not see that such action, as understood by Kant, was possible.

For, in Kant's view, morally good action was an instance of pure reason being practical, being a cause producing action. And he realized that when this notion was explained, it would appear to the reader surprising, paradoxical, even impossible of realization. But there was no use in embarking on his project of a Metaphysics of Morals, or examination of pure reason's contribution to moral thinking and action, until he had established that pure reason *could* make such a contribution. He had to explore the power and scope of reason in its practical exercise (as entering into action rather than merely thinking) just as his previous two works had done for speculative or merely cognitive reason. He proposed, therefore, in the *Groundwork* to write a Critique of pure but practical reason (i.e. of practical reason in its *a priori* or non-empirical exercise). A partial or inchoative Critique would suffice, however. For the present it would be enough to establish the bare fact that pure reason could be practical. The forthcoming Metaphysics of Morals required no other preliminary; but that preliminary was indispensable.

Stating his purpose more precisely towards the end of the *Preface* Kant declares: 'The sole aim of the present *Groundwork* is to seek out and establish *the supreme principle of morality*.' In the first two Sections or

Chapters of the work he is engaged in ' seeking out ' ; in the Third, he ' establishes '. The first two he describes as analytical ; his argument consists in analysing men's ordinary moral thinking and separating-out the bed-rock knowledge or judgment or experience implicit in that thinking. The third Section he calls ' synthetic '. What he *means* by that is not quite clear. What he *does* is to make an affirmation which has been hanging fire up to that. All through Sections One and Two he has been saying : ' This is what morality is, if there be such a thing at all as moral willing.' In Section Three he ' purifies the condition ' : moral willing exists or, at least, is possible.

* * *

In Kant's view, morality, moral goodness, ' goodness without qualification ' is the attribute solely of action for duty's sake. This belief is basic in Kant's ethics. Yet in the *Groundwork* I cannot find a rigorous proof of it. Kant seems to think it sufficient to call men's attention to this proposition in order that they should recognize its accuracy. Morality, moral goodness is a characteristic of good willing, and an agent's willing is good when he does what he ought simply because he ought. The motive (Kant calls it ' maxim ' or principle) is paramount. One may do the right, but from another motive than duty. A shopkeeper may trade honestly in order to keep his customers. His action is right but devoid of moral goodness. He is not actuated by the moral motive. Only when he does what he ought *because he ought* does his action realize that supreme value which we call morality.

Implicit therefore in all man's moral thinking, the reasoning and judgments which inform and guide action that is morally good, are judgments of the type : ' I ought to help my neighbour,' ' I ought to avoid false promises.' Morality, moral goodness, is action in accordance with such judgments. But note that such judgments are complete in themselves ; they imply no tacit condition or hypothesis ; that is, they are categorical. They are quite different from the guiding principle of the shopkeeper above which might be formulated thus : ' I ought to act honestly, if, or since, I wish to keep my customers.' They are different even from such apparently moral principles as : ' I ought to act honestly if I am to secure eternal happiness ', or, even, ' if I wish to obey God.' In these last three examples the force and validity of the ' ought ' depends on an ' if ', on an hypothesis. They are hypothetical ' oughts '. The characteristic ' ought ' of moral judgment is not so dependent. The form of moral judgments is ' I ought ' — no more. Yet Kant maintains that such principles are acknowledged as binding. Hence the moral ' ought ' is a categorical or absolute ' ought '. We recognize in this terminology

an application of the modal distinction of propositions into hypothetical (conditional) and categorical (absolute).

Kant's claim to originality in ethics is based upon his discernment and justification of this unique ' ought ' which is implicit in truly moral judgments. When he speaks of setting forth ' the supreme principle of morality ' it is this ' ought ' he has in mind. Sections One and Two of the *Groundwork* are altogether occupied with detecting it, describing it, formulating it, distinguishing it from its many counterfeits. It is difficult to explain this categorical ' ought ' ; to realize that, if my action is to have moral worth, I must do what I ought precisely because I ought ; I must act ' from duty '. Duty is, he believes, what is utterly basic in moral experience. That is, no doubt, why he is content in the ' analytical ' part of the *Groundwork* to draw his readers' attention to this experience and the unconditional ' ought ' in which it finds expression.

He describes this ' ought ' as a ' command ' or ' imperative '. (We need not bother about the distinction he makes, and does not always adhere to, between these two terms.) It is as if my reason, uttering the practical propositions in which this ' ought ' is contained, were giving me commands. For example, ' I ought to develop my talents ' may be paraphrased as ' I am to develop my talents ' (imperative mood, first person) or ' Develop your talents ' (imperative mood, second person). My reason is, as it were, hypostatized and set in authority over me. And, as the ' ought ' is absolute or categorical so is the imperative or command. Thus we get the name ' the categorical imperative '. Kant formulates it frequently in the imperative mood : ' Act so '.

He is well aware that when he teaches that the only moral motive is that of duty, in other words, that to act morally well, I must do what I ought just because I ought, he is saying something paradoxical. Practical reason enjoins, e.g. ' Act honestly '. ' Yes ', we inevitably rejoin, ' but why ? ' (Is not this the crucial question of moral philosophy : Why should I do my duty ?) And Kant replies : ' Because you ought ; that is all ; that ' ought ' is motive enough. If you need to call upon any other motive your action will have no moral worth.' And yet the tendency to ask why, to seek a more compelling and evident motive, is almost irresistible.

Kant recognizes the difficulty. He expresses it in the terminology of his own Critical philosophy by declaring that the ' ought ' propositions which make up our moral thinking are *synthetic-a-priori* propositions. And it is not immediately obvious how a synthetic *a priori* proposition can be made with certainty by practical reason. (The notion of a synthetic *a priori* proposition is quite central to the Critical philosophy of Kant. To determine how such propositions are possible in the theoretical order was the main problem of the great Critique of

speculative reason. Small wonder then that, when he comes to the Critique of practical reason, the same phraseology and a similar problem recur.)

A synthetic proposition is one which truly augments our knowledge, in as much as the predicate is not discovered by analysis of the subject-concept. Such propositions may be derived from sense-experience, as when I say: 'This paper is white.' Our knowledge that the paper is white is not acquired by analysing the concept of the *paper*. Propositions of this kind which follow a particular sense experience are synthetic *a posteriori*. Their genesis presents little difficulty; they can be accounted for by the particular sense experience. But we also make synthetic affirmations, which are universal and necessary, valid, that is, far beyond the range of our actual sense-experience, like : ' Every event has a cause distinct from itself.' Sense experience cannot account for their genesis ; hence Kant concludes that they are partially due to the spontaneous operation and contribution of our thinking equipment. They are synthetic *a priori*. To lay bare the mental mechanism which enables us to make such affirmations was a main task of Kant's so-called *Transcendental* Criticism.

Turning now from the purely cognitive to the practical exercise of reason we are confronted by propositions embodying the categorical imperative, the moral ' ought ' : such practical propositions as ' I ought to help my needy neighbour.' Those propositions, Kant maintains, are also synthetic *a priori*. But they belong to the practical order ; hence the nexus between subject, e.g. ' I', and predicate, e.g. ' to help my needy neighbour ' is not ' is ' but ' ought'. This nexus is not established by analysis of the subject-concept, ' I'. The proposition is therefore synthetic. Yet it is not derived from sense-experience. Sense experience could never account for the necessity it imposes upon me ; nor for the fact that I judge the proposition to be valid of any rational being whatever who might be in my circumstances. It is therefore synthetic *a priori*, Kant concludes. That is why we find such judgments so difficult to comprehend.

For, compare a categorical imperative with a hypothetical. Compare the moral principle : ' I ought to help my needy neighbour ' with a maxim of expediency like : ' I ought to help my neighbour if I wish to be well thought-of in the locality.' The latter can easily be explained. ' I-a-rational - agent - effectively - willing - to - be - popular - in - the - locality - and - seeing - beneficence - to - be - the - means - thereto must therefore (ought to) help my neighbour.' Spelled-out like this the proposition is seen to be analytical, subject entails predicate. There is no mystery.

Quite otherwise in the former, and truly moral, principle. In it there is no condition. The subject is immediately linked with the predicate. ' I-a-rational-agent', with the action of helping my neighbour. This action cannot be discerned from an analysis of ' I-a-rational-agent '

merely. The proposition is not analytic ; therefore synthetic. And synthetic *a priori,* because necessary and universal. To say that the proposition is *a priori* means, for Kant, that the nexus between subject and predicate, between the rational will and the action imposed on it, is due to the mind's spontaneous activity.

This, in Kantian phraseology, is an account of the grounds of our initial dissatisfaction when we are told that a proposition like ' I ought to help my neighbour ' is complete in itself, furnishes adequate motive, the sole moral motive, for helping my neighbour. We spontaneously ask : ' Why ought I ? ' But if we are to remain within the limits of moral action, there is no answer to the ' why', except perhaps to reiterate : ' Because you ought,' ' because it is your duty'. The mystery arises from this being a synthetic *a priori* practical proposition. Such propositions need to be shown possible. How can we affirm them with certainty and conviction ? That was the problem in the great *Critique.* That problem, but now concerning practical propositions, confronts us here again.

Indeed, as Kant proposes it in the *Groundwork,* the problem is more difficult than that of the *Critique of Pure Reason.* In the latter work, it was admitted that there are synthetic *a priori* theoretical propositions, e.g., those of physics and mathematics. The task was to show *how* they are possible. In the *Groundwork,* he believes that he must show also that we *actually make* synthetic *a priori* practical propositions, that *there is* a categorical imperative, that we are not mistaken in thinking that we sometimes act, or can act, purely for duty's sake. Kant sets himself a two-fold task ; first, to show that practical reason *formulates* a genuine categorical imperative and therefore a synthetic *a priori* proposition ; and, secondly, how or why it can do so.

* * *

But, before propounding an answer to those weighty problems, he indulges in one of those idiosyncracies of composition which help to make his book such difficult reading. He goes off on a long digression. Three or four times in this part of the book he leads his reader up to the point where an answer to his main problem is reasonably expected. And on each occasion, he, as it were, refuses the jump and proceeds instead to clarify some further issue. It is a disconcerting trick, but nowhere is it so confusing as here. Specifically, at this point Kant proceeds to give various formulations of the categorical imperative, with the intention of ' gaining entrance for', that is, winning acceptance for, his doctrine. These formulae are undoubtedly meant to be criteria of morality, rules for distinguishing good or bad conduct. The character of Kant's treatise in this particular pericope (the heart of his central chapter) is undoubtedly

that of an ethical disquisition, a systematic examination of laws of moral behaviour. Here we have, to my mind, a specimen of the sort of thing Kant means by Metaphysics of Morals, a sample, or foretaste of the sort of work Kant, in 1784, meant that projected work to be. The thesis of Professor Duncan's book is mainly concerned with this passage. For the present, however, so as not to interrupt Kant's main line of argument, I shall omit consideration of it.

* * *

After his divagation Kant gets back to the question of whether synthetic *a priori* practical propositions (judgments embodying the unconditioned moral 'ought') are possible, and, if so, how? The key to his answer is Freedom or Freewill. And he leads up to Freedom by an exposition of the Principle of Autonomy.

Moral judgments, we have seen, are those which contain the categorical 'ought'. Now such judgments, since they are independent of any particularizing desire or aim of the individual agent who elicits them (e.g. 'I ought to develop my talents,' not 'I ought to develop my talents if I wish to make money') are universal in their application. That is, they are valid for every rational being whatsoever; they are *laws*. Furthermore, Kant argues, they are laws imposed by the practical reason of the agent, therefore self-imposed. He seems to reach this conclusion by some such argument as the following: If I carry out the action enjoined by a moral law (e.g. 'Act justly') for the sake of pleasing or obeying an external lawgiver, e.g. God, my action is not on that account morally good. Why? Because its principle is a hypothetical and not a categorical imperative. The principle is: 'I ought to act justly, if I wish to please God.' And Kant is emphatic that unless the principle of my action is simply 'Act justly' or 'I ought to act justly' (a categorical imperative) that action does not belong to the class which we regard as morally good. Therefore, a pivotal conclusion of his analysis of men's moral thinking and judging is that those actions only are morally good of which the principle is (1) *universalizable*, hence a law, and (2) a law, at that, which is not imposed from without but self-imposed by the agent's own practical reason. That is the celebrated Principle of Autonomy; it means that the practical reason of the moral agent is a *law-making* reason. Therein consists the dignity of the rational agent, that he obeys only a law which he himself makes. To such a conclusion Kant's examination of the moral 'ought' leads.

So far his occupation has been purely analytical; he has been making explicit what he believes is contained implicitly in the reason of the

ordinary, good man, whenever he elects to perform a morally good act ; if, indeed, anyone ever does perform a morally good act and is not deceiving himself when he thinks he does his duty merely because he ought.

* * *

But Kant does not really doubt that morality is possible. His efforts to establish its possibility are found principally in Section Three, the ' synthetic ' part of the *Groundwork*. The argument hinges on the doctrine of Freedom or Free-will.

Moral goodness, if there be such, is action in conformity with a principle whose form is that of a categorical imperative. For instance, it is action on the mere principle : ' I ought to help my needy neighbour.' When a principle is of such a form, it can truly be regarded as a law of practical reason, self-imposed. Now for a will (or practical reason) to act on a self-imposed law is freedom. Such a will is self-law-giving or autonomous. To be autonomous is to be free.

And so we can be moral *if* we are free. Certainly we seem to be moral ; we seem sometimes to act upon categorical imperatives ; but we must guard against self-deception. Who can say that, even when he thinks he does his duty for duty's sake, deep-down his spring of action may not be, after all, ' the dear self ' ? Therefore, we cannot presume that morality is possible. We must establish it. We do so by showing that our will is free.

After so much insistence on the need to prove freedom, it is disappointing when in Section Three we come upon the actual demonstration. Kant simply says that a rational agent must act ' under the idea of freedom '. He means that such an agent when he addresses himself to action must believe, suppose, assume himself to be free. Therefore, *for practical purposes* he is free. It is not easy to find in the *Groundwork* any more cogent demonstration of the all-important fact of freedom than this : a rational agent must consider himself free.

Nor is this apparently lame argument so weak when we grasp Kant's complete position. Note the expression above: ' for practical purposes '. It is reason-in-action which knows itself free. For purely cognitive reason, freedom does not exist. It is self-contradictory. How can this be so ? How can something be grasped by reason in action that is impervious to reason contemplating ? It is now that Kant introduces the famous distinction which he has elaborated in the speculative *Critique* between the *noumenal* and the *phenomenal* orders. We can know things only as they appear to us in sense-perception, never as they are in themselves. Our knowledge is confined to appearances ; it never penetrates to the reality behind them. We can *think* this latter, but not know it. Our cognitive reason grasps the world of appearances, the phenomenal world. The

intelligible world, the noumenal, eludes it. And this is true also of our own selves, our personality. When we introspect, what meets our contemplation is the passing show of thoughts, volitions, emotions, never the intelligible self which lies beneath. Never — save in one instance : when we are conscious of freedom. Then we are in contact with our real, our intelligible selves.

For freedom, Kant maintains, belongs to the intelligible world, not to the sensible; to the real, not to the apparent. That is why it is veiled and inexplicable to the speculative reason which is at home and sure of itself only in the world of appearances. The laws which apply to the phenomenal world do not apply to the noumenal. This explains why freedom is so incomprehensible. We seek to prove and explain it by the law of causality which governs all visible nature. But, Kant holds, it is only in the world of appearances that the law of causality is valid. According to his own principles, therefore, he may fairly ask not to be required to *prove* freedom. To prove anything is to explain it in terms of cause and effect, of natural causality. But the law of causality does not hold in the noumenal world. Hence, all we can say is, in rational action, in morality, we experience ourselves to be free, we are free *in act.* But we cannot turn back upon ourselves and prove our freedom. As soon as we attempt to do so, we are using reason in a speculative, theoretical manner and speculative reason cannot apprehend the noumenal world to which freedom belongs.

So too with the apparent contradiction in the very notion of freedom. Freedom consists *negatively* in the capacity of the will (or of the practical reason with which Kant identifies the will) not to be determined to action by any object other than itself ; and *positively* in the power of determining itself in accordance with laws which itself gives. How can the will give itself laws which bind ? How can it thus as it were initiate action as a sheer beginning, behaving after the fashion of a finite, unmoved first mover ? This antinomy might well cause us to reject freedom and, with it, morality, did we not remember that in dealing with freedom we are dealing with the noumenal world and that what is contradiction to our speculative reason, contemplating the world of appearances which is ruled by the law of natural causality, may be reality to practical reason which alone is in contact with the noumenal. Freedom is incomprehensible, but Kant hopes he has safeguarded it by enabling us to comprehend its incomprehensibility.

* * *

In brief, then, what does Kant consider that he has accomplished in his cryptic little book ? He believes he has elucidated and vindicated the true nature of moral goodness. And, in doing so, that he has not

merely rendered a service to science and philosophy, but helped as well to make the world safe for morality. Moral goodness is found only in action for the pure motive of duty. Now duty is not only arduous for human nature—a sensuous as well as rational nature—but its very notion is liable to adulteration. Men are very apt to find the doctrine that they should do what they ought, simply because they ought, paradoxical and unsatisfying. Hence the temptation, even for professional ethicians, to represent the 'ought' as deriving from some more readily appreciable motive like happiness or perfection or God's command. But this is to eliminate altogether the moral motive and, with it, moral goodness. Kant has tried to make duty clear and unambiguous by his teaching on the categorical imperative.

But more. Even though men have been saved from mistaking the true nature of the moral motive, they must be shown that such a motive is possible and how it is possible. Otherwise they are still in danger of moral sophistication. This second service to mankind Kant performs by his 'transcendental deduction' of the categorical imperative. 'Deduction' here means justification; it is an old legal word. 'Transcendental' is Kant's term for all that belongs to the spontaneous activity of mind, for the contribution of our thinking apparatus to the content of our thoughts and judgments. That I judge with unshakeable firmness for instance: 'I ought not to make deceitful promises, however convenient,' is due to a spontaneous activity of my reason, an activity in accordance with the 'idea' of freedom. By 'idea', Kant does not mean a concept. He means here an initiative of practical reason by which it gives itself laws, universally valid, unconditioned commands. Reason was shown in the speculative *Critique* to be the faculty of the unconditioned in knowing; here it is seen to be the faculty of the unconditioned in acting or volition.

It is the fact of freedom that makes possible the categorical imperative of morality. Speculative reason cannot prove nor disprove this fact. Neither can it explain it, strictly speaking. But reason in its practical exercise, the rational agent when he acts, knows that freedom is a fact. And now Kant has taught him *why* he cannot theoretically prove or explain it. It belongs to the order of reality, of intelligibility, the noumenal order, which lies beyond theoretical explanation. Knowing this, the agent is armed against the temptation to think freedom, and hence morality, to be mere illusion. So the way is clear for writing a Metaphysics of Morals. Thus speculative reasoning, though it cannot explain freedom or morality, has been able *to defend* them against all cavillation, and thus give the green light to ethics. That was the main task of the *Groundwork*. The subsequent history of ethics has shown that the book was epoch-making.

This article aims at little else than a clear exposition of Kant's doctrine in the *Groundwork*. It is no part of my purpose at present to

add a critical appraisal of Kant's position in the light of Thomistic ethics. Kant wrought a major revolution in moral philosophy. He made duty or obligation, rather than goodness or end, the fundamental conception. In so doing he departed from the two-thousand year old tradition of teleological or finalistic ethics of which the most notable exponents were Aristotle and St Thomas Aquinas. For this, as well as other reasons, it happens that when the student, nurtured on Thomism, first reads Kant's account of the moral life, he seems to find himself in utterly alien territory where no familiar landmarks are discernible. It will, I think, help the Thomist to appreciate and fairly criticize Kant's viewpoint if he keeps in mind the two levels of discussion observed in Kant's *Groundwork*, namely, the 'descriptive' level, on which Kant is merely analysing the content of moral experience, and the 'metaphysical' level, on which that experience is accounted-for in terms of Kant's own philosophical system, previously elaborated. The student of St Thomas must, I believe, hold himself on the alert to distinguish those two levels of discussion in the relevant parts of St Thomas. If he does, he may come to the conclusion that, while the metaphysic of Aquinas differs *toto coelo* from that of Kant, the description of moral experience given by St Thomas, say in I. II, q. 94, art. 2, is not without its interesting similarities to that of Kant, albeit expressed in very different terminology. It would indeed be strange if two such acute thinkers, contemplating the same experience, were to give utterly disparate accounts of it.

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The exposition just attempted of the teaching of Kant's *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, concentrating as it did on the book's quality of Critique, might appear to bear out the thesis of Professor Duncan's *Practical Reason and Morality*. That thesis is that Kant planned his book as exclusively a Critique of practical reason, preparatory to, but quite distinct from, the systematic ethics or Metaphysics of Morals which he hoped to write later. Yet right in the middle of Kant's Section Two (pages 48—67 in Abbott) there occurs the lengthy passage (called by Duncan 'Subsection C') where Kant uses the categorical imperative, variously formulated, as a criterion of morality. No one, not even Professor Duncan, can deny that this is specifically ethical writing. But Duncan's contention is that the passage is an irrelevant afterthought which Kant in a momentary lapse into inconsistency, and for extraneous reasons, intruded into the framework of his Critique. Duncan finds some plausible grounds for this view in the historical circumstances of the *Groundwork's* composition. But his main argument is twofold : that the

Groundwork can be read as a Critique in entire independence of Subsection C ; and that the ethical interlude upsets the logical coherence of the work and creates insoluble puzzles.

Space does not permit a detailed examination of this contention. I must, however, with regret record a personal verdict of ' not proven'. With regret, because in the first place if Duncan's assertion were established, and if we could, with sound scientific conscience, simply omit the ethical interlude altogether, the task of understanding and expounding the *Groundwork* would be facilitated. With regret, in the second place, because I have learned so much from *Practical Reason and Morality* that it seems ungracious to reject its author's cherished thesis. But, to be very brief, it seems to me that Subsection C is bound into the fabric of the *Groundwork* by so many threads that to sever them and excise the passage could only be regarded as unwarranted mutilation.

In conclusion, let the remark of Dr Walter McDonald, with which this article opened, find echo in some equally heart-felt words of Professor Duncan : ' For anyone who examines the text of the *Foundations* with care, it remains a puzzling and exasperating piece of writing.' (p.1)

Book Reviews

ANCIENT CLASSICS

SOPHOCLES—DRAMATIST AND PHILOSOPHER. By H. D. F. Kitto. London : Oxford University Press. 1958. 64pp. 7s. 6d.

THE POETRY OF GREEK TRAGEDY. By Richmond Lattimore. Baltimore : Johns Hopkins Press. London : Oxford University Press. 1958. 157pp. 18s.

COLONIAL ELITES—ROME, SPAIN AND THE AMERICAS. By Ronald Syme. London : Oxford University Press. 1958. 65pp. 7s. 6d.

These three books, all published courses of lectures by classical scholars, reflect both the merits and the limitations of the spoken word. All deal with large subjects, all undoubtedly stimulated their more intelligent listeners to more detailed study, and all are written in an attractive and lively style ; but they appear distinctly thin in cold print.

Professor Kitto's three lectures at Newcastle concerned themselves with the cosmological vision which inspired Sophocles's handling of tragic themes. Leading Sophoclean scholars like Jebb and Wilamowitz, reflecting perhaps the spirit of nineteenth and twentieth-century scepticism, suggest that Sophocles

is a dramatist of consummate technical skill but without a formed cosmological outlook. In his first lecture, Kitto does indeed admit that the plays can be enjoyed merely as secular drama ; but in his second he demonstrates from the *Electra* and *Antigone* the large arena allotted to divine agencies, and suggests that the religious thought behind this is not merely ' a general suffused piety but a controlling element'. The third lecture investigates the precise nature of this religious thought. Kitto rightly stresses that in pre-Platonic religious thought the gods are immanent and not transcendent ; they are symbols for the forces which control the universe. More might have been said here of the influence of the Ionian physicists ; Anaximander and others are intensely preoccupied by the idea of physical justice in the universe by the balance of opposing elements. In drama this notion is translated into the field of human action ; *dike,* ' the regular order of things', may not be contravened for long with impunity, which explains why Oedipus's punishment, and Creon's sufferings in the *Antigone,* have an incontrovertible logic. Chance (*tyche*) has no relevance ; an ethical determinism prevails as in the later history of Stoicism. We must be grateful to Professor Kitto for expressing an unpopular view with such force, though the brevity is regrettable.

Mr Lattimore, whose gifts as translator are well-known, chose the poetry of Greek tragedy as his subject at Johns Hopkins University. In his introduction he implicity states that he will not concern himself with questions of dramatic construction or with problems of theology or morality. The way seems open for a stylistic study of the Greek tragedians, each considered as ' the artificer of lines, the master of sound combinations, the painter of images and architect of rhetorical figures.' Unfortunately the author's concern for his audience prevents consideration of the Greek ; he is largely content to illustrate with his own excellent translations rather than to analyse. Inevitably, too, those elements which he had promised to eschew tend to intrude. But disappointment at this seeming change of horses in mid-stream should not blind us to some interesting and stimulating comments on individual plays. I am, however, distressed at the equation of *hybris* with lust, and appalled at the suggestion that ' *hybris* begets a tyrant ' in *Oedipus Rex* has reference to the lust of Laius and Jocasta, ' who lusted and must breed'.

Professor Syme of Oxford, an historian of the Roman Empire of great distinction, chose a fascinating topic for the Whidden lectures at McMaster University. His subject is the origins, growth, and behaviour of colonial elites in three great empires—the Romans in Spain, the Spaniards in South America, and the English in North America. It is a contribution to a more positive question than Toynbee's : how did these empires last as long as they did ? On his home ground, he demonstrates how the Roman Empire, the object of rough treatment from most of the panoramic historians, was renourished and reanimated by its peripheral subjects. The Spaniards by the end of the first century A.D. were providing outstanding teachers, literary figures, civil servants, and even emperors ; and it is instructive to examine the benevolent extension of citizenship and Latin rights which had made such Romanisation possible. (Perhaps Sertorius should have received a louder cheer in this lecture.) This ingrained *Romanitas* should not be forgotten in a scrutiny of the three centuries of Spanish dominion in South America. Syme pricks the bubble of

the Black Legend of Spanish imperialism, suggests that they treated the Indians originally with far more humanity than did the first English settlers, and carefully distinguishes between the avaricious conduct of the Conquistadores and the enlightened policy of the Spanish government. His general thesis is that the Spanish achievement has been much underrated, and that the revolution led by Bolivar, after prevailing against the wishes of the majority, has reaped its harvest in the tragic twentieth-century picture of isolated states haunted by tyranny and instability. But he stresses that the Spanish government had been too inflexible in failing to admit the local aristocracies into high positions of Church and State. In English America on the other hand colonials could aspire to governorships. In his third lecture Syme concentrates on the immigrants in New England and Virginia, with the piquant contrast which they offer. But here particularly the canvas is far too vast for a single lecture, and no clear conclusions on their motives and attitudes to revolution emerge.

P. G. Walsh

FROM MYCENAE TO HOMER. A Study of Early Greek Literature and Art. By T. B. L. Webster. London : Methuen. 1958. 312pp. with 24 plates and folding map. 30s.

The year 1952 was a landmark in the ninety years of archaeological research, initiated by Schliemann, into the Mycenaean civilisation reflected in the Homeric poems. In that year, Ventris, a young English architect, claimed to have deciphered the Linear B script, which had been found on fifteenth-century tablets at Knossos in Crete, and on thirteenth-century tablets at Mycenae and Pylos on the Greek mainland. The details of this decipherment, first publicized in a celebrated article in *The Journal of Hellenic Studies,* were received with that alloy of uncritical enthusiasm, reserved scepticism, and malevolent criticism which momentous claims invariably arouse in the academic world. After six years the claims of Ventris (since tragically killed in a motor-accident) appear to be accepted by the large majority of experts in the field, though with considerable reservations of detail.

The new evidence thus unearthed was the chief inspiration of this new book by Professor Webster, who was closely associated with Ventris in the years before his death. Of themselves, however, the tablets offer little beyond the confirmation of the influential theories of Nilsson and others, which were based on the archaeological evidence and on the Homeric poems. Conclusions of detail are as yet highly speculative ; many scholars indeed believe that the time for authoritative evaluation of the tablets is not ripe. Webster, however, believes that these records offer adequate indications of a community-life markedly similar to that at such Eastern sites as Ugarit and Alalakh — a highly centralized, bureaucratic kingship, in which the king, invested with divine honours, governed a mixed society of craftsmen and landworkers through the agency of a nobility which was part military, part administrative. Such a similarity with the theocratic Eastern kingships poses the interesting question of their influence on the art and poetry of early Greece.

So far as Mycenaean art is concerned, ' the evidence for internationalism is overwhelming'. The prevalent griffin and lion *motifs* have strong Hittite and Egyptian affiliations. ' Nestor's cup ' seems in fact to have been a libation-vessel of Egyptian type. And, in general, external influences are reflected in the conservatism in the shape of vessels and in the representation of deities. (Webster has speculatively identified some of these deities in Mycenaean art, but many will be chary of his conclusions, especially those pertaining to Dionysus and Hyperion.) There is a very informative chapter on Eastern poetry contemporary with the Mycenaean era, where Webster cites suggestive parallels from Sumerian, Akkadian, and Hittite poetry to the noun-epithets, refrain-lines, and formulae of repetition characteristic of Homeric epic. He then proceeds to outline, on the evidence of tablets, archaeology, and style and content of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey,* the themes and form of the Greek poetry of Mycenaean days. The names on the tablets are taken to indicate the themes of the poems then current ; and the poets ' sang in double-short rhythm, using formulae, refrains, and typical scenes, of their kings in peace and war, of their houses, furniture, and beautiful objects, and of their fighting and their armour.' Webster also suggests that the decipherment on the tablets of names celebrated in Homer as Trojan, such as that of Hector, reinforces the theory that the story of a siege of a town from the sea was elaborated for centuries in Mycenaean times before being later adapted to its new setting at Troy.

Mycenae finally fell about 1100 B.C. ; and the following centuries, during which the defeated Greeks gradually migrated to Ionia, are commonly known as the dark age, a period for which no literature has survived and which the evidence of pottery alone illuminates. Webster here presents a very useful synthesis of specialized research achieved by others in his survey of Mycenaean, Protogeometric, and Geometric art. He suggests that the figure-scenes appearing on eighth-century vases are indicative of current poetic themes ; and, following Myres, he claims that the patterns of geometric pottery show a remarkable similarity to the compositional structure of contemporary epic.

The final chapter is devoted to Homer. Linguistic evidence is adduced to assert that the poems long antedate Hesiod and must be attributed to the eighth century. In Ionia the traditional heroic themes were retained, but the old stories took on a more contemporary complexion in such features as fighting-methods. There follows a discussion of the much-disputed question of the authorship of the Homeric poems. The linguistic arguments propounded by Page in *The Authorship of the Odyssey,* in support of his claim that the author of the *Odyssey,* was separate and isolated from the author of the *Iliad* are courteously demolished. Webster indeed appears to be that rare but refreshing bird, a Homeric unitarian ; it is a pity that he does not go on to counter the non-linguistic arguments of those who suggest that the Odyssey is a much later work.

Though this book is inevitably speculative in part as befits a pioneering work, it also affords a well-referenced survey of the major Homeric and Mycenaean problems and it will be indispensable to specialist libraries. The publishers are to be congratulated on the production of a well-annotated, well-illustrated book at such an economic price.

P. G. Walsh

HORACE. By Eduard Fraenkel. Oxford : Clarendon Press. 1957. Pp. 464. 55s.

Horace, a poet of wide learning, high intellect, and subtle wit, makes large demands on the ideal interpreter. One must begin with the realization that he wrote his lyric poetry for the educated few—people competent to appreciate not merely virtues of organization and structure, but also the debts to and refinements on his models, Greek and Roman. Secondly, there is the formidable difficulty of understanding and expounding the Augustan background—not merely at the superficial level of Horace's relation to the regime, but also, more fundamentally, to the *Geisteswelt* which the Augustan poets helped to create. For this a detailed knowledge of the politics and religious thought of the period is essential. Thirdly, Horace's popularity since the Renaissance has drawn illustrious scholars and poets to the production of numerous editions and descriptive works about him ; a knowledge of many of these is vital for a proper appreciation of his poetic aims and methods.

Professor Fraenkel's astonishing erudition and industry (he has made substantial contributions to the understanding of Greek tragedy, and of Latin literature from Plautus to the Augustan age) are equal to all these demands. On problems of text and interpretation, on the political and religious background he is equally informative. Few concessions are made, however, to the non-professional. No help is offered with the considerable Greek extracts : there is in my view, much quotation from modern authorities—German, Italian, French—which is hardly necessary : the text of the work is too often overladen with academic controversy on textual readings which might have been relegated to foot-notes. All this leads one to suspect that a full commentary might have been Professor Fraenkel's true *métier*—and there is a real need for one in English. This would have allowed the author to spread enlightenment on many poems omitted here through want of space. On the other hand, Horace's poetic development emerges clearly from this selective approach, and this is the author's main aim.

The book begins with a thorough survey of the biographical details as delineated by Suetonius and quite voluminously by Horace himself. There follows a chapter on the *Epodes*—a particularly useful contribution because these poems are so rarely read. A clear picture emerges of Horace's exploratory techniques, at the threshold of his poetic career, in the adaptation of Greek *motifs* to Roman settings. On the *Satires,* again, Fraenkel is most perceptive in exemplifying Horace's central dilemma—he was too obscure a personage in too exposed a position to attack any influential contemporaries. Hence his topics are either too generalized to exploit the jagged tooth, or they are concerned with his own embarrassments. But the poet's mastery of his medium is effectively demonstrated, especially in the use of the dialogue-form which becomes increasingly the orthodox structural device in this *genre* of writing.

It is impossible to indicate in a brief review the many-sided excellences of the discussion of the *Odes.* There is enlightenment on every page. Especially notable are the fruitful comparisons with Greek models like Alcaeus and Pindar, and again with Catullus. There is a sane estimate, too, of Horace's relationship with Augustus, which many will welcome for its more sympathetic assessment of the *princeps* after the recent excessive condemnation of Syme.

A very instructive chapter on the *Carmen Saeculare* (though it is a surprise to find it labelled ' the greatest triumph of Horace's achievement as a lyric poet ') allows the author to discuss the relevant religious background ; and interesting judgments on Horace's own philosophical standpoint are made here and elsewhere in the volume.

P. G. WALSH

ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

THIRD REPORT ON THE AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA. Paris : OEEC. October 1958. 24s.

This third OEEC Report on agricultural policies differs from its predecessors, which surveyed general policies and price support policies, as they exist in Western and Southern Europe and in North America. In this report the twenty-one States involved are divided into five groups, on the basis of a somewhat arbitrary selection of the problems believed to be most fundamental to each. The five different types of problems which are thus considered in the context of individual States are structural problems, problems in the cereals, dairy and meat sectors, and, once again, price support systems. Ireland might have been considered almost equally appropriately under any of these five headings,—but has in fact been allocated to ' Structural Problems ' together with Austria, Luxembourg, Portugal and Yugoslavia.

The purpose of this approach is stated to be to make it possible ' to make more precise suggestions for changes likely to bring national policies and measures more in line with the agreed principles and to contribute to a better co-ordination of agricultural policies in OEEC countries.'

This, however, the Report notably fails to do, at any rate in the case of Ireland. Far from suggesting any changes in the national agricultural policies current at the time when the Report was prepared, it reads like a pre-Whitaker ' hand-out ' from Irish official sources. Land reclamation, for example, is largely featured, and is the subject of uncritical comment of the kind with which we were familiar during the years up to November last. It has made, we are told, ' an important contribution to raising the economic potential of existing farms . . . by increasing their productive area' and ' while no comprehensive survey of the results of the Project has so far been carried out, . . . a limited survey conducted a few years ago, embracing some 500 holdings, indicated that the increased annual productive value resulting from the reclamation work might be of the order of £25 per hectare (viz. £10 per acre), on which basis it would be estimated that the work already done to date has increased the potential productive value of the land dealt with by about £7 million per annum.'

Even making full allowance for the care with which qualifications have unobtrusively been introduced into this latter statement—' a *limited* survey ' ' indicated ' ' might be of the order of ' ' on which basis it *would* be estimated ' —the note sounded is totally at variance with Mr Whitaker's presumably

authoritative remarks : ' No detailed analysis of the economic returns from expenditure under the Land Project has *ever* (my italics) been made. In its absence, conclusions about its merits must be somewhat indeterminate . . . An expenditure of more than £40 an acre on reclaiming marginal land would be difficult to justify on present returns from farming. Yet over 80% of the work undertaken under Section B costs more than that . . . If, as seems clear in the case of Section B, the cost is uneconomic, the Land Project is merely a case of misdirected State aid.'

It is in fact difficult to find *any* ' precise suggestions for (policy) changes ' by the Irish Government in this OEEC Report—a fact which is all the more surprising in view of the number of major revisions of policy announced by the Government here within a week or two of the publication of this document. There is, however, a suggestion, subsequently re-iterated in the annual OEEC Report on Economic Conditions in Ireland—that other Governments should modify their policies to Ireland's benefit : ' A willingness by (the food importing) countries to allow at least some part of their growing total food consumption to be met by countries that can produce relatively cheaply would be in accordance with the principle accepted by Ministers that the most economically efficient use should be made of productive resources, thus bringing about freer and increased intra-European trade.'

It is, of course, always difficult for the officials of an international agency to carry out independent surveys of national economies and national economic policies from a distance, without relying on the authorities of the country in question for necessary data to an extent that may stultify the purpose and destroy the value of the ' independent ' survey ; but if organizations like OEEC are to justify themselves and to create confidence in international institutions, they must achieve a higher standard of independent judgment than this publication reflects, at any rate in so far as it concerns Irish problems. In particular, they must above all try to avoid the type of complacency reflected in such statements as ' supplementary employment in non-agricultural activities (in the Congested Districts) plus the adequate supplies of food produced on the holdings mean that conditions there can be regarded as basically satisfactory.'

The statistical data accompanying the articles in this volume is useful and well-presented, and the articles on the agricultural problems of other European countries contain much valuable information that should stimulate fresh thought in this country on many issues.

GARRET FITZGERALD.

TEXTBOOK OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS : By Edward Nevin, M.A. (Wales), PH.D. (Cantab.). London : MacMillan & Co. Ltd. 1958. 18s.

THIS book is designed to ' provide an introduction to the groundwork o contemporary economic and monetary theory '. It is a good basic textbook, suitable mainly for the University student who is embarking on a course in Economics. The style is lucid and the presentation of the subject-matter

commendably clear-cut and incisive. The book covers effectively the whole range of subjects usually found in a work of this kind—the nature of Economics, the theory of Demand, Production, Price, income Distribution and Employment ; Money and Banking ; and International Trade.

The approach is predominantly analytical with emphasis on fundamental economic principles and concepts rather than on current specific economic problems : descriptive matter is held to a minimum. It might be argued, however, that the freshman, to whom this book is directed, is frequently somewhat at a loss if the theoretical principles and generalizations with which he must acquaint himself are not liberally illustrated by concrete instances of their application. If this be accepted, the author's marked emphasis on the theoretical side is somewhat of a disadvantage.

Mr Nevin specifically confines himself to a statement of one view point in those areas of the subject where opinions are diverse and conflicting. This is a wise thing to do, as there can be little doubt that necessarily brief surveys of a number of different interpretations will usually leave the novice in a state of unhappy confusion. In this respect the argument presented in relation to the Rate of Interest and the theory of Employment and Income Determination is strictly Keynesian. This approach, although it is expressed here in relatively simple terms, might be regarded as out of place in a book of this kind, where the less complex classical analysis is generally held to be a more appropriate starting-point.

Gerard Quinn

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN IRELAND—DÁIL ÉIREANN 1919-1948. By J. L. McCracken. Oxford University Press. 1958. Pp. 229. 30s.

THE IRISH ELECTION SYSTEM. By J. F. S. Ross. London : Pall Mall Press. 1959. Pp. 85. 3s. 6d.

Professor McCracken's book is a very useful one, filling many gaps in our knowledge of our own Parliamentary system, how it works, and what kind of people have been elected by it during the early decades of the existence of the new Irish State. It is a balanced and objective study which has clearly involved its author (the Professor of History in Magee University College, Derry) in considerable research, and although it does not attempt to provide a comprehensive study of every aspect of our parliamentary system, the ground that has been covered has been covered thoroughly. Finally it is a readable book ; those who find statistics muddling can skip the many tables that are scattered through the text.

If anything Professor McCracken is inclined to let us off too lightly on a number of counts. It is difficult to share his conclusion in respect to the composition of the Dáil : ' When the occupational analysis is considered

in conjunction with the other facts relating to members—their religion, education, birthplace and residence—the conclusion may safely be drawn that the representative character of the Dáil is reasonably satisfactory.' But surely it can scarcely be considered satisfactory that over 80% of the members of the Dáil are normally self-employed people, drawn from a group which comprises no more than 30-40% of the population, especially since, to a large extent the self-employed are identified with the producers, whose economic power is in any event considerable, while the employee class are primarily consumers, against whom the economic scales are in any event overweighted.

Similarly while Professor McCracken makes it clear that Protestant representation in the Dáil has dwindled to a tiny fraction of its level in the early days of the State, he concludes, in perhaps, unduly complacent terms : ' Nevertheless, of the total members between 1922 and 1948, 6% were Protestants—a remarkably close approximation to the total Protestant strength in the country.' This is not a case for looking at averages ; the critical fact is that whereas thirty years ago the Protestant community was more than pulling its weight in politics, to-day it is under-represented in the Dáil—grossly under-represented when account is taken of the high educational level of the Protestant community, and its tradition of public service. While no doubt the religious minority has not always been encouraged by the trend of affairs in this part of the country to take part in public life, it must accept some, at least, of the blame for this situation.

The chapters on the mechanism of the Dáil, and on the Dáil and the Second Chamber are particularly interesting. It is encouraging, for example, to see that between 1938 and 1949 just over a quarter of the Bills sent to the Senate were amended by that body, and that none of these amendments were totally rejected by the Dáil, while 90% of these amended Bills were accepted without further alteration. But one must cavil at Professor McCracken's statement that ' The Taoiseach's power of nominating eleven senators is in itself a guarantee that the government will enjoy a majority in the second house.'

Finally, Professor McCracken's bibliography is of considerable interest and value.

Mr Ross's booklet is published with financial assistance provided by a trust fund established by the Proportional Representation Society ; it scarcely pretends to be an impartial survey of our P.R. election system. Nevertheless it contains a good deal of useful factual information, including a series of tables showing the composition of every Dáil on the morrow of its election, and the proportion of the seats that each party would have won on each occasion if its strength in the Dáil had in fact reflected exactly its first preference poll.

There are several irritating inaccuracies, however, including a repeated confusion of the short-lived Coras na Poblachta party, which unsuccessfully contested five seats in the 1943 election, with the later Clann na Poblachta, 10 of whose 93 candidates were successful in 1948.

GARRET FITZGERALD

LITERATURE AND THE ARTS

THE OXFORD BOOK OF IRISH VERSE. Edited by Lennox Robinson and Donagh MacDonagh. London : Oxford University Press. 1958. 21s.

PROLOGOMENA TO THE STUDY OF YEATS'S POEMS. By G. B. Saul. Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press. 1958.

EDWARD MARTYN AND THE IRISH THEATRE. By Sister Marie-Therese Courtney. New York : Vantage Press. 1956. $3.

THE ABBEY THEATRE. By Gerard Fay. Dublin : Clonmore and Reynolds. 1958. 21s.

GNOMON : ESSAYS ON CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE. By Hugh Kenner. New York : McDowell, Obolensky, Inc. 1958. $4.50.

There is a nip in the air. Those of us who are interested in Anglo-Irish literature have already felt it. One finds it increasingly difficult to rely upon the warm welcome, the ready ear, the open purse, the lecture-tour. Now that the American undergraduate has sensed the necessity of coming to terms with himself through his own literary past, there is very little energy remaining for Joyce-Yeats-and-all-that. Or indeed for Eng. Lit. Lionel Trilling has recently explained the new fact, with solicitude and some regret. It remains. Those who have held back their reminiscences of Yeats and Joyce in expectation of a rise in world prices would be well advised to sell quickly.

Having no material for intimate literary memoirs I am not deeply disturbed by the cold wind. Indeed, I should welcome it if it forced us to examine our literature in a less heady spirit from now on. The examination might remind us that being a poet and being a devotee of AE's ' evenings ' are not necessarily identical conditions.

Several poetasters take up space in the new *Oxford Book of Irish Verse,* a volume which brings together fine poems by Swift, Yeats, Clarke, and Kavanagh, and dispensable but interesting poems by Goldsmith, Mangan, Wilde, AE, Synge, Joyce, Seumas O'Sullivan, Gogarty, Blanaid Salkeld, Colum, Stephens, Graves, Day-Lewis, MacNeice, Iremonger, Maire MacEntee, and Thomas Kinsella. The remaining poets and poems are included to make the book ' representative ' of Ireland, though not—unfortunately—of good poetry. It seems pointless at this stage to challenge the editorial decisions in the matter, or to query still further their ' scholarly ' pretentions. Everybody now knows that the editors have given the sources of their texts only where copyright is involved : the ' Luke Wadding ' ascription, in particular, has been questioned. The justification of including Graves, Day-Lewis, and MacNeice is tenuous : there is none at all for making up weight with bits of the *Playboy, Ulysses,* and *Finnegan's Wake.* On the whole, the book is an unfortunate venture, partially redeemed by the inclusion of Austin Clarke's *Marriage* and *Ancient Lights,* both magnificently taut compositions by our best living poet.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to say anything at once new and sensible about Yeats's poems. Professor G. B. Saul has taken the easy way out in his *Prologomena.* The title of the book led me to expect a gathering of correlative

material (legend, history, myth, gossip, biography) as ' background ' to the reading of Yeats ; but no. It turns out to be little more than an index of Yeats-criticism. Since all the critical writing on Yeats is readily available and well known to any specialist, and since much of it is collected in *The Permanence of Yeats,* the justification for Mr Saul's book is not clear. To be specific : on *Leda and the Swan* Mr Saul gives details of its date and printing. Then :—

> V. Yeats's note in Cuala *The Cat and the Moon* . . ., p. 37 ; and cp. Hone, 387, MacNeice, 144, Rothenstein's *Since Fifty,* 242, Drew-Sweency, 164-166, Stein (*Sewanee Rev.*), Trowbridge (*Mod. Philol.*), Reid (*Jour. Aesthet. & Art. Crit.*), Burke (*South. Rev.*), Spitzer (*Mod. Philol.*).—Jeffares, 224 relates this great sonnet to ' Michelangelo's painting ' on its subject ; cp. Henn., 243.

That finishes that. Does Mr Saul seriously expect the Common Reader to cp. and v. ? And does he imagine that the instructed reader of Yeats has been until now innocent of the critical perceptions of Burke, Stein, Trowbridge, etc. ? Mr Saul's note gives no critical guidance to any reader, common or uncommon : it does not bother to comment on the issues involved in the dispute between Trowbridge and Spitzer : it does not even attempt to say why this is a ' great sonnet '.

It would be much easier to justify a helpful study of Edward Martyn and the Irish Theatre. Martyn was not an important writer, but he was an interesting and influential person : it would be possible to say many valuable things about modern Ireland by means of a penetrating account of Martyn's involvement in Irish affairs. A straightforward critical biography would serve. Sister Marie-Thérèse Courtney has tried this, but she is not a penetrating thinker. Most of her mental energy dribbles away in sentimental gestures. If we tear the book apart from its ' fine writing ', we are left with hundreds of facts, hundreds of footnotes, citations from dozens of Martyn's contemporaries : useful, perhaps essential matter for later students of the period. A more severe thinker than Sister Marie-Therese Courtney will probably use her material to write a better book : it is an occupational risk.

Mr Gerard Fay, a competent journalist, has written a competent book about the Abbey Theatre. It contains everything a first-night audience could demand ; gossip, photographs, letters, play-lists, and a suitably parochial presentation of its material. The crucial questions are neatly ignored ; there are things one does not mention. Mr Fay knows his audience :

> ' Juno ' has even survived being truncated to make a television play at which English critics sniped because it underemphasised the comedy, although the play is crystal clearly a tragedy in which the principal theme is expressed in the words ' Sacred Heart of Jesus, take away our hearts o'stone, and give us hearts o'flesh ! Take away this murdherin' hate, an' give us Thine own eternal love ! '
>
> When those words were first heard from the stage at the Abbey a tremor ran through the audience unlike anything felt since . .

Yes, this will sell like hot cakes.

One can hardly predict such happiness for Mr Hugh Kenner's *Gnomon,* which suffers from the fact that its author is a remarkably intelligent and serious man. Mr Kenner's books are unlikely to figure on Book of the Month Club lists : indeed, only the more advanced university libraries will notice their existence. But meanwhile he continues to read modern literature with a startling degree of perception : all praise to him, and gratitude. The new book contains, among brilliant essays on Pound, Williams, Marianne Moore, Ford, Lewis, and Empson, the most valuable essay on Yeats which has turned up within the past twenty years. Perhaps this is inadequate praise, but let it stand. I believe that Kenner's essay could inject new life into the study of Yeats's poems, but we should have to read it with something of its author's intelligence. 'Not arrogant from habit/But furious from perception'. (E.P. *Canto 90*)

DENIS DONOGHUE

LYTTON STRACHEY. His Mind and Art. By Charles Richard Sanders. New Haven : Yale University Press. London : Oxford University Press. 1957. Pp. 381. 36s.

Faced with a book like this, a careful critical study of an artist in words whose field was history and literature, a reviewer can only throw up his hands in despair. So much is of fascinating interest and so little can be touched on. The book must be read but not from beginning to end. The first forty odd pages of biographical note are the dullest in the book but even they, if read last of all, become interesting in the light of all the rest and satisfy our natural desire to know, at least partially, how such a gifted writer as Strachey came to be. Most readers would turn first of all to chapter 8, 'Conceptions of Biography,' which should be and is the kernel of the book.

We are given copious quotations : phrases, sentences, paragraphs and often pages in which Strachey appears as one of the great masters of rhetorical English in this century. Mr Sanders, who keeps himself with admirable discretion in the background, is the best of biographers : thorough, patient, calm and when necessary—in spite of his great admiration for Strachey—critical. And, although he prefers to let Strachey speak for himself, his own remarks and judgements are refreshingly sensible. Once or twice only, in a long book—and then in the cause of thoroughness—he writes a sentence that might be thought obvious or naive. His analyses of Strachey's style and humour are orderly, methodical and excellent.

Strachey's biographical writing was what he wanted it to be : interesting, intelligent and very much alive. His people, he believed, should come alive on the page even if, by so doing, they made themselves more ridiculous. Of Saint-Simon he wrote : '. . . he never forgot, in the extremity of his ferocity, to commit the last insult, and to breathe into their nostrils the fatal breath of life.' Strachey was speaking in the context of this liveliness when he said that history was an art and not a science. He meant—although he does not appear to have said so explicitly anywhere—that the actual writing of history and the imaginative enlivening of facts, immediately preceding

the writing, called for the skill of the artist and all his patient reshaping and reworking of material. The patient accumulation of fact that came first of all was, for him, a scientific labour second to none in painstaking objectivity. Indirectly he said as much when he wrote of the historian Mandell Creighton, whom he very much admired, ' the biscuit is certainly exceedingly dry ; but there are no weevils in it.' In order to have the people he wrote about not merely perambulating bundles of facts but facts warmed to life by the enlivening imagination of the writer, the biographer, Strachey held, must have a point of view. He believed too in brevity. Biography, in short, was ' the most delicate and humane of all the branches of the art of writing.'

Strachey was reactionary. He cursed, in the preface to *Eminent Victorians*, ' those two fat volumes with which it is our custom to commemorate the dead—who does not know them, with their ill-digested masses of material, their slipshod style, their tone of tedious panegyric, their lamentable lack of selection, of detachment, of design ? ' Still, reactionary as he was, he by no means condemned all previous writing of history. He admired Lockhart's *Walter Scott,* Carlyle's portraits from life and, with some reservations, Froude. He praised Edmund Gosse's contemporary account of the character of Queen Victoria and *Father and Son.* But Gosse's *Sir Thomas Browne*, he felt, committed the too common fault of obscuring the essential and significant by an excess of irrelevant facts. He wished to know more about the writing and less about the sons. Boswell, of course, he loved and Johnson's *Lives of the Poets.* He found that an English biographer could learn much from Fontenelle, Condorcet, Saint-Simon and, as well, from Racine and Dostoyevsky. By his reaction Strachey contributed to the inauguration of a new ' school ' of biography : a school so loosely associated as to be little more, perhaps, than a fashion of higher standards and containing names so different (except for their mutual difference from Strachey) as D. B. Wyndham Lewis and Fr Broderick. Strachey has been called a debunker (how he must have loathed that ugly word) and academic historians have been uneasy about his soundness. Mr Sanders quotes a *Times Literary Supplement* reviewer's suspicion that the uneasiness was caused by Strachey's being too amusing.

One bone of contention, between Strachey and his critics, Mr Sanders does not take quite firmly in his teeth. Authors of the ' two fat volumes ' Strachey condemned commonly gave all the available facts—or alleged facts—and let the reader come to his own valuation of the subject of the biography. At the most, comment or judgment was in terms of the conventional standards of a rather complacent society. Strachey wrote from a point of view. He judged and judged, moreover, by exigent modern standards merciless to self-deceit no matter how well disguised. He does not often condemn outright (although he puts the condemnation into our mouths) nor often accuse his subjects of hypocrisy but he is constantly—especially in the Victorian studies—finding self-deception in complacent, well-meaning people. That is to say he seeks for the real, as opposed to the supposed or consciously explicit, motivation : a dangerous business but a necessary risk. Even if a man tells us his motives we cannot always give him credit for telling all the truth, no matter how honest he may otherwise be. Human motivation, says Professor Nuttin of Louvain, is rarely purely rational. So that a man's

motives for action, a great deal of the time, may have to be (here Mr Sanders wavered) a question of guess-work: informed and intelligent but still guess-work. The only proof for the validity of a guess is its intrinsic probability and Strachey's guesses are intrinsically very probable. If guessing is necessary for the writing of readable history then it is better that the guesses should be made by a man of genius (which Strachey undoubtedly was in spite of his second-class degree) who, along with genius, has a shrewd commonsense and a penetrating imagination. Virginia Woolf thought Strachey a frustrated dramatist and it is true that, even were his history discredited, he would still be worth reading as an imaginative writer.

But I am not so sure, on Mr Sanders charge-list, that the history will be discredited. It is true Strachey was mistaken about Essex—it may even be that his integrity slipped if he omitted to read the sources—but to the historians his Elizabeth is correct as well as lively. When Edmund Gosse wrote that Strachey's picture of Lord Cromer was unrecognizable to the nobleman's friends, Strachey replied, very uncompromisingly, that a man's friends are not always the best judges: which is notoriously true—or, at least, half-true. It is too often forgotten that one half of a half-truth is, quite simply, true. Mrs Rosalind Nash pointed out some slips in the sketch of Florence Nightingale but they are insignificant and Mrs Nash knew Miss Nightingale: the dog was a working dog not a pet, not splints but hot fomentations were used, the mother was the match-maker not Mr Nightingale, the room Florence died in was bright not dark as Strachey said. What is important is that subsequent biographers of Miss Nightingale, Cecil Woodham-Smith for instance, have not succeeded in making her any more likable. There was something sinister about the Lady of the Lamp in spite of her enormous contribution to civilization. Strachey, of course, although he does not like Florence, is more than willing to give her credit where credit is due.

Indeed he constantly does more justice to his subjects than may be realized. Readers are inclined to fasten on the foolishness or unpleasantness Strachey reveals and forget the good points he makes. It is quite clear, as Gosse said, that he fell in love with Queen Victoria while writing his book. In spite of the fun he has with her dull and stupid ways and sayings she still appears as a very nice woman and, moreover, Strachey reveals himself as a very nice man. Maurois charged Strachey with being 'a shade nastier than is really fair'. That is saying too much. Strachey sometimes exposes the nasty but more often he rips the covering blanket of convention from the silly, the pretentious, the confused muddle. There is no strong reason for believing that such a revelation, so much in place in the present, is out of place when dealing with the past.

Strachey, however, is charged with mocking at religion and sacred things. He is accused of a genteel, polished but—for that very reason—doubly dangerous whiggery. Mr Sanders writes: '. . . it is not God that Strachey satirizes in dealing with Florence Nightingale, Cardinal Manning, General Gordon, and King Philip of Spain, but ridiculous thinking about God, used for purposes of rationalizing or for cloaking the ego, and ridiculous behaviour related to such thinking.' (p. 322) In general, I think that is quite right and worth saying. We always stand in need of writers (they will not

always be religious writers) who are not afraid to reveal the bogus in conventional religious thought and action. To put it in more acceptable terms : they help us with the discernment of spirits. Ridiculous thinking about God and its consequences in action does more harm to the true cause of religion, perhaps, than anything else.

JOHN C. KELLY.

PLAYS OF THE YEAR. Chosen by F. C. Trewin. Vol. 16. London : Elek : 1958. Pp. 432. Price 18s.

THE HOSTAGE. By Brendan Behan. London : Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1958. Pp. 92. Price 10s. 6d.

Mr Trewin's annual volume of plays often serves as a convenient indication of contemporary taste in the English theatre. Not for the first time he includes one translation, one other play of Irish origin and, inevitably, one drawing-room farce of appalling inanity. Not a bad reflection really of what constitutes the West End theatre of to-day.

Apart from Joseph O'Conor's I.R.A. play *The Iron Harp,* the farce *Dear Delinquent* by one, Jack Popplewell, might in a vague kind of way, interest Irish readers. It depends largely for its frivolous appeal on an improbable family of successful Irish burglars who have (there is probably some insight into the emigration problem here) taken their business to London. The family name is Shawn and Mr Trewin's suggested alternative ' O'Blarney ' seems far more to the point.

Mr O'Conor's play is about an English hostage and his I.R.A. guardians, exactly the same in fact as that of Mr Behan. Both plays treat of the inevitable reprisal, the death of the prisoner with human friendship and love lost in the ruthless impersonality of war. Neither play to my mind treats the theme in any way as artistically, or indeed dramatically, as Mr Frank O'Connor has in his short story *Guests of a Nation.*

The hero of *The Iron Harp,* Michael O'Riordan, is blind, a harpist, mystic and an eager singer of ballads. In addition to these embarrassments, Mr O'Conor has enburdened his hero, as he has that of many other characters in the play with some of the most wildly extravagant, rhetorical lines to appear in print for quite some time. Occasionally however, the wildly thrown words do score a direct hit, as in the blind man's final agonizing cry, which is splendid in its context of despair :

> ' O, Christ my Saviour, what is happening
> in the light? '

The characterization is monotonously single-toned. O'Riordan is annoying in his philosophic good-will and understanding of everyone while the Englishman, Captain Johnny, and his Irish girl friend Molly, are figures from a cheaper form of romantic fiction. There is the customary, and very necessary

hard-hearted I.R.A. officer, Shamus the laboriously comic retainer and an odd (but not quite odd enough) Charles Lever-like landlord, Tolly, whose function in the play is never quite clear.

The same central tragic theme is in no better focus in Mr Behan's by now, very well-known play *The Hostage*. In spite of its Gaelic original, *The Hostage* is quite obviously a product of London's Theatre Workshop and, more particularly of Joan Littlewood whose dynamic direction alone could carry a play like this. Under the encouragement of this experimental theatre Mr Behan has written a form of intimate, conversational drama where the central theme is lost, apparently without very many regrets, under profuse public-house jokery. On the printed page without the animation of the players Mr Behan's jokes begin to pall after the first few pages. His scene is set in a Dublin brothel, where prostitutes, homosexuals, pimps, religious maniacs and members of the Irish Republican Army cavort in Mr Behan's confusion of balladry and bawdiness.

It might all be very exciting for the jaded spirits that seem to fill most of the London theatres to-day, but it is very difficult to see what relation it all bears to Ireland, drama or even Life. In order to stimulate his audience still further Mr Behan decorates his circus with a liberal amount of topical quips on the Royal Family and material from the Wolfenden Report. Mr Harold Hobson, the distinguished English critic, speaks of *The Hostage* as giving ' the impression of a masterpiece', which is very high praise indeed. Perhaps now, remote from the heated performance given to this play on the London stage, threadbare patches, crude assembly work and unworthy ' gimmicks ' are more apparent. This in turn raises another point, too involved to handle in a review ; just how much can an impressive director cover up by bewitching the audience ?

As a post-script : it should not be necessary to add that neither of these two plays has any particular significance for or relevance to, modern Ireland and its problems.

The other two plays in Mr Trewin's collection are quite impressive. He himself obviously thinks very highly of Rodney Ackland's *A Dead Secret* and in comparison he speaks of ' a lesser piece *The Entertainer*'. In stage technique—perhaps, but the difference is that Mr Osborne wrote a play of immense implications for the society around him, he made himself responsible for interpreting its ethos. Like all significant dramatists, Mr Osborne staggers under the weight of a country's traditions, the task of identifying in dramatic terms the people around him gives weight to his plays, stature to his characters.

By comparison *A Dead Secret* is merely an excellent thriller. In performance the play for the present reviewer owed much of its power to the playing of Paul Scofield as Frederick S. Dyson the miser. Around him, in the noisy suburban house, crowd the eccentric, voluble relations and servants who are almost all cowed by his dictatorship. The plot, involving the poisoning of the old woman lodger for her gold was based roughly on the notorious Siddons case. But how Mr Trewin could attribute greater significance to the play is somewhat of a mystery !

The translation of Fritz Hochwälder's *The Public Prosecutor* is crisp and mobile. It succeeds in recapturing the ironical downfall of Fouquier, the

blood-thirsty prosecutor of the French Revolution. The play revolves upon the ironical process whereby Fouquier is led to plot, perjure, and accumulate evidence against himself, plan the execution and literally condemn himself by his own perverted eloquence. Dramatic irony is pushed to the limit :

> When this tribunal arrives at a quick, as well as a merciless and irrevocable verdict, it will not be I who am responsible for that decision. I merely execute the demands of freedom and personal liberty !

The final moments of the play are particularly effective when the Terror, for the removal of which Fouquier lost his life, slowly creeps back upon the stage.

One word about the production of these books. The Trewin collection is in its usual neat, handy size but the Behan play seems hastily put together without much attention paid to the enquiring reader. There is no mention made of *The Hostage's* first production as *An Giall* in the Damer Hall, Dublin.

THOMAS KILROY

LEONARDO DA VINCI. By Kenneth Clark. 181 pp. Illus. Penguin Books. 1958. 6s.

LASCAUX. Paintings and Engravings. By Annette Laming. Translated by Eleanore Frances Armstrong. 208 pp. Illus. Penguin Books. 1959. 5s.

GEORGES BRAQUE. By John Richardson. 31 pp. Illus. Penguin Books. 1959. 8s. 6d.

WHILE the volumes of the Pelican History of Art continue to come from the presses at the rate of two a year, Penguin Publications still add to their library of art books in cheap, pocket-size editions. Already this year three new titles have appeared. In the selection of subjects—a modern painter, a renaissance painter, and prehistoric cave-paintings—the editors cannot be accused of narrowness of taste. At the same time they are attentive to popular demand ; each book in its own way responds to the interest of the moment.

Braque, the latest in their Penguin Modern Painters series, is coming to be regarded widely as the foremost living painter, or at least the painter whose influence on his contemporaries is most fruitful. For a long time he has been eclipsed by Picasso and other more spectacular painters. He lacks the fireworks, the sheer virtuosity of Picasso. But while Picasso has been preoccupied with artistic acrobatics, Braque has slowly evolved a style of great subtlety, delicacy and emotional depth. His debt to Picasso, of course, is very great, but as John Richardson in his excellent introduction shows, that debt has been handsomely repaid. Braque has long been recognized as a superb decorative artist, but he is considerably more than that. Mr Richardson notes this but does not give it quite the emphasis it deserves. He uses his limited space to trace the evolution of Braque's style, a complex

subject which he handles brilliantly with the aid of thirty-two well chosen plates. In fairness to Braque however it must be said that the sixteen colour-plates do not convey the textural richness and sensuous quality of his paintings, but, for the price, they are remarkable.

The cave-paintings discovered in 1940 at Lascaux, near Montignac in the Dordogne, are among the best preserved and artistically most interesting of prehistoric works of art. Of all forms of primitive art the prehistoric cave-paintings have delivered the shrewdest blow at the theory of progress. They have also provided ammunition to both sides in art and comparative religion controversies. They are claimed as examples of naturalism, spontaneity, truth to material, art for art's sake, animism, totemism and sympathetic magic. It is with gratitude (not to say relief) that we find in Mlle Annette Laming's *Lascaux* not only a clear and valuable account of its paintings and (for the benefit of the general reader) of European cave-art in general, but also an objective discussion of the various theories which have been brought forward to explain the meaning and purpose of this kind of art. She is prepared to accept sympathetic magic as an explanation of some of the figures taken in isolation (she has no time for art for art's sake, and very little for totemism) but rightly points out that it will not explain the various groups which cannot all be dismissed as fortuitous. The very existence of the paintings, she says, ' proves that the mentality of Palaeolithic man was far more complex than is generally supposed and that the scope of his artistic inspiration extended far beyond a daily preoccupation with the hunt and its quarry.' She is content to ask questions rather than rush in with a theory, though her questions imply a theory and one worth exploring. Do the paintings, she asks, ' illustrate myths concerning the origin of man, the lives of supernatural beings, or death and the after life ? ' In other words, is a man disqualified from thinking about his destiny just because his features are simian and he chops his meat with a flint ?

There are certain works of art which each generation must re-interpret, says Sir Kenneth Clark. His own brilliant re-interpretation of the works of Leonardo has now been made available in a pocket-size edition, the second of his books to appear among the Pelicans. It is a pity that his other commitments have made it impossible for him to carry out the further re-interpretation outlined in the introductory note. Here he repents his earlier distinction between Leonardo's thought and his art (' in the fifteenth century art aspired to be a branch of knowledge '). He now sees the development of Leonardo's art as a movement away from the accepted practice of trying to impose mathematical order on nature to a realization that nature is not governed by rigid laws but is in a state of flux, of continuous, mysterious and rather terrifying energy. ' The whole movement of Leonardo's mind was from mechanism to organism.' In the end ' like his contemporaries, we no longer think of him as a scientist, a seeker for measurable truth, but as a magician, a man, who, from his close familiarity with the processes of nature, has learnt a disturbing secret of nature.' If the reader bears in mind that this is how the author now views his subject, he will find the reading of this beautifully written book all the more rewarding.

Cyril Barrett

PHILOSOPHY

LA SOURCE DES VALEURS ; Les Relations Intersubjectives. Par Jean Pucelle. Collection ' Problèmes et Doctrines ' XIV. Paris : Emmanuel Vitte, 1957. xiv + 206 pp.

This slender volume does not make easy reading. It is a contribution to that difficult, and nowadays highly controversial, part of philosophy concerned with finding a basis for values—above all for moral and religious values.

What, one asks, is value ? Is it something discovered in experience, or is it created by human activity ? Is beauty in things or in the eye of the beholder ? There are two sides to value, the subjective and the objective ; and the first of the two basic intuitions of this book is that values depend upon liberty—but without being merely subjective. Take economic values, which would seem the least dependent upon the play of free will. At a sale of works of art it is apparent that valuation is subjective without being arbitrary. On the Stock Exchange where, if anywhere, economic realism should operate, values are found to depend upon credit and credit upon a whole series of factors, of which the ability to meet commitments is only one. After all the manoeuvres, bluffs, false bids and jobbery it is only at the stroke of the auctioneer's gavel that market values are determined. And if it be argued that the real determinant of values is the law of supply and demand then one must look to the factors that influence supply and demand. Civilization has made conventional necessities of things like neon-signs, tobacco, coffee, the cinema, etc. Advertising stimulates further artificial demands. On the other hand it is not unknown for supplies of a commodity to be restricted in order to maintain prices. In fact, the more one reflects the more one is tempted to see economic values as quite subjective ! It is clear that values like truth and goodness are even more at the mercy of human waywardness.

The second of the intuitions that are the avowed basis of this book is that values originate in what the author calls the *dialogue des consciences.* Between two individuals all relationships are possible, ranging from unselfish love to open warfare. The introduction of a third party reinforces the intersubjective relation (the birth of a child gives parents a new motive of love) or weakens it (a rival tends to supplant one of the partners). The members of the intersubjective group may react against an intruder—as children ostracize one of their number or a church excommunicates a heretic—or may plan his integration into the group. In the one case they defend, in the other they communicate, the value generated by the intersubjective relation. Again, one may study the object interposed between the subjects that are related ; it may further the relationship or it may be an obstacle to it. Our possessions are a sort of prolongation of ourselves and an intermediary between us and our acquaintance. When a man dies his personal effects, losing this function, appear somehow strange and lacking in purpose. In this connection the author remarks that clothing, worn for protection, for modesty, for adornment or as a sign of office, has long been neglected as an object of philosophical analysis—although he does quote Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus.*

Now values cannot subsist in a void ; they must be given form, incorporated in institutions. But it is not the institutionalization—the sclerosis—of values

in effect their betrayal? Faced with the institutions of modern society is not the unique and irreducible value of human personality, in particular, endangered? Kierkegaard, Berdyaev, Buber, Jaspers and Marcel have all reacted, each in his own fashion, to the danger. (The reviewer recalls the eloquence of M. Gabriel Marcel, in Brussels some years ago, when he used the symbol of the wretched figure, made familiar by the tragedies of our time, of the depersonalized inmate of a concentration camp, all but reduced to the level of a cipher, a statistic.) Our author argues, in some of the most interesting pages of his book, that the impersonal character of institutions like human law, far from endangering human values, is their best guarantee. The law consolidates the values we call 'rights'; indeed these values are frequently not appreciated until they are endangered or lost and the machinery of the law has to be set in motion to restore them. The very trappings of law—the formalities that surround the execution of a legal document or the solemnization of a marriage, the ceremonial (one might say, even in completely laicized states, the liturgy) of the administration of law—are as a protective shell about intersubjective values.

Having considered the source and the objectivation of value, the vertical dimension as it were, the author, in his concluding pages, turns to the horizontal plane and examines the specific values, spread out fan-wise for our consideration, goodness, truth, beauty, utility, the sacred. He begins with material things. They have no intrinsic value but are merely depositaries of value, *les signes d'une valeur omniprésente et fugace*. Still, they can teach us something about the fluctuation and change of values. What has value today may be worthless tomorrow—like a debased coinage or a bankrupt's cheque or a writing that has been proved spurious. But there is revaluation as well as devaluation; the coinage interests the numismatist, the cheque the collector of autographs and the apocryphal writing the historian. In fact the passage of time alone will work an appreciation of values; yesterday's newspaper lights the fire but that of twenty years ago is already an historical document; last year's style is now outmoded but will again be of interest when the history of fashion comes to be written; the ancient motor-car raises a smile when it appears on the roads but it finds its proper place in the Museum of Transport! History, in a word, is '*une vaste entreprise de récupération des valeurs*'. The intrinsic value of the human subject is incommensurable with that of things—the saving of one human life is worth the destruction of all the books in the National Library. The special values, moral (goodness), scientific (truth), esthetic (beauty), economic (utility) and religious (the sacred) are analysed with an abundance of illustration. The last, religious value, is found to provide the ultimate foundation of the other intersubjective values.

These studies in the philosophy of values will repay reading—but they require very close reading. They contain many of those illuminating analyses at which French writers seem to excel. The author, however, does not do very much to help his reader. His style is nervous and allusive, his text densely charged. The five essays which make up the book overlap to some extent and there are frequent cross-references; yet there is neither index nor table of contents (apart from the brief synopsis at the head of each essay). The terminology, avoided as far as possible in this review, is difficult and must at

times seem capricious to those not acquainted with the *genre*. The author, indeed, seems to have had a misgiving on the point for he compares (p.79) his methodological use of terms with the mathematician's use of the roots of minus quantities—they help the calculation but have no place in the final result.

M. B. Crowe

PSYCHICAL PHENOMENA. By Fr Reginald-Omez, O.P. London : Burns and Oates. 1959. Pp.144. 7s. 6d.

Fr Reginald-Omez is clearly a man of unshakeable conviction. He believes in the occurence of telekinesis, levitation, radiesthesia, teleradiesthesia, telepathy, clairvoyance, extra-sensory perception, and all the rest of the stock-in-trade of the psychical researchers, the metapsychologists, parapsychologists, and psi-phenomenologists. And he still believes it all, apparently, even after the evidence he himself records of fraud, deception, negative results, inconclusive experiments and unscientific hypotheses.

It is astonishing that Messrs Burns and Oates should have published this work (in translation, by Renée Haynes) in their FAITH AND FACT series. Not that there is anything contrary to the faith in it, but that E.S.P. and the psi-function generally are constantly alleged to be facts whereas neither has ever been shown to exist. The translator says the psi-function ' has been proved to exist', ' has been established . . . in the context of biology' (p.9), and the author speaks of ' absolute proof ' (p.50), parapsychology ' has verified ' (p.127) its existence, and so on. This is not good enough. The author should know that mathematics of itself does not reach existential conclusions, and apart from the mathematics of Rhine and company, the only other evidence is anecdotal—and even the good Fr Reginald-Omez would be slow to accept anecdotal evidence for the establishing of ' scientific ' conclusions. What has been ' proved ' by the experiments of Rhine and his followers is the occurrence of correct guessing above the chance expectation, in a very few individuals. This could legitimately be interpreted to mean that the human being is not a random guessing machine (but that was known already). It does not establish the existence of PSI, ESP, PK, and the rest of the jargon. These remain hypotheses which *if they were true* would explain the phenomena. That is their scientific status, and Fr Reginald-Omez should have made that clear. They belong with phlogiston and ether, with Ptolemy's epicycles, and Aristotle's intelligences of the spheres.

In his handling of the ' evidence ' Fr Reginald-Omez tries to have it both ways : where the evidence appears to bear out the psi-hypothesis, he accepts it ; where it does not, the hypothesis is not rejected, but the evidence is (see p.51 and pp.54-55). He does not appear to understand the nature of statistical reasoning, a fault which he shares with many ESP men.

Clearly, ' thought-transference', whatever it may mean, is not metaphysically impossible for finite creatures, since presumably angels can communicate with each other, and perhaps disembodied souls can do likewise. That is not the problem of ESP, however. The problem is : can we, human beings in *statu viae,* communicate in this way ? Can we receive knowledge through channels other than the known sensory modalities, and without the stimulation of our receptors by any of the known physical or chemical stimuli,

and yet without the intervention of preternatural or supernatural power? That this happens is gratuitously asserted by all parapsychologists and psi-men, who appeal to a fluid, power, radiation, energy, magnetism, which is always unknown to science, has no physical properties, and belongs more properly to science fiction. Discussing Le Fluide, Fr Reginald-Omez astonishingly seems to accept it. How else interpret his sentence on page 112: 'Let us not take for paranormal what is no more than a little known manifestation of perfectly natural energy varying in intensity from one individual to another'?

It seems clear that nothing would induce him to relinquish his belief in the 'phenomena' he describes (and he will doubtless conclude that your reviewer is 'a victim of blinding prejudice, incapable of considering coolly and objectively the facts before him' (p.71)

I wish his translator had indicated exactly where she 'occasionally incorporated one or two sentences' of her own (p.7), and I wish her publishers had not included her rather tiresome footnotes (what is a 'schizophrenic distinction' (p.74)? and what is one to think of the 'projection of subconscious conflicts in telekinetic form' (p.106)?) I presume the author approves of her support of Rhine (p.78), and Dunne (p.123, p.142). But then, he himself supports Richet (p.26, seq.), while showing that 'Richet decided to keep silence' (p.70) about a famous piece of fraud described on the previous page.

Perhaps Fr Reginald-Omez can find some excuse for his beliefs in the fact that St Thomas Aquinas accepted water-divining and the influence of the heavenly bodies. Besides, I am told there are still some flat-earthers around.

E. F. O'Doherty

THOMAS AND THE PHYSICS OF 1958: A CONFRONTATION
The Aquinas Lecture, 1958. By Henry Margenau, Ph.D. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. 1958. Pp. 62 and viii

This is the 23rd in the series of Aquinas lectures delivered annually under the patronage of the Aristotelian Society of Marquette University. The speaker this year, Henry Margenau, is Professor of Physics and Natural Philosophy at Yale University, and has been recognized for many years as an outstanding worker in these fields. Among his most important publications are *The Foundations of Physics* (with R. Lindsay), and *The Nature of Physical Reality*. The genuine value of the present lecture lies in the clear exposition which it gives of Margenau's position as regards philosophy, science and their interrelation. Indeed, in this short work he succeeds in expressing his view point with a clarity that is not always present in his longer writings. His consideration of empiricist and positivist interpretations of human knowledge is good, as also is his treatment of pure perception.

Now, had the title of the lecture been 'Margenau and the Physics of 1958' all would have been well. Unfortunately however Aquinas figures in it, and the result is not a happy one, for, although Professor Margenau's competence in physics goes unquestioned, his knowledge of St Thomas appears difficient. As he says himself, he is 'a relative stranger' to St Thomas's writings, and under the challenge of the Aquinas Lecture his task was not an

easy one. ' Selecting what appears relevant portions of his (St Thomas's) writings for special study,' he says, ' I propose to confront his views on science with the physics of today.' He does this from two positions : first, viewing our science from the vantage point of St Thomas, secondly, seeing the work of St Thomas from the modern standpoint. It would seem, however, that his confrontation is not altogether adequate. A few points perhaps might serve to illustrate the foundation for such a criticism.

Margenau deals at some length with the problem of the reason's relation to sense. In doing so he considers Aristotle's ' intellectus agens', to which unfortunately he attributes functions which are by no means to be found in St Thomas's texts. For instance, in order to resolve an elementary confusion between the real as imagined and the real as understood—which confusion is the basis of Eddington's famous problem of the two desks, the ' ordinary ' one and the ' electron-etc.' one, which Margenau considers here—he appeals to the distinction between ' possible ' and ' agent ' intellect. In this of course he touches on an element of the truth, but one doubts whether this element is apparent to him, especially as he says later that ' the differentiating feature in experience is the function of Aquinas's factive intellect in one (kind) but not the other.'

Later he speaks of the ' metaphysical rules', which, he says, seem to change as man's understanding progresses : and he claims that in St Thomas's writings he has discovered no arguments against this. However, he does not enlarge on what he means by these variable metaphysical rules, but one suspects a neo-kantianism of the type echoed by the words of Einstein, ' we do not conceive of the ' categories ' as unalterable.'

On p. 41 Margenau, claiming that ' interesting things have happened with respect to the doctrine of creation', shows little appreciation of the questions involved in the *Summa Theologica,* and he goes on to discuss a piece of relativistic physics on matter-energy conservation which has as little to do with creation as pole-vaulting has with the growth of trees.

Margenau begins his last section—that in which he is to view St Thomas from the standpoint of modern knowledge—with an apology for the lack of reference to Aquinas. And rightly so. After some interesting remarks on scientific research the section proceeds to an allegorical consideration in which he sees the amorphous liquid mass of human experience as ordered, gradually and interminably, by the crystalline growth of science. He concludes by attributing to St Thomas the function of putting such a ' systematic structure into the shapeless mass of human experience available in his day '. Surely ' shapeless mass ' is a little strong : or are we to conclude that Aristotle, Augustine, Anselm or Abelard—to take only the first letter of the alphabet—had previously only stirred the amorphous liquid ?

These considerations have undoubtedly been very negative, but one must face the truth. Not only does the lecture give no coherent account of St Thomas's position in regard to modern physics but it conjures up an approach to reality which was far from Aquinas's mind. On the other hand, if one considers the philosophy of St Thomas in its full richness, its significance for science appears unquestionable, a significance not only as intelligible unification but also as normative and directive. This is so because St Thomas's

philosophy is not merely a system constructed to explain the real, but it is the explicitation of the radical structure of both knowing and being, forced on the thinker by the witness of his own consciousness. All occurrence is governed by that radical structure, hence it is ultimately explicable only in terms of that structure. An account therefore of the place of Aquinas's philosophy in modern physics without even an allusion to this basic explanation of material reality cannot be considered as adequate. However, Professor Margenau deserves credit for venturing into St Thomas at all, and his example should be an encouragement to both scientists and philosophers to come together more often, and to determine better where their respective fields complement each other in order that true progress may not be hindered by a lack of mutual understanding.

PHILIP MCSHANE

WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICS. By Lawrence Bright, O.P., S.T.L., M.A., D.Phil. London : Sheed and Ward. 1958. Pp. 48. 2s. 6d.

This is the third in a series of pamphlets published by Sheed and Ward in conjunction with the Philosophy of Science group of the Newman Association. The series aims at an examination of the roles and interplay of science and philosophy in the study of reality. The Philosophy of Science group has already done much in this line by establishing contact between scientists and philosophers, especially through their annual meeting at Hawkesyard Priory and by means of their Bulletin of which Fr Bright is the editor.

The present essay is a very successful attempt to bring the work of A. N. Whitehead in this field within easy reach. It is very welcome, partly because the philosophic work of Whitehead, especially that section treated of in this book, has not received the attention it deserves ; partly perhaps because of his strong criticism of theories about physics current in 1920 and now ; and partly because of the nature of his own system which is both difficult in itself and exacting in its demands on the theoretical physicist. Yet Whitehead's work is fundamental and searching and it is coloured throughout with his own deep appreciation of the complexity of the real and of the interplay of physics and philosophy necessary for its fuller understanding :

> the world around us is complex, composed of details. We have to settle upon primary types of detail in terms of which we endeavour to express our understanding of nature. We have to analyse and abstract and understand the natural status of our abstractions. At first sight there are sharp-cut classes within which we can sort the various types of things and characters of things which we find in nature. Every age manages to find modes of classification which seem fundamental starting points for the researches of the special sciences. Each succeeding age discovers that the primary classifications of its predecessors will not work. In this way a doubt is thrown upon all formulations of laws of nature which assume these classifications as firm starting points. A problem arises. Philosophy is the search for its solution.
>
> (Whitehead in *Nature and Life*, p. 9)

Fr Bright's pamphlet is welcome also because it helps to fulfil that very need for greater collaboration between philosopher and physicist which is being

increasingly felt and the need too for a more thorough understanding of the foundations of theoretical physics. This is most manifest to those working in the fields of Quantum Mechanics and relativity where such notions as 'reference frame', 'location' and 'continuity' are dominant. Indeed, it is from a lack of such an understanding that disputes arise regarding the 'paradoxes' of relativity, or indeterminacy in Quantum Theory. Thus, as Whitehead insists,

> we have to bend our energies to the enunciation of adequate concepts (*Concept of Nature*, p. 47).

and this is a task which belongs to neither physicist nor philosopher alone.

Fr Bright succeeds admirably in presenting a coherent account of Whitehead's position, most especially in his treatment of the 'Theory of Internal Relations'. The whole is presented objectively without critical assessment. The element of caricature that results from the necessary condensation is small, and constant reference to Whitehead's works will enable the interested reader to pursue in the original any line he desires. This is all the more necessary since the writer does not give any detailed consideration to Whitehead's specifically physical theories but prefers, for brevity's sake, to expose only their foundation.

PHILIP MCSHANE

RELIGION

THE APOCRYPHA OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. Revised Standard Version. vi and 250 pp. London : Thomas Nelson and Sons. 1957. 18s.

OUR BIBLE AND THE ANCIENT MANUSCRIPTS. By Sir Frederick Kenyon. Revised by A. W. Adams. Introduction by G. R. Driver. 353 pp. 48 plates. London : Eyre and Spottiswode. 1958. 42s.

DOCUMENTS FROM OLD TESTAMENT TIMES. Translated with introductions and notes by members of the Society for Old Testament Study, and edited by D. Winton Thomas. London : Thomas Nelson and Sons. xxvi and 302 pp. 16 plates. 18s.

These Protestant books deal respectively with the contents, the text and the history of the Bible. We take the liberty of calling them Protestant, in spite of their being primarily works of scholarship, because of their relevance to the present spurt of interest in ecumenical unity. When differences between Catholic and Protestant are discussed, by an Ecumenical Council or the 'World Council of Churches', the Bible must come up. Many will assume that the Bible makes all the difference : 'Protestantism is founded on the Bible, Catholicism on the rock of Peter.' Or : 'One believes the Bible, or submits to the Church.' Or : 'The Church is Apostolic—The Church is scriptural.' But each of the books under review gives warning of a more complicated pattern of relationship between Church and Bible.

To begin with *Documents from Old Testament Times.* These are texts from the countries involved somehow with Israel, or from Israel itself, where archaeology provides non-Biblical matter, e.g., the potsherds with messages inked on them, which passed between the Israelite commanders as invading armies closed in on them in 590 B.C. The foreign documents include the Law Code of Hammurabi, Egyptian 'Proverbs' and Accadian epics of creation

and deluge. They have a bearing on the Bible, much as the State Papers of Elizabeth I and Holinshed's *Chronicles of Scottish History* have on Shakespeare's *Macbeth*. The contributors (twenty-one experts) try to show the relation of the documents to Old Testament history and literary *genre*. The selection and treatment of the texts is admirable. It is ' designed to meet the needs of teachers of Scripture in schools, of the clergy, and of others who are not professional scholars.' But the very elaborateness of the apparatus, not the first of its kind, but certainly the handiest and cheapest, would revive in any context, and especially in the ecumenical one, the question of ' the Bible alone'. This book in fact asserts that the reader of the Bible needs more than simple faith to reach its religious message. Advanced scholarship is undoubtedly a help.

Sir Frederick Kenyon's book has been a classic for sixty years. It explained to the English-reading public how the ancient sacred books came down substantially unscathed to the printed pages of ' Our Bible '—principally the Authorized Version of 1611. But Kenyon wrote from a partisan viewpoint, common enough in 1895, when the book first appeared. For him the history of the Bible became the long struggle of the Christian to have the Bible in his own hands and in his own language, against the timid obscurantism of the Church.

The book refutes itself, since it describes over twenty vernacular translations long before the Reformation and twenty-four continental translations in the century before Luther, besides English ones. However, Kenyon makes it clear that he thought the religious millenium came in only with the Authorized Version and the like, when the Scriptures were at last ' known to all classes of men directly, and not through the medium of men's instruction '. Not till the Revised Version changed the language and text of the old familiar book did the public apparently need instruction again. Kenyon then undertook a comprehensive introduction to the Bible, with emphasis on textual criticism, especially of the New Testament. He was a master in that field, as his edition of the great Chester Beatty papyri was to show.

Dr Adams, an expert on the ancient Greek and Latin texts, has now brought the book abreast of the latest research and discoveries. He has added sections on ancient writing which include even the decipherment of the Minoan Script, and the Dead Sea Scrolls are of course discussed. The only noticeable gap in Dr Adams's revision is the omission of all reference to the Persian *Diatessaron* (Gospel Harmony). He might well, however, have eliminated the legend that the Jesuits suppressed, out of spite, the Vulgate of Sixtus V, in 1591. The whole story is not very edifying, which is perhaps why Kenyon lingered over it, but since it is still there at length, we may recall two of the main facts. One is that the chief Jesuit concerned, St Robert Bellarmine, went so far in ' covering up for ' Sixtus V that the *advocatus diaboli* charged him with equivocation when Bellarmine came up for canonization. The other fact is that it was the Venetian ambassador, acting for the Venetian printers against the monopoly conferred on the Vatican press, who caused Sixtus's Vulgate to be withdrawn. One would also like to see Kenyon's strictures on the Douai Version balanced by a word of appreciation for the text of the New Testament, which was, in the Gospels

particularly, by far the best text generally available for nearly three hundred years.

After history and text we come to the contents of the Bible. The Revised Standard Version, a combined operation of American scholarship, produced in 1952 what may well be said to be the best ever English translation. It left out the ' Apocrypha', possibly in deference to the Puritan Westminster Confession of 1648, which claimed authority to define the canon of scripture and to put the books of Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, Maccabees, etc. on its Index. They now appear in a supplementary volume, expertly translated from the basic Greek and Hebrew texts, which will be practically indispensable to students of the Bible, and of particular interest to Catholics. A short preface gives a plain and fair history of the place of these books in the canon of Scripture, though one must protest against the statement that ' they are not included in the Hebrew Canon of Holy Scripture.' That Hebrew Canon—more correctly, Pharisee Canon—is a very doubtful quantity. And the question arises, even more insistently than with regard to the meaning of sacred history or the precise form of the text : who is to determine what books are canonical and what is their authority and meaning ? Sound scholarship, such as we have in the books under review, will have much to say in the ecumenical debate. But the Church's understanding of itself, its doctrines and its sacred books will always have to be taken into account. KEVIN SMYTH.

JUNG AND ST PAUL. By David Cox. London : Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd. 1959. Pp. xiv and 357. 32s.

THE great Dr Jung has a strange fascination for theologians. This is due in part to the fact that Jung himself has several times asked for the co-operation of theologians in unravelling the problems of the human psyche. But it is also due to the fact that he has his own theories about the nature of religion, and the function of religion in therapy. It would appear that the nature of these theories was not clear to theologians : some of whom seem to have thought that Jung was on the side of the angels, defending the faith against the arch fiend of Vienna. Indeed, they might be forgiven for taking up this attitude, since a good deal of the language of Jung reads like a defence of religion, and of its importance in mental health, as against the Freudian version that religion is itself a neurosis, an illusion, which with more and better analysis, will pass away. The odd thing is that Fromm might very well be right in contending that Freud is the lesser menace. Freud was concerned with the analogies between neurotic behaviour and some ' religious ' practices. Beginning with materialism and atheism, it was inevitable that he would deny all objectivity to religion. But the advantage of this is that his reader knows where he stands. It is otherwise with Jung. He constantly reiterates his contention that he is an ' empirical psychologist '. But he is more than this in fact : he is basically a Kantian philosopher, and an agnostic. It is possible also that he is an atheist, since ' god ' is a projection of an unconscious fantasy : the differences between ' gods ' being constituted apparently by their efficacy in integrating the different parts of the psyche.

There have been several books recently on Jung, psychology, and religion (see Fathers White, Hostie, Goldbrunner, among others). The work under

review here is by an Anglican divine, who modestly claims that if he had any special qualification for entering this arena, it would be that he was not a psychologist (preface, p. ix). But he has done a very fine job.

There are two things about this book which set it apart from the average run of works on this topic. One is the fact that the author set himself a more limited task than that undertaken by others. Instead of the whole range of psychology and religion, he has dealt only with the relation between two doctrines : Jung's concept of the individuation process whereby we become the sort of men we ought to be, and St Paul's concept of justification, which again makes us the sort of men we ought to be. The other fact which sets this book apart is the use of linguistic analysis to clear up a good deal of the ' mysticism ' of Jung's private language. This is a very powerful weapon in the hands of Mr Cox.

The general thesis of the book is that Jungian analysis, leading to individuation, is not a substitute for justification : psychotherapy is not an alternative to Christianity. This is a timely conclusion. It would be wrong to suggest that some of our own theologians have made this mistake. But it is certainly true that many psychotherapists, and some psychoanalysts, have tended to think that their job was to produce the ' ideal man ', the ' good man ', and that this could be better done by analysis than by the grace of God. It is possible that Fromm, whom we have quoted with approval above, could be accused of this error. It seems quite certain that this is the fundamental error of Jung : whose ' therapy ' is a form of re-education, re-formation of the personality, to produce a sort of Stoic–Confucianist–Kantian–Buddhist–Humanist–Jungian–Christian. It is doubtful if therapy is the right word. The process seems to be not so much a curing of an ill, as a process of re-birth. The reader anxious to learn about Jung will find one of the best expositions in English in this book, and I say best advisedly : it is clear, accurate as far as one can judge, penetrating, sympathetic, and critical, where so many other expositions are woolly and worshipful. The device of expounding Jung, followed by a parallel exposition of St Paul on a similar or analogous topic, makes for easy and clear reading. (Easy and clear here do not mean that this is a popular work. On the contrary, it is a serious and difficult work. The publishers say ' any thoughtful person can read it without training in either Analytical Psychology or Theology ' but he would have to be a *very* thoughtful person in your reviewer's opinion).

The treatment of St Paul is naturally much less satisfactory from the Catholic point of view : and yet the author is at pains to try to do justice to this most difficult doctrine. He knows the Roman Catholic position, and quotes the Council of Trent, saying in a foot-note, page 103, that understood in Newman's way, ' the Tridentine formula expresses precisely the conclusion to which we come in the text '. (But it is hard to reconcile this with the statement on the next page : ' As a definition of the word used by St Paul . . . the formula of Trent must be dismissed, as it is by the consensus of non-Roman Catholic opinion, as a misuse of words.')

There are other points of some magnitude which one is worried about. The treatment of the good will (p. 148 *et alibi*), the apparent subjectivity of morals (p. 154), the use of the word ' myth ' (p. 122), would require lengthy

comment. But there are many good things: the application of the doctrine of ' logical constructs ' to the Jungian conceptions, the paragraph on Ryle (p. 58), above all the treatment of the concept of religion (p. 256, *seq.*) chez Jung. For this alone, the book is worthwhile.

One can only congratulate the author on a remarkable achievement and hope and pray that some Catholic theologian will do a like service to the Church.

E. F. O'Doherty

EAST TO WEST. A Journey round the World. By Arnold Toynbee. London : Oxford University Press. 1958.

CHRISTIANITY AMONG THE RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD. By Arnold Toynbee. London : Oxford University Press. 1958.

THE LORD OF HISTORY. By Jean Daniélou S.J. London : Longmans. 1958.

There was a time when a professor would give his lectures and forget about them. The custom may have lost us some good lectures — one would give a lot for Plato's — but it has surely saved us some very dispensable books. Now professors have grown more cautious. All three books under review show the marks of their origin as lectures or articles. It would have been a pity to miss *The Lord of History*, and Dr Toynbee's travel book is quite unique. But his little book on the comparative religion should surely have been content with the single life of the lecture hall.

It was an inspiration to send Dr Toynbee, with his prodigious stores of energy and learning, round the world. His itinerary, ranging non-stop for seventeen months over four continents, would be staggering even in a young man, much more so in one past the retiring age. This is travel in four dimensions : to and fro, as for most travellers ; up and down, in town and country, meeting the people, as only those can do who have languages or interpreters ; but also it is travel in time. Each land is seen in the receding panorama of its history, and in the imminent shadow of its future. The historian's view can bring the past startlingly close : ' If Jesus were to take ship from Tiberias today, seeking to land on the Syrian side of the Lake, He would draw fire from two alerted armies.'

For this reason the book should be a godsend to the teacher of history, and still more of geography, if that is not too grimy an end to suggest for it. For casual reading it is rather heavily loaded with historical and geographical comparisons, facts, and meticulously translitterated names.

Dr Toynbee's view of the future is apocalyptic : the prophet in him is always straining for utterance, and while his judgments are always plausible, they are too ready and too numerous to carry full conviction. And this meticulous historian is sentimental about the one matter in which sentimentality is unpardonable, about religion. The price is too high. We cannot afford to be anything but hard-headed in a matter that concerns eternal destinies. And why insert ' the City of God endureth for ever ' in a page of twentieth-century prose ?

His little book of Hewett lectures lends substance to one's misgivings. It is a restatement of religious indifferentism, which is new only in the author's

evident charity and the virtuosity with which he draws comparisons from many religions and cultures. But as in his previous book on religion, his concepts of religion and of Christianity are never defined and never clear. He treats Christianity as just another unsupported ' vision ' of God, rather than as an obedience to an unambiguous and unique self-revelation of God, based on ample historical arguments. Dr Toynbee in effect by-passes the Christianity of history and preaches another religion of his own making, which he still calls Christianity. The arguments are vitiated especially by a confusion of concepts. Myth is blandly equated with history, Adonis with Christ. Dr Toynbee pronounces on the problem of evil without showing any awareness of the traditional, carefully thought out Christian approach to it. On page 44 he defends a position of moral relativism which robs his own numerous value-judgments of their basis. In this field of revelation and comparative religion, so long and carefully explored by thoughtful men, goodwill alone will not equip a scholar. Dr Toynbee has here strayed outside his own wide province and paid the price in a *gaucherie* and imprecision unworthy of him.

It needs no violence to couple Fr Daniélou's book with Dr Toynbee's in the one review. Both authors are men of unusual learning, both feel the need to synthesize that learning into a *Weltanschauung*, and both are, partly on that account, unpopular, or rather suspect, with their colleagues in scholarship, Toynbee with the professional historians, Daniélou with the theologians. But where Dr Toynbee is seeking the historian's approach to religion, Fr Daniélou is coming the other way, seeking a view of history in the light of Christian revelation. His sub-title : ' Reflections on the Inner Meaning of History ', which would be enough to launch a Frenchman or a Russian on a glorious evening's argument, will set the noses twitching on many of our professional historians. If they do not deny the existence of such an inner meaning, they will certainly deny that they have the tools to discover it. Nor is this inner meaning of history the object of study in normal theological seminaries. Yet this book is certainly more than a piece of French theological ebullience. Among other things it is a precise statement of the relationship of Christianity to history. Whatever one's persuasion, one cannot pretend to discuss Christianity while ignoring, as Dr Toynbee does, this essential feature :

> The first characteristic of Christianity is belief in an event, the resurrection of Christ, which represents an incursion of God's action into the historical process, a radical change in the conditions of human life, an absolutely new thing. Here is a fundamental difference from all other religions . . . The great non-Christian religions know of an eternal world over against the world of time ; but they know nothing of an irruption of one into the other, giving substance and form to the flux of time, making it into history. (p.109)

A modern poet has written, of the moment when Christ was raised from the earth on Calvary :

> And it was noon,
> Noon of that day and the whole vast of time.

In Dr Toynbee's vision of history there is no noon. In the Christian vision, all time is seen in relation to that noon. The story of mankind is transformed

from a mere chronicle of events into a history of salvation, beginning with creation and culminating in Christ. This is the 'inner meaning of history' on which Fr Daniélou reflects. The themes of some of his chapters were obviously dictated not by the development of his own ideas, but by some book or author whom he discusses critically. To that extent the book is still clearly a series of lectures. Though the author would probably disagree, his discussion in the first part of various philosophies of history seems more substantial and valuable work than the second, in which he tries to interpret the types of the Old Testament—the Vineyard, the Exodus, the mystic numbers—in the light of Christian history and theology. The third part of the book is pure Pauline spirituality, on the virtues demanded of a Christian in this age. This is a very good book, a deep and yet stimulating book, which requires and well repays a second reading. The translation, by Nigel Abercrombie, is excellent.

PAUL ANDREWS

THE GREAT WEEK. An Explanation of the Liturgy of Holy Week. By Aemiliana Löhr. Translated by D. T. H. Bridgehouse. London: Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd. 1958. xii + 211 pp. 12s. 6d.

DAME AEMILIANA LÖHR is a Benedictine nun of the convent of Herstelle in north-west Germany and a disciple of the late Dom Odo Casel of Maria Laach Abbey, author of the well known *Das christliche Kultmysterium* (1932) and chaplain to the Herstelle community. In a foreword Dom Ralph Russell of Downside Abbey reminds us that, apart from one other work of Dame Aemiliana which was published in America some years ago, this is the first translation from the school of Maria Laach—which has contributed so much to the modern liturgical revival—to be given to the English-speaking public. *The Great Week* is a commentary on the Divine Office and the liturgical ceremonies of each day of Holy Week, from Palm Sunday up to and including the Easter Vigil. Its purpose is to lead the reader, through a better understanding of the ceremonies of Holy Week and a greater appreciation of their symbolism, to a more fruitful participation in them. It will not, however, be suitable as a simple guide to the Holy Week services for the ordinary layman. It presupposes a fair amount of familiarity with the liturgy of Holy Week and consequently it is to be recommended chiefly for priests and religious. They will find much in it to stimulate and deepen their own personal devotion and they will find it helpful too for the explanation of the Easter liturgy to others.

P. C. BARRY

GOD'S BANDIT: The Story of Don Orione, 'Father of the Poor'. By Douglas Hyde. London: Peter Davies. 1957. 15s.

THE HERMIT OF CAT ISLAND: The life of Fra Jerome Hawes. By Peter F. Anson. London: Burns and Oates. 1958. 21s.

CHARLES DE FOUCAULD. By Lancelot C. Sheppard. Dublin: Clonmore and Reynolds Ltd. 1958. 10s. 6d.

Three priests, one a man of action who finds strength and inspiration in prayer, the others contemplatives who must be active, are the subjects of these three books and unite them together. But in treatment they are poles apart.

Douglas Hyde has tried to make his book attractive and readable, but that effort has made it rather a disjointed work. After reading it you still feel that you do not know Don Orione and therefore still lack that admiration for him which attracted people to him in a remarkable way during his lifetime. To the author's credit he has tried to write critically, reacting strongly against the pious but unfounded stories which have grown up around this Italian priest. Don Orione founded a congregation of priests and another of nuns to look after the old, the sick, the insane, outcasts, and physical, social, and moral failures. Some-time communist Douglas Hyde in his last two chapters points the moral to be drawn from the life and work of Don Orione : even though the Welfare State may look after social justice, it leaves an open field for Christian Charity.

As the title implies this is meant to be a popular type of book, but it is priced out of the popular range in a way that is not justified by illustrations, extra care, or outstanding writing.

In *The Hermit of Cat Island,* Peter Anson gives a full picture of an extraordinary man, Mgr John C. Hawes who ended his life as Fra Jerome, a hermit in the Bahamas. Yet this Monsignor and hermit had once been an architect, a monk of Caldey, a beggar pilgrim in England, an Anglican missionary in the Bahamas, a parish priest in Australia. He was a man of vast activity, spiritual, missionary and architectural ; he had a fullness of interest in life, a great love of horses and dogs, of places and of the sea, of buildings and most of all, of people. Yet he was ready to give up all these to live a life of poverty, loneliness, hardship and prayer.

The book is well illustrated with pictures of the man and of his many works in stone, but over and above there are maps and drawings taken from Fra Jerome's letters and diaries. Most of the drawings are humorous, and more humour is to be found in the many quotations from the hermit's writings which are blended so well into the body of the book. Fra Jerome was no ordinary man but you cannot help getting to like his great human qualities in this book and acquiring at least an admiration for his high spiritual ideals.

Older eyes might cavil at the small print, but the book's sound worth and the pleasure it gives will amply compensate for that.

Fra Jerome's admiration for Charles de Foucauld might lead one to expect too much from the book by Lancelot Sheppard. Both these men were converts, one from heresy, the other from irreligion ; they left interesting letters, painted, built hermitages, tried to live under self-imposed inhuman orders of time which broke down under the pressure of ' works'. This is a short account of the life and work of de Foucauld, with some chapters at the end devoted to his considerable influence on people since his death in 1916. That you know little more of de Foucauld and his inspiration after reading this is due perhaps to the shortness of the account and the lack of life in the style. It seems unfair to such a great explorer and traveller that his life should appear without a single map or illustration.

PATRICK CROWE